ORISSA UNDER MARATHAS

(1751-1803)

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FOREWORD

In the eighteenth century the power of the Marathas was felt, either directly or indirectly, throughout the whole of India. Often hailed as liberators of their homeland from Muslim oppression, they do not always appear in such a role in other parts of India, and their rule was not always an unmixed blessing. Little has hitherto been written about their activities in Orissa, and my friend Dr. B. C. Ray has made a very valuable contribution to knowledge in throwing light on the Maratha regime in that region. His work deserves the serious attention of all students of Indian History.

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PREFACE

The second half of the eighteenth century formed an important period in the history of India. It saw the collapse of the Mughal imperial authority, expansion of Maratha imperialism and establishment of British power in India. There was occasional clash of these three important forces, one dying, offering feeble resistance, the other struggling hard against the more powerful non-Indian force.

Orissa was no exception to this. The period saw the end of the Mughal rule, Maratha assumption of power and their inability to successfully resist the diplomacy and well-organised force of the British. Political changes in the neighbourhood reacted on the economic condition of Orissa, which in its turn affected the social life of the people to some extent. The Maratha rule was a custodian and defender of what was time-honoured and indigenous. Particularly it added new vitality to the religious life of the people. But with the overthrow of the Marathas, the old ideas gave way to the new ideas from the West.

In this work an attempt has been made to analyse the Maratha rule in Orissa. Chronologically the work covers the period from 1751 to 1803. Geographically it relates to Orissa which was occupied by the Marathas after the treaty of 1751.

This work has been divided into six chapters. Chapter I deals with the advent of the Marathas. Chapter II describes the government of different Maratha Governors in chronology. It has been divided into nine sections. Chapter III analyses the conflict of interest of the British with that of the Marathas. Chapter IV concerns with the Maratha expulsion from Orissa. Chapter V deals with the administration and general condition of the people. It is divided into two sections. Section I relates to some aspects of administration and of society. Section

II deals with only communication. In Chapter VI an attempt has been made to bring these things together.

The history of this period had not been properly studied so long with adequate reference to the different kinds of original sources available to the students of history. For the first time, I have tried in my humble way to throw new light on this period of the History of Orissa. It is based principally on original sources.

The idea to work on the Marathas was given to me by the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar. The Jyana Vijyan Parishad of the Utkal University was very kind to award a grant to encourage me in this work. The work was discontinued for two years when I left India for my Ph.D. degree under the University of London. In London I got the privilege of collecting some useful materials in connection with this work from British Museum and India Office Library without which the work would have remained incomplete.

Some of the articles incorporated in this work have been published in some historical journals.

Ravenshaw College,
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April, 1960.

B. C. Ray

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CHAPTER I

Advent of the Marathas

The boundary of Mughal Orissa was not the same as that of the Hindu Orissa. During the rule of the Gangas, the kingdom of Orissa extended up to Tribeni ghat, above Hugli through Bishenpur to the frontier of Patkum in the north; sea in the east; the river Godavari in the south; a line carried from Singhbhum to Sonpur skirting Gangpur, Sambalpur and its dependencies, in the west. Later on the conquests under the Gajapati Kings of Orissa occasionally extended still further into the south. But as it appears, no firm footing in the new possessions could be obtained. During the rule of Akbar, Hugli and its ten dependent *mahals,* previously included in Hindu Orissa were added to Bengal.[1] Akbar's Orissa consisted of five Sarkars,[2] *viz.* Jaleswar, Bhadrak, Cuttack, Kalinga Dandapat and Raj Mahendri which stretched from Tamluk and Midnapur in the north to the fort of Raj Mahendri in the south. The hill countries stretching from Bishenpur to Karronde, Bastar and Jaypur were classified under a separate head in the revenue accounts of the empire. These countries were left to the entire management of the native chiefs who either rendered military service to the Mughal Governors or paid a light quit rent. During or soon after the settlement of Akbar the Sarkar of Raj Mahendri and that part of the Kalinga Dandapat Sarkar that lay on the south of Tikali Raghunathpur, were detached from Orissa owing to the encroachment of the Qutbshahi Kings of Golkunda. Later on the rising Hyderabad State that was established by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah, gradually managed to absorb whole of the country south of Chilka lake in Orissa.[3]

In the years 1706-7 Hijli and Tamluk with some other *parganas* were taken away from Orissa and added to

1 Stirling and Peggs, *Orissa,* pp. 11-2.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 12 f. Abul Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari,* Translated by H. S. Jarrett, Vol. II, p. 126.
3 Stirling and Peggs, *Orissa,* p. 12.

Bengal. A further change took place in the political geography of the country when Murshid Quli Khan, for the sake of financial convenience separated Midnapur from Orissa and annexed it to Bengal.[5] Thus the *parganas* in Jaleswar Sarkar as far as the river Subarnarekha, with the exception of the *pargana* Pataspur, and a few others, passed into the hands of the Bengal Government. At the end of the second half of the eighteenth century Muslim Orissa, strictly speaking, was bounded by the river Subarnarekha and *pargana* Pataspur and some other *parganas* in the north, the Chilka lake in the south, sea in the east and Barmul pass, the only chief entrance into this country through the chain of mountains, in the west. Although the southern frontier was protected by the establishment of an outpost at Malud,[6] nothing shows that there was any sincere attempt on the part of the government of the country to safeguard the western frontier in the difficult mountainous regions.

The statistics provided in Chahar Gulsan shows that Muslim Orissa covered an area of measured land amounting to 5,95,079 Birsingh Bighas which is difficult to be converted into acres.[7] The Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh assigns to this country a length of 120 coss and a breadth of 100 coss.[8] From these sources it is difficult to have an accurate idea of the area of the country. But from Grant's analysis we are able to form a fair knowledge about this. He says, "Orissa which was ceded by Aliverdi Khan to the Marathas included an area of 8,000 sq. miles and an extent of 200 miles sea coast from Pipli in Subernarekha to Malud on the frontier of Ganjam".[9]

4 Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the affairs of East India Company, 1812 (to be abbreviated as Fifth Report from Select Com........) (Appendix No. 4), p. 245.

Riyaz-us-Salatin Eng. Tr. (to be abbreviated as *Riyaz*. Eng. Tr.), 1904, p. 255.

6 J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 222.

7 *Chahar Gulsan* was written by Rai Chatar Man Kayath in 1720. In this work the above Birsingh Bighas have been converted to 9,01,26,259 Akbarsahi Bighas, which figure is found incorrect as verified by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, J. Sarkar, *India of Aurangzeb*, p. Lviii.

8 *Ibid.*, PL viii, p. 48. *Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh* is a work by Subhan Rai according to Elliot or Sujan Rai according to Bengal Asiatic Society Manuscripts.

9 Fifth Report from Select Com., p. 245.

In regard to the maritime activities and trade in this country during this period, Balasore on the river Barabalang, Pipli on the river Subarnarekha, and Harishpur on the river Patua were important ports which were outlets for the collection of commodities from the interior. The former two were more used for the export and import of goods than the latter. The state ships, ships of individual businessmen and the ships of foreign merchants including the English, Dutch, Danish and Portuguese were loaded and unloaded at these ports.[10]

Of all the ports on the coast of Orissa, Balasore was the most important. This was frequented by sloops from Madras, Ceylon,[11] Surat and Masulipatam.[12] Ships from Balasore sailed for Nigapatam, Batavia and Malaka.[13] The ships that were sent to the Thousand Islands called the Maldives fetched *kauris* and 'Cryre' (coir).[14] Rice,[15] cloth and salt[16] were important articles to be exported in plenty.

But in spite of such activities at the ports mentioned above, the old prosperity[17] of trade of Ancient Orissa was on decline for the following reasons.

Firstly with the change in the political geography of the country during the Muslim period some of the ports like Kalingapatam, Hijli and Tamluk, previously within

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10 My paper 'Shipping and Maritime activities in Orissa during Muslim rule' published in the proceedings of Indian History Congress, 14th Session, Jaipur, 1751.

11 Bernier, *Travels in the Mughal Empire*, p. 441.

12 *Siyar-ul-Mutakhedin* Eng. Tr. (to be abbreviated as *Siyar* Eng. Tr.), Vol. I, p. 352.

13 Niccolo Mannucci, *Storia Do Mogor* (1653-1708)—(Eng. Tr. Irvine), Vol. IV, p. 160.

14 Thomas Bowry, *A Geographical Account of the country round the Bay of Bengal* 1669-1679 (printed Hakluyt Soc.) pp. 172-80. Thomas Bowry writes, "The Nabob and some merchants here and in Ballasore (Balasore) and Piplo (Pipli) have about 20 saile (sails) of considerable burthen that annually trade to sea, some to Ceylone, some to Tanassaree (Tenasserium). Those fetch elephants and the rest 6 or 7 yearly goe (go) to 12000 Island called Maldiva to fetch couries and cayre (coir) and most commonly doe make very profitable voyages"; also *vide* Radha Kumud Mukherji, *Hist. of Ind. Shipping & Maritime Activities*, p. 234.

15 Pelsart's *Jahangir India*, p. 8.

16 Moreland, *From Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 12[illegible]

17 R. D. Banerjee, *History of Orissa*, Vol. I, pp. [illegible]4-8. In this chapter he shows how the people of Ancient Orissa (Kalinga) were prosperous in trade.

the limit of Orissa passed into the hands of the neighbouring states of Golkunda and Bengal. Thus the volume of the trade was affected.

Secondly the southern parts of Chilka and Puri lost their former importance, owing to the lack of royal patronage and the indifference of the Muslim Government with headquarters far away in Bengal in the north.

Thirdly the control of some important ports and strategic sea coast areas, together with the occasional imposition of a sort of ship money,[18] by the Muslim administrators over the mercantile community, limited their privileges to a great extent.

Lastly in consequence of the coming of the Muslim foreigners and foreign merchants like the English, Dutch, Portuguese and Danish into this country the trade and money were shifting hands from the old indigenous mercantile class to the Muslims and more particularly to the European trading merchants.

The revenue collected from the country at this period is variously stated by different authorities ranging from Rs. 31,43,316 to Rs. 1,00,02,625. Over and above the usual revenue the people paid, they were subject to many imposts. Some of these imposts were abolished by Aurangzeb.[19] But

[18] Thomas Bowrey, *A Geographical Account of the countries round the Bay of Bengal*, pp. 162-3.

[19] Revenue of Orissa (1594-1707).

1504 A.D. Rs. 31,43,316—*Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, pp. 141-44.
1648 A.D. Rs. 50,00,000—Abdul Hamid's *Badshah Namah*, II, p. 711.
1654 A.D. Rs. 5,63,500—*Dastar-ul-Aml*, used by E. Thomas.
1665 A. D. Rs. 72,70,000—*Bernier Travels*, p. 437.
1690 A.D. Rs. 35,70,500—*Dastur-ul-Aml*—British Museum Or MS. No. 1641, F. 5b.
1695-1700 A.D. Rs. 43,21,025—*Dastur-ul-Aml*, used by Thomas.
1695 A.D. Rs. 1,01,02,625—*Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh*, 32a.
1697-1707 A.D. Rs. 57,07,500—Mannucci, ii 414.
1707 A.D. Rs. 35,70,500—Ramusio.
1707 A.D. Rs. 35,70,275—Jagajivan Das—India Office MS. No. 1799, p. 5.
Tieffenthaler Rs. 35,70,525.

This list is compiled by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *vide* J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 240.

' The high figures excepting the figure in *Ain-i-Akbari* do not appear to indicate the standard revenue. They seem to have included the arrears of some previous years and tributes from tributary states.

new imposts were imposed on the people during the time of Murshid Quli Khan and Shujauddin Muhammad.[20] There was a tendency in many of the revenue officers to show an increased amount of revenue by coercing the people to pay more, for their higher promotion. During the diwanship of Hashim Khan certain *mahals* were reduced to desolation. Khan-i-Dauran writes to Aurangzeb, "He has increased the revenue (on paper) twofold in some places and threefold in the others, while the ryots unable to pay have fled (from their homes) and villages have turned into wilderness. It is impossible for me to report fully the grievances of the ryots, who having sold their wives and children have barely succeeded in keeping body and soul together".[21] Surplus revenue was despatched to the imperial treasury. At times the payment of revenue was made in kind in form of rice.[22] The country was at times visited by famine or scarcity.[23] Economically it was deteriorating.

With the Muslim conquest of Orissa, the power and position of the old nobles at the court of the Raja of Orissa began to decline. In many cases the people who were appointed as Governors of Orissa were recruited from the officers at the Court of Bengal. By the time they came over here to take up the administration, they brought many Muslim and non-Muslim Bengali friends and followers. Thus some of these people together with other people in the country who could win favour, from the Muslim Governors, either in form of *jagirs* or high salaried posts, rose in prominence and formed a new class of nobility in the country. During the rule of Murshid Quli Khan many officers' *jagirs* in Bengal, being turned into *khalsa* they were sent to enjoy *jagirs* in exchange, in Orissa.[24] This resulted in the transfer of some Muslim or non-Muslim Bengali families into the country. There was an addition of some Muslim or non-Muslim Bengalis to the original Oriya Hindu population in the country.

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20 Fifth Report from Select Com., p. 297.
21 J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 244.
22 J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 238.
23 A. B. Mahanty (ed.), *Madalapanji*, pp. 62, 67, 71.
24 J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 409.

It is during this period that many Muslim saints[25] came to this country. Some of them were granted villages[26] as Madadi-Maash and could be popular even amidst the Hindus by their austerity and miraculous performances. There are some places[27] in Orissa where the tomb of some Muslim saints are honoured and visited by some Hindus. The Satyapir Puja, which is respected by both Hindus and Muslims, in this province is the outcome of Hindu-Muslim contact.

All through the Muslim period the Hindus never felt very secure in the worship of their gods. During the rule of Hashim Khan, in fear of being dishonoured at the hands of the Muslims, the idol of Lord Jagannath was removed from the temple to the Gopal Ji Mandir at Khurda in Puri district.[28] When Mukarram Khan was the Subahdar of the country the idol of Sakhi Gopal was broken. The *Sebakas* of the temple of Lord Jagannath removed the idol to Gobarapada in Banapur circle in the Khurda sub-division, and this was brought back to the temple after the departure of the Subahdar.[29] When Shah Jahan, after his rebellion against Jahangir entered into Orissa through the Deccan in October, 1623, the idol of Lord Jagannath was removed from the temple and was worshipped at Manitiri, a village far away from the temple.[30] The temple of Kendrapara was broken and a mosque was built there in consequence of an order, issued by Aurangzeb for temple destruction in the country.[31] During the oppression of Taki Khan, the Muslim Subahdar of Orissa, the *Sebakas* took away the idol of Jagannath from the temple through the

25 J. Sarkar, *India of Aurangzeb*, p. XVII; Chahar Gulsan states about two saints. Sarkar refers to the following saints—Shaikh Abdul Khair, Shaikh Barkhurdar of Naqshabandi order and Hakim Muhammad Rafi, J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 246.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 426.

27 At Kaipadar in the Khurda Sub-division of the Puri district, there is such a tomb of a Muslim saint.

28 *Madalapanji*, p. 65.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 66.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 67.

31 J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 247.

Chilka lake and Banapur and kept it secure at Tikali[32] in the south, and there was a considerable decrease in the number of visitors to the temple of Lord Jagannath, as a consequence of which there was a loss of 9 lakhs of rupees to the revenue of the State, accruing from the pilgrims.[33]

The *paiks* or the landed militia were given lands, from very early time, by the Raja of Hindu Orissa for the performance of military duties. Though chiefly their occupation was to be acquainted with various techniques of land and naval warfare, still when there was no war at hand they took to cultivation.[34] As soon as Orissa was annexed to the Mughal Empire, the Raja's resources were found limited to show the same amount of encouragement to the *paiks* as before. Moreover the Muslim Governors brought their own soldiers with them,[35] and recruited or hired others from the country in their own way. This resulted in the gradual deterioration of the *paik* class.[36] There now developed a tendency in these people to look more to agriculture than before.

When we look to the political condition of the country towards the end of the second half of the eighteenth century it is seen that the hold of the Nawab of Bengal was growing weaker over the government of Orissa. This may be remembered that in the battle of Gheria which was fought between Sarfaraz, son of Shujauddin, and Nawab of Bengal, and Aliwardi Khan, Sarfaraz was defeated and killed. Aliwardi Khan seized the throne of Bengal and declared himself the master of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Rustam Jang originally known as Murshid Quli Khan II, son-in-law of Shujauddin, the Governor of Orissa was not prepared to recognise the authority of Aliwardi Khan. Consequently

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32 *Madalapanji*, p. 76; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 303. It says that during the commotion in Muhammad Taki Khan's time, the Raja of Purusottam (Puri) had removed Jagannath from the limits of the Subah of Orissa and had guarded it on the summit of a hill across the Chilka lake.

33 *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 303.

34 Stirling and Peggs, *Orissa*, p. 49.

35 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 355.

36 The deterioration of the Paik class has been deplored in a book *Paikakheda*, p. 60, written by Kanhai Champati, a writer in the 17th century. This is a rare work that gives a vivid picture of the organisation of local militia in ancient Hindu Orissa.

in a battle which was fought between Aliwardi Khan and Rustam Jang at Phulwari on 1741 the latter was defeated and fled away to the Deccan, with his son-in-law Mirza Baqar who felt much more wounded in his heart than his father-in-law, at their expulsion from Orissa.[37]

The Subahdari of Orissa now being vacant Aliwardi appointed Sayyid Ahmad Khan, his second son-in-law as the (Deputy) Governor of Orissa. This new Governor was assisted in his government by Gurjar Khan, at the head of an army of three thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry.[38]

For the sake of money and pleasure Sayyid Ahmad adopted three measures. Firstly he curtailed the salaries of his troops and bodyguards which brought discontentment for them. Many Bengal soldiers who found this change was not suitable for bettering their fortunes, left their service for return to their homes. This gap, thus created in the army was to some extent filled up by recruitment from among the natives who agreed to accept the reduced pay and some of them like, Salim Khan, Darvesh Khan, Nizamat Khan and Mir Azizullah[39] won reputation for their loyalty to Rustam Jang's government.[40]

Secondly houses of some rich persons suspected to have been the hoarding places of the wealth of the dispossessed Governor were raided by the troops. Thirdly this young Governor, ill-advised by a fakir named Shah Yahya could not check the temptation of procuring some girls for his harem, in a manner disgraceful to the prestige and sentiment of the people. So the people grew disgusted with him.[41]

Mirza Baqar knew this state of affairs in this country. He asked Rustam Jang to invade Orissa but on his refusal, he instigated the discontented people, who under the leadership of Shah Murad, the saviour of the family of Rustam Jang, gathered together in a conspiracy to break into open revolt against the government, in which they were joined

37 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 327-53.
38 *Ibid.*, p. 335.
39 *Ibid.*, p. 350-60.
40 *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 332.
41 *Ibid.*, p. 360-1.

by some native soldiers and some employees in Sayyid Ahmad's household. The plan was complete; one day in the month of August, 1741 the people revolted. Gurjar Khan and Husain Beg, another officer of the army were killed. Qasim Beg and Shaikh Hadiatullah were sent to repulse the insurgents but they could not control the situation. Rather the former was killed and the latter, being wounded, fled away. In time Mirza Baqar marched to Cuttack, imprisoned Sayyid Ahmad with his children, wife and relatives in the fort of Barabati, made himself the master of the country.[42] Then he conquered Midnapur and Hijli by sending his forces.[43]

Hearing the news of the death of Gurjar Khan and imprisonment of Sayyid Ahmad, Aliwardi, with his army soon proceeded towards Cuttack. He met Mirza Baqar with his force at Riapur,[44] at a small distance from the city of Cuttack. Sayyid Ahmad was seated on a four-wheeled carriage, surrounded by five hundred Deccani troopers[45] with instruction from Mirza Baqar to make an end of him as soon as Aliwardi's men would be nearer to them for his rescue. But at the sight of a huge army, Mirza Baqar was dispirited and fled away into the Deccan with the Deccani allies, by the help of Shah Murad, Commander of the Raja of Puri[46] possibly in the first part of December, 1741.[47]

After the rescue of Sayyid Ahmad, Aliwardi inflicted severe punishment on the friends of Mirza Baqar. He appointed Shaikh Masum[48] to govern Orissa. He left Cuttack with determination to suppress the Raja of Mayurbhanj who recently helped Mirza Baqar against him, on his way to Bengal.[49]

This was the political condition of Orissa when the Marathas appeared. The following are the reasons why an invasion was made into this country.

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42 *Ibid.*, pp. 362-4.
43 *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 333.
44 Coast and Bay Abstract Letters Aug., 1734—Feb., 1743, Vol. IV, p. 391 (Bengal Letter to Court 23rd Dec., 1741).
45 These Deccani troopers were Marathas—*Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 366-7.
46 *Riyaz*. Eng. Tr., p. 336.
47 Bengal Letter to Court 23rd Dec., 1741.
48 *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 337; *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 370.
49 *Ibid.*, p. 337.

First Raghuji Bhonsla, the Raja of Nagpur who failed to dominate over Shahu, owing to superior talent and ability of his rival, Baji Rao was contemplating plunder towards the north-east of his dominion.[60]

Secondly it was just possible that Nizam-ul-Mulk of Hyderabad who was always in fear of Maratha raids was all the more instigating Raghuji in his design.

Lastly, when the relatives and faithful followers of the dispossessed Governor of Orissa, persuaded him in this matter, he entrusted Bhaskar Pandit, his prime minister with the task of invading the kingdom of Aliwardi.[61] Bhaskar entered into Orissa, possibly through Barmul pass on the ill-defended western frontier at the head of an army.[62] The fort of Barabati was taken on 19-4-1742.[63] Masum was embarrassed at the approach of the Marathas, four times superior in number to his own. He fled towards mountains leaving the country defenceless.[54] Then Bhaskar moved towards Panchet; Midnapur, Burdwan as far as Balasore were systematically plundered and fell into his possession.[55] Maratha detachments were busy in plundering countries as far as the river Ganges towards Murshidabad all through the rainy season.[56]

Soon after the rainy season the Marathas were defeated in an engagement near Katwah[57] by Aliwardi from where they fell back to Ramgarh to ravage Orissa.[58]

Masum had fled away from Cuttack at the first appearance of the Marathas. Meanwhile he gathered strength and encamped at a place[59] near Cuttack with a number of

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60 G. S. Sardesai, *New Hist. of Marathas*, Vol. II (1948), p. 208.
61 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 375-6; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 338.
62 *Ibid.*
63 S. L. Vaidya (ed.) *A selection of papers from Vaidya Daftar* (to be abbreviated as Vaidya Daftar), Vol. IV, 16 May, 26, 1742—Letter No. 16.
54 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 395.
55 *Ibid.*, *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 343-4; Bengal Letter to Court, 30 Oct., 1742, para 6 & 25.
56 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 396.
57 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 403; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 345.
58 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 404-5; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 346.
59 This is called 'Hariharpur' according to *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 405.

men to oppose Marathas. The Marathas fell upon him and he was killed. Thus Cuttack together with fort of Barabati fell into their possession.[60]

On hearing the death news of Masum, Aliwardi marched with his army, towards Midnapur. At this Bhaskar was frightened. So he fled to Balasore. Hotly pursued by the Nawab's soldiers, he with the Marathas ran into the Deccan by crossing Chilka on the southern boundary of Orissa.[61]

Aliwardi stayed at Cuttack for about two months for restoring his authority. Before his departure from Cuttack, the post of deputy governorship was given to Abdul Nabi Khan, uncle of Mustafa Khan, a powerful Afghan leader in the Court of Murshidabad. Considering his administrative inexperience, Raja Durlabhram was appointed as his *peshkar* or agent.[62]

Soon after the departure of Aliwardi, Raghuji invaded Orissa with a big army and captured Cuttack.[63] He left Bhaskar at Midnapur;[64] he then proceeded to Katwah for exacting the *chauth* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from Aliwardi. By this time Peshwa Balaji Rao agreed to drive Raghuji from Bengal on an application from the Delhi Emperor. Accordingly after his march to Murshidabad Peshwa entered into a conference with Aliwardi Khan at Plassey on 31st March, 1743 in which the latter agreed to pay the *chauth* of Bengal to Raja Sahu and 22 lakhs of rupees to Balaji for the expenses of his army.[65]

Then the two allies decided to drive Raghuji from Bengal; so Raghuji in fear soon left Katwah and went back to Nagpur. Bhaskar also raised his camp from Midnapur and followed his master.[66]

On 31st August, 1743 a compromise was effected between the Peshwa and Raghuji at the suggestion of Raja

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60 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 405; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 346.
61 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 406; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 347.
62 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 406.
63 *Vaidya Daftar*, Vol. IV, 6 May, 1743, Letter No. 14; Bengal Letter to Court 13th Aug., 1743.
64 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 420.
65 Bengal Letter to Court 13th Aug., 1743.
66 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 421.

Sahu. As a result, Bengal, Orissa and the portion east of Patna was assigned to the latter. So Bhaskar invaded Orissa on his way to Bengal through Midnapur.[67]

Aliwardi was very much worried at his heart, at the repeated Maratha invasion. He invited Bhaskar to an interview for settling the question of *chauth*. A meeting was arranged on 31st March, 1744 at Mankora. Bhaskar was treacherously massacred there with twenty-three of his captains. At this the Marathas fled away to Nagpur from both Bengal and Orissa.[68]

In spite of the flight of Marathas, the political condition of Orissa did not improve. Mustafa Khan rebelled against Aliwardi.[69] Abdul Nabi Khan could not decide as to which side he would join in the struggle between the two rivals. He died in a state of mental embarrassment after a slight indisposition of three or four days. He was succeeded by his son Abdul Rasul in the deputy governorship of Orissa. But soon he left the service in response to a call from his uncle Mustafa to fight against Aliwardi. Orissa was thus left without a ruler. So Raja Durlabhram was appointed to that office with a brigade of three thousand horse.[70] Some spies were employed by Raghuji who lived in Orissa in the disguise of *sanyasis*. They were supplying information concerning the conduct of Durlabhram and the weakness of his government.[71] During this time, in order to take revenge on Aliwardi Mustafa Khan invited Raghuji to invade Bengal. Raghuji who never forgot the treacherous death of Bhaskar marched at this opportune time at the head of fourteen thousand horse,[72] and crossing the mountain tracts and leaving Sambalpur on the left reached Orissa on March, 1745.[73]

At the time when the Marathas reached the frontier of Orissa, Durlabhram was busy with sanyasis on the 'shore'

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67 *Ibid.*, p. 460.
68 Bengal Letter to Court 3rd Aug., 1744; pp. 434-5, *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., pp. 434-5; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., pp. 348-9.
69 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., pp. 439-44; *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., pp. 351-3.
70 *Ibid.*, p. 445.
71 *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 2.
72 *Ibid.*, p. 3; *Riyaz*. Eng. Tr., pp. 349-50.
73 *Vaidya Daftar*, Vol. IV, 12 May, 1745 Letter (to be abbreviated, henceforward as L), No. 22.

of river Mahanadi, without any knowledge of their approach. Mir Abdul Aziz, a brave officer, learnt that the Marathas were near. He first ordered his troops to be ready for fight. Then he went to the house of Durlabhram and found him fast asleep. It is only when there grew commotion in the city, he got up and came out half-naked without a turban, in a *palkey* to take shelter in the fort of Barabati. But at the sight of some Marathas plundering the people, he was completely nervous and was too frightened to move. When he was assisted by Abdul Aziz's troops and later on by his own troops and was further encouraged by the daring words of Abdul Aziz, he took heart and managed to go safe to enter the castle.[74] Soon Raghuji arrived and besieged the fort. As soon as Durlabhram understood that no reinforcement was likely to be sent from Aliwardi because of his expedition against Mustafa, he was afraid of his safety. He soon decided to surrender under the influence and advice of some *sanyasis* and some of his officers in spite of vehement opposition by Abdul Aziz. Accordingly, he was out to pay a visit to Raghuji with some of his officers. He left Abdul Aziz inside with three or four hundred of his followers. He paid a visit to Raghuji in a conference there; he and his followers were invited to an entertainment, in which they forgot all about themselves and laid out their arms. Soon they were found prisoners in the Maratha camp.[75]

Yet it was not easy for Raghuji to capture the fort which was stubbornly defended by Abdul Aziz. Raghuji sent his own brother along with some followers of Durlabhram to persuade him to surrender, but he did not listen to it. So the siege operation continued. At the same time Maratha raiding parties were sent to occupy whole of Orissa as far as Midnapur and Hugli. A major portion of Burdwan was too plundered.[76]

The rainy season stood in the way of Aliwardi to take any measure against the Marathas. He sent a man, named

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74 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 3.
75 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
76 *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

Munamanly Khan to Raghuji for negotiation but Raghuji's demand of three crores of rupees as compensation could not settle the matter.[77] When the provisions ran short Abdul Aziz was forced to surrender the fort on 12 May, 1745,[78] to the Marathas after a brave defence for two months. Then the Marathas moved to Burdwan.[79]

It is during this time Murtaza Khan, son of Mustafa, Buland Khan and a few other Afghans who rebelled against Aliwardi invited Raghuji to Bihar for their rescue. Raghuji marched and joined them.[80] But Aliwardi by pursuing, met him in an indecisive battle at Mehib Alipur[81]; from there he ran towards Murshidabad on 21st Dec., 1745. Aliwardi gave Raghuji a crushing defeat at Ramdighi near Katwah.[82] Raghuji left the place for Nagpur in disgust in the month of January, 1746. Before his departure he entered into an agreement with Mir Habib that he should pay eleven lakhs of rupees for the use of his army in acquiring the possession of Orissa.[83] Three thousand Maratha horsemen and six or seven thousand Afghans were left under the command of Mir Habib. With them, he plundered and took possession of Orissa and stationed soldiers at Midnapur, where they were joined by some Afghans dismissed by Aliwardi.[84]

The activities of the Marathas on the frontier of Orissa forced Aliwardi to take some measures. Sayyid Ahmad Khan was appointed as the Governor of Orissa and Mir Jafar was made his deputy, who at the head of seven thousand horse and twelve thousand foot, marched from Murshidabad in the month of November, 1746. After

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77 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 6.

78 *Vaidya Daftar*, Vol. IV, July 13, 1745, L. No. 29.
" July 24, 1745, L. No. 31.
" " May 12, 1745, L. No. 23.

79 *Vaidya Daftar*, Vol. IV, 2 Aug., 1745, L. No. 32.

80 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 7.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

82 *Ibid.*, p. 12, p. 14.

83 *Selections from Peshwa's Daftar*, Vol. 20 (1717-74), L. No. 41.

84 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 23.

a few days' march (early in the month of December) he inflicted a crushing defeat on a body of Marathas at Midnapur,[85] in which, some officers of Mir Habib were killed.[86] The Marathas fled towards Balasore through Jaleswar. At a distance of two miles from Balasore town, on the bank of the river, Barabalang Mir Habib encamped with 8,000 horse and 20,000 foot. There he was busy in raising batteries in order to oppose Mir Jafar. Vessels were also fitted with cannons.[87]

Mir Jafar advanced some distance. He encamped on the northern side of Kenhasa (Kansai) river. Here he got report that Januji had already reached Cuttack with a large army to help Mir Habib. He suddenly decamped from his post and marched back to Burdwan. He was hotly pursued by the vanguard of Januji's army; some of his baggage and elephants were captured.[88] Attaulla Khan and Fakrulla Khan were sent by Aliwardi to assist him. They fought an indecisive battle with Januji but soon entered into a conspiracy to divide the kingdom of Aliwardi by assassinating him.[89] Therefore Aliwardi himself led the army to encounter the Marathas. After furious contests between Aliwardi and Januji, the latter took the road to Midnapur; the rainy season having set in Aliwardi, too, returned to Murshidabad. The Marathas were thus left master of Orissa up to Midnapur all through the year 1747.[90] From here straggling parties were sent to Dacca and Murshidabad to plunder. Then Januji and Mir Habib proceeded to Patna. They formed a junction with Shamshir Khan and other Afghans, who rebelled against Aliwardi.[91] Aliwardi pursued and defeated them at Rani Sarai on 18 April, 1748. After his flight from the battlefield, Januji had a plan to plunder Murshidabad in Aliwardi's absence. But

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85 *Ibid.*

86 Bengal Letter to Court 22nd Feb., 1747, para 110.

87 *Ibid.*

88 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 24.

89 *Ibid.*, p. 25.

90 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

91 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

he went to Nagpur[92] at the death-news of his mother. Mir Habib was left behind with a Maratha force at Midnapur.[93] A few days after, one of the younger sons of Raghuji was sent from Nagpur to assist Mir Habib in Orissa.[94] During this period Midnapur remained the headquarters of the Marathas.[95]

Aliwardi returned from Bihar. He sent Hyder Ali Khan with 8,000 soldiers in advance towards Burdwan to check the advance of the Marathas from the side of Orissa. In the middle of March, 1749 he himself left the capital to drive them out. At Burdwan Hyder Ali did not obey the orders of the Nawab to accompany him to Midnapur as the arrear-pay of his troops had not been cleared off.[96] Aliwardi continued in his march without waiting for him and reached Balasore on 8 May, 1748. He sent a part of his forces which drove away a party of Marathas who were making arrangements to enter and plunder the English Factory under the command of Nilla Pandit.[97] Here he learnt that Mir Habib had fled into the jungles of Cuttack.[98] So he crossed the two branches of Baitarani river at Bhadrak and proceeding further encamped at Bara about 36 miles north of Cuttack.[99] He made a regular search in the dense forest for the Marathas. But he could not get any trace of them. Then he started with 2,000 horse for a surprise attack on the fort of Barabati. On his arrival at noon 17 May, 1749 at Cuttack he found that in consequence of the tiresome march of eighteen hours his army had been reduced to 300 only.[100] Sayyid Nur, Dharma Das and Sarandaz Khan of the fort of Barabati, who were ignorant of this fact made

92 *Ibid.*, pp. 53-6.

93 *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.

94 *Siyar* refers to Bimbaji, *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 77.

95 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

96 *Ibid.*

97 Bengal Letter to Court 10th Aug., 1749, para 3, No. 30; J. Long (ed.)—*Selections from Unpublished Records*, Vol. I, No. 30.

98 He fled with Manaji.

99 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 79.

100 *Ibid.*, p. 80.

a decision to surrender the fort the next day. Accordingly when the three came for an interview with Aliwardi for this purpose, the former two were imprisoned and the latter who offered resistance during his arrest was killed. The garrison in the fort grew furious at these treacherous deeds and consequently the gates were closed. After a heroic defence of fifteen days, the fort was lastly surrendered to Aliwardi on condition that no injury should be done to any of the garrison either in person or in fortune.[101]

After settling matters Aliwardi offered the deputy governorship of the country first to Mir Jafar and then to Durlabhram.[102] They were unwilling to accept this post, in fear of the attack of 7,000 or 8,000 Marathas, concealed in the neighbouring jungle. So a beggar named Shaikh Abdus Subhan was ultimately appointed. Aliwardi marched quickly towards Bengal in June, 1749 to avoid the difficulty of crossing over a number of raging streams on the way during the rainy season.[103]

Only six or seven days after the departure of Aliwardi, Mir Habib appeared at the head of a number of Marathas at Cuttack. He attacked Subhan Khan, who offered a gallant resistance receiving seven wounds in the body and losing the use of his arms. Lastly he was overpowered and taken prisoner.[104]

Aliwardi received this news at Balasore on 16 July, 1749. As his troops were completely fatigued and rainy season had set in, he postponed the recovery of Cuttack. He continued his homeward march. On the way his people had to cross the little river of Termahan upon rafts made of pieces of trees and timber. Hundreds of horses and other animals were drowned in the water.[105] At the beginning of July, he reached Murshidabad where he fell ill till October, 1749.

101 *Ibid.*, p. 802.
102 *Bengal Public Consultations*, 29th May, 1749; J. Long, *Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 45; p. 10, *Bengal Public Consultations*, 1749, p. 10; *Bengal & Madras Paper* Vol. II, 1688-1757, Part I, p. 68.
103 *Siyâr*, Eng. Tr., p. 83.
104 *Ibid.*, pp. 84-5.
105 *Ibid.*, p. 84.

After the subjugation of Cuttack, an advanced Maratha force under the command of Mir Habib and Mohan Singh marched towards the north and encamped at Balasore on 17 October, 1749. When the rearing guards consisting of Pathans joined them, they altogether formed an army of forty thousand men.[106] After ravaging Orissa, they began raid upon Bengal at the end of February, 1750. Murshidabad along with neighbouring places was subject to occasional raids.[107]

Aliwardi recovered from ill-health. Then he marched from Murshidabad to Katwah; thence he proceeded to Midnapur via Burdwan, to drive out the Marathas. At his approach, the Marathas ran away. They concealed themselves in the jungles. Aliwardi passed over the little river Kahnsai; he encamped on its other side. He appointed Ali Quli Khan, *faujdar* of Midnapur, to establish a permanent army headquarters there for that season. Dost Muhammad and Mir Qasim were sent ahead to gather intelligence about the enemy. Siraj-ud-daulah at the head of an army was ordered to follow them.

At the sight of the Siraj-ud-daulah's force, the Marathas fled.[108] He pursued them for some distance and then encamped at the port of Balasore. Aliwardi could not stand the separation of his beloved grandson; so he soon issued an order for his retreat. He met Siraj-ud-daulah at Narainpur by long marches towards Balasore.[109]

In March, 1750, while Aliwardi was at Midnapur, the Marathas marched towards Murshidabad plundering all the way. At this news Aliwardi decamped from Midnapur and came to Burdwan wherefrom he learnt that the Marathas had run away into the hills and jungles.[110] It is during this time, that the Marathas again appeared at Midnapur. Aliwardi marched back from his camp and they fled away.[111] He could not stay there long because of

106 *Bengal Public Consultations*, 26th Oct., 1749; p. 20.
107 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 86.
108 *Ibid.*, p. 87.
109 *Ibid.*, p. 88.
110 *Ibid.*, p. 90.
111 *Ibid.*, p. 93.

an unexpected danger that entailed a conspiracy of Siraj-ud-daulah with Mahdi Nisar Khan to seize the throne of Bihar, from Nawab's agent Janakiram.[112] So he left the troops at Midnapur to the charge of Durlabhram and Mir Jafar. After instructing them to drive out the Marathas from Balasore he marched to Patna. Here he fell ill.[113]

Durlabhram and Mir Jafar grew nervous at the news of the illness of Aliwardi and could do nothing to check the Maratha raids. Aliwardi, who had not yet fully recovered to his normal health, proceeded in December, 1750 with a big army to Midnapur. He chased the Marathas on and on till they returned to Orissa. He was very tired; so he returned to Murshidabad.[114]

The circumstances that led to a treaty between Aliwardi and the Marathas may be summarised in the following manner.

By this time Aliwardi was an old man of 75 suffering from physical ailment and infirmity. The fall of Hazi Ahmad[115] and Zainuddin Muhammad, the revolt of the chief Afghan pillars of the State and his inability to pay the soldiers in the protracted war with Marathas, broke down his spirit. He wanted rest and his own people, who were much troubled, desired peace.[116] The Marathas were defeated several times at the hands of Aliwardi; so they were also tired of war.

Both the parties were now inclined for peace. Mir Jafar on behalf of the Nawab and Mirza Saleh on behalf of Mir Habib and the Marathas carried on the detailed negotiation for a treaty; the draft of this treaty was first made at Murshidabad and then finally approved and signed by both the parties.[117] The terms of the treaty as described by Ghulam Husain Tabatabai are given below :

1. Mir Habib was to be regarded as a servant of Aliwardi and had to rule over Orissa on his behalf. He would

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112 *Ibid.*, pp. 94-102.
113 *Ibid.*, p. 109.
114 *Ibid.*, p. 110.
115 *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 361.
116 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., p. 111.
117 *Ibid.*, pp. 111-2.

spend the (surplus) revenue of the province for payment of arrears to Raghuji's troops.

2. Twelve lakh rupees should annually be paid to Raghuji "on condition that the Marathas would not set their foot within the dominions of Aliwardi".

3. River 'Sonamukia' which runs near Balasore was to form the demarcating line between the boundaries of Orissa and Bengal.[118]

This treaty was a triangular compromise amongst three sets of forces in the name of Raghuji, Mir Habib and Aliwardi, Raghuji for money, Mir Habib for honour and revenge, and Aliwardi for rest without being unmindful for retaining his nominal overlordship over Orissa.

This treaty was anomalous and not clear in its contents. If 12 lakhs of rupees were to be paid by Aliwardi, as *chauth* for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and moreover Mir Habib was appointed as Governor of Orissa, it is not clear what was the necessity of adding the last clause by specifying a demarcating line between Bengal and Orissa over which he desired to retain authority according to first two clauses. The last clause reveals the weak stand of Aliwardi, which afterwards gave scope for the Maratha occupation of Orissa.

The treaty authorised Mir Habib to pay the surplus revenue of Orissa to Raghuji for the arrears of his troops. But it is silent as to what should happen to the surplus revenue, after the full payment of the arrears of Raghuji's troops.

Politically the Maratha invasions produced two effects. Firstly these invasions kept Aliwardi occupied mainly with war with the Marathas, instigated sedition in his own officers and weakened the government of Bengal, and thus giving time and scope, paved the way for the rise of the English in Bengal.

118 *Ibid.*, pp. 112-3.

It has been further explained that the sum of 12 lakhs of rupees should be remitted in two qists (instalments) in every six months to Banaras either through Jagat Seth or Raja Swarup Chand as Raghuji would think proper. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence* (to be abbreviated as *C. P. C.*), Vol. II, No. 1247.

Secondly they created a sort of anarchical atmosphere in Orissa for about a decade. Of course, successive deputies were appointed by the Nawab to rule the country but they had neither time to look to the administration nor were fit to ward off the Marathas from Orissa. At this stage the feudal chiefs grew more powerful than before. The southern part of the country was less affected by the Maratha raids than the northern part which was a parading ground not only of the Maratha soldiers but also of the Muslim army from Bengal who chased and fought with them.

In such a state of insecurity and anxiety people were not always free to pursue their own profession of life. So economically during this time, there was to some extent a decline in trade, commerce, industries and agriculture in the country.

There was a tendency of the shifting of population from the localities which were ravaged by the Marathas to the safer places in this country; thus the balance of the population was disturbed.

CHAPTER II

Maratha Governors

(i) Mir Habib

(1751-2)

Mir Habib, a Persian by birth, came of a very humble family in Shiraj.[1] Like many Persians he migrated from his mother country to India in search of fortune. When he reached Hugli he began to earn his living there by retailing the wares of Mughal merchants. Sujauddin's son-in-law Murshid Quli II was highly impressed by his deep knowledge in pure Persian which he used in his common talk. When Murshid Quli II was entrusted with the Government of Dacca he appointed Mir Habib as his Deputy Nawab who rendered him considerable assistance ably and faithfully. He reduced the expenses of state flotilla, artillery and military department by his sincere efforts. He granted monopolies in certain articles of trade and made huge profits for himself and his master. He treacherously murdered Nurullah, zamindar of pargana Jalalpur and utilised his wealth for his own interest.[2]

When Taki Bhan, son of Shujauddin, Naib Subah of Cuttack died, Murshid Quli II was sent to Cuttack from Dacca. Mir Habib accompanied him to Cuttack. Murshid Quli II received valuable assistance from Mir Habib in improving the financial condition of the government, in bringing under his control the local zamindars, in reducing unnecessary expenses and in introducing efficient management for the realisation of the revenue.[3]

It may be remembered that Sarfaraz became the Nawab after the death of Shujauddin. He was deceitfully killed by Aliwardi. Now Murshid Quli II, son-in-law of Sujauddin and brother-in-law of Sarfaraz was the only enemy of Aliwardi. The latter defeated the former at Balasore and

[1] J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 456.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 426; K. K. Datta, *Alivardi and His Times*, p. 64.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 428.

drove him out of Orissa. From that day Mir Habib entertained bitter hatred towards Aliwardi whom he considered to be a usurper. Although he was in service under Aliwardi still his heart was burning with revenge. The first Maratha invasion on Bengal took place in 1742. Aliwardi marched towards Katwah. A fighting took place when the Marathas rushed forward to the centre of the enemy. Mir Habib was there. He was suddenly surrounded, wounded in three places and fell to the ground. Then he was taken prisoner. From that day he joined the Marathas and took service under them.[4]

Henceforward, in Maratha campaigns into Bengal and Orissa, he acted as 'guide, friend and philosopher'.[5] When Bhaskar Pandit the Maratha general thought of returning to Nagpur through Birbhum Mir Habib objected to this. From Katwah he could persuade Bhaskar Pandit to march to Murshidabad. He entered into the city of Murshidabad and plundered it. He plundered Jagat Seth's house from where he carried full two crores of rupees. There he took away his brother Sheriff from his house. Then he with Bhaskar Pandit got possession of Hugli and ravaged all Bengal south of the Ganges. It was for his suggestion that Midnapur, Burdwan and part of Rajsahi and even the town and district of Akbarnagar and Rajmahal fell into the possession of the Marathas for some time. In fact he was Prime Minister of Bhaskar Pandit.[6]

In the Maratha invasion of 1744 of Bengal, Bhaskar Pandit was again sent there. Mir Habib was with him. Aliwardi Khan invited Bhaskar Pandit to a meeting to kill him treacherously. Here Mir Habib warned Bhaskar against the assertion of Aliwardi's agents. If Bhaskar Pandit would have listened to the good advice of Mir Habib he would have not been killed.[7]

In the Maratha invasion of 1745 there was a serious fight between the Marathas and Aliwardi's soldiers, after which the Nawab's Begams proposed a treaty. Mir Habib

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4 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. I, p. 387.
5 *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 361.
6 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 393-5.
7 K. K. Datta, *Alivardi and His Times*, p. 90.

could influence Raghuji to reject such a proposal. Raghuji was thus guided himself by the advice of Mir Habib.[8]

When Raghuji left Bengal after his defeat, it is Mir Habib who remained in Bengal.[9] He oocupied many places at the head of roving Maratha bands. Although he was occasionally defeated by Aliwardi and saved himself by retiring to the woody mountain tracts of Orissa, yet he did not lose courage. He continued to harass Aliwardi either by reoccupying many places in his absence or by occasionally meeting him in fresh engagements.[10]

By the time the treaty was made between Aliwardi and Raghuji, Mir Habib created such a ground that both parties were compelled to accept him as the Governor of Orissa. The Marathas chose him not only because he helped the Marathas in plundering Orissa and Bengal but because the money which he promised to pay to Raghuji for utilising the Maratha soldiers had not yet been fully paid. Aliwardi agreed to such appointment because the situation in Orissa was so made that appointment of any Muslim General except Mir Habib would have made the matter still worse in this province.[11]

He was considerate and was ready to change his decision when convinced. For example, Raja Ramchandra Deva II, the Raja of Khurda died. Bhagirathi Kumar who was at that time at Kodala Athagarh (in Ganjam) was invited by the nobles of the Court at Khurda and was made the king of Khurda. He was called Raja Birakishore Deva. Padmanava Deva from Patia put forth claim for the same. As soon as Mir Habib was Subahdar of Orissa he first took up the cause of Padmanava Deva. But when the nobles of the Court of the Raja of Khurda convinced him about the legitimate claim of Birakishore Deva he was satisfied and confirmed him on the Khurda throne; Padmanava Deva was asked to remain satisfied with Patia.[12]

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8 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. II, p. 12.
9 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
10 *Ibid.*, pp. 51. 56, 77, 79; *Letter to Court*, 22 Feb., 1749, *Consultctions*, 5 Sept., 1751.
11 *Ibid.*, pp. 112-3.
12 A. B. Mohanty (ed.), *Madalapanji*, p. 80.

He was a stern ruler. He attempted to enforce strict discipline in the administration. He had an Afghan force under him. A Maratha force under the command of a Maratha officer related to Raghuji was also stationed in Orissa under his control. He received from Bengal twelve lakhs of rupees to be sent to Raghuji. He also promised to pay four lakhs of rupees to the Marathas annually.[13]

He unfortunately fell into the angry eyes of Januji, son of Raghuji and was killed in 1752.[14]

(ii) MIRJA SALEH

(1752-9)

Mirza Saleh was the nephew[15] of Mir Habib, who was the Governor of Orissa and was murdered on 24 August, 1752. It was he who at Patna saved Mir Habib from torture, at the hands of the Afghans joining the Marathas against Aliwardi.[16] He took a very prominent part in fixing the basis for the treaty of 1751 on behalf of the Marathas. He was present as an envoy at the place where the terms

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13 *Select Committee Proceedings* (Proceedings, to be abbreviated as *Progs.*), 5 January, 1768, p. 653, *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. II, p. 115.

14 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. II, p. 116.

The death of Mir Habib is given in both *Riyaz-us-Salatin* and *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*. Both the sources agree on the fact that Mir Habib's death was owing to the anger of Januji. But they give two different stories as to why Januji grew angry with him. The author of the *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* was a *sardar* in the Court of Aliwardi. Therefore his writings seem to be more trustworthy than that of the *Riyaz*. The story as described in *Siyar* is briefly given below.

Mir Habib was found irregular in sending the promised amount to Raghuji. Moreover the Maratha soldiers and some Maratha officers working under him as accountants were chafing under his strict rule and discipline. So they now launched a complaint against him before Raghuji who sent his son Januji to examine the account. Januji made enquiry into it. He put various questions to Mir Habib and made him to sit the whole day in a humiliating position in the account office. Then Januji left the matter to be decided between Mir Habib and his followers and himself went away. His followers did not allow him to leave the place unless he gave a satisfactory account of the money he had received or leave a bond for the balance he appropriated himself. Mir Habib persuaded them to allow him to go to his residence; but to no purpose. In the midnight he asked his men to march but the Marathas offered obstructions. As a result there ensued a scuffle. In the fight in which both the parties were engaged Mir Habib was killed while pushing forward his way through the crowd with sabre in his hand.—*Siyar*, Eng, Tr., Vol. II, pp. 115-7.

15 *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., p. 361.

16 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. II, p. 51.

of the treaty were accepted by Aliwardi. For the laudable and honourable part he played in the concluding of the treaty between the Nawab of Bengal and Raja of Nagpur he was honoured with the appellation of Muslihuddin Muhammad Khan. He returned from Bengal with the patent of the treaty carrying an elephant and several other presents for his master, the Raja of Nagpur.[16a] He received the investiture of the government of Orissa both from Aliwardi and Raghuji.[17]

As Governor of Orissa he found his position peculiar. He had to satisfy the whims and caprices of two masters, *i.e.* Aliwardi and Raghuji. He was fully conscious of the way by which the Marathas put his predecessor to death. The situation made him more submissive and less firm and all the while ever cautious in his dealings with Raghuji and Aliwardi.

Raghuji demanded more money from Mirza Saleh than what was promised by Mir Habib. To please Raghuji, Mirza Saleh agreed to pay four lakhs more over and above the stipulated sum of 12 lakhs to be realised as *chauth* from the Nawab of Bengal. So Aliwardi was displeased with him. He told him that if he had consented to such payment he had to pay the money himself.[18]

Mirza Saleh therefore occasionally coerced the people to pay more to the government. He also by some pretext or other occasionally interfered with the British trade in Orissa with the object of collecting money from them.[19]

The British had factories at Harishpur, Pipli and Balasore. They expected improvement in their trade. But the repeated Maratha raids upon Orissa from 1742 to 1751 affected it. Even the treaty of 1751 between Aliwardi and Raghuji did not save the British from the interference of the Governor of Orissa. Besides it brought the Governor

16a *Ibid.*, p. 113.
17 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
18 *C.P.C.*, Vol. II, No. 1244.
19 *Bengal Public Progs.*, 19 Oct., 1753 (Balaramgarhi L. No. 80); *Bengal Public Letters to Court*, 1753-54. pp. 177-79. paras 113, 114, 115; *Bengal Public Progs.*, 21 Nov., 1754 and 23 Dec., 1754.

of Orissa more under the influence of Raghuji than under Aliwardi. Yet the British gave much importance to the power of Aliwardi and considered him to be a real master over the Governor of Orissa as before. They therefore thought that an order from the Nawab of Bengal would stop Mirza Saleh's interference in the Company's affairs. On 27 June, 1755 Mirza Saleh left Balasore for Murshidabad. Macquire, a British Officer at Balramgarhi advised the British authority in Bengal "to procure an effectual order from the great Nawab or his successor that whatever goods, he may provide for the Hon. Company at Almorra, Cussary, Muhunpore, Georgepur, Budruck or any of the *Aurungs* may be brought to that factory without any demand of custom, Magun or Churagh and.......servants employed by him on the Hon. Company's business may pass with their goods unmolested."[20] Accordingly the British sent a *vakil* to the Nawab. But they failed to get an order to that effect owing to the unwillingness of the Nawab.

This made them realise the miscalculation of the situation in Orissa. From 1751 to about 1756 the British attitude to Mirza Saleh had not been so cordial, rather one of making an attempt to thrust things upon him by procuring an order from the Nawab of Bengal. But from 1756 onwards they changed their policy because now they found that the hold of the Nawab of Bengal over the Governor of Orissa was rapidly growing weaker and moreover the political situation in Bengal demanded a change in their former attitude. So they desired to keep Mirza Saleh reconciled and in good humour.[21]

The British offered suitable presents to Mirza Saleh to make their business free from all the impediments. This made Mirza Saleh friendly to British. As a result, the British trade prospered. Orissa *Aurangs* supplied the British goods worth Rs. 10,000.[22]

Politically they also gained to some extent. Aliwardi died in April, 1756. Siraj-ud-daulah came to the throne of

20 *Bengal Public Progs.*, 10 July, 1755 (Balaramgarhi Letter No. 59).
21 *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 2 December, 1756.
22 *Bengal Public Progs.*, 12 March, 1759.

Bengal. On the question of the demolition of extra-fortification at Fort William there was a conflict between the Nawab and the British. Consequently there was a raid upon the British Settlement in Bengal; Fort William was surrendered to Siraj-ud-daulah on 20 June, 1756. Within a few days the up-country factories and agencies fell into his hands. Only "a few fugitives huddled together in misery and privation" at Fulta. At this time Boddam, the British Chief of Balasore was merely panic-stricken; as a matter of precaution he fled with a few soldiers and with Company's effect to the amount of 5 or 6,000 rupees.[23] But the out-station of Balramgarhi at the mouth of Balasore-river was still in possession of the British.[24]

Mirza Saleh, who was considered to be dependent on Aliwardi was not in good books of Siraj-ud-daulah.[25] This they desired to utilise to their advantage. Mirza Saleh was willing to help the British secretly. The British at Fulta were in need of *buxuries.* Though there was instruction from Siraj-ud-daulah not to help the British in enlisting *buxuries* Mirza Saleh helped them secretly to raise 1,000 gun men. When the British were hounded out from one place to another in Bengal, Mirza Saleh did nothing to disturb the British factories in Orissa.[26] The British felt so much secure in this province that on 30 November 1756 Holwell wrote to the Court of Directors suggesting that Balramgarhi should be nominated as their Presidency.[27]

Again a few days after this incident there arose bitter Anglo-French rivalry. Consequently both the powers in India made arrangements to attack each other. Siraj-ud-daulah who was already not on good terms with the British objected to the British attack on Chandannagar. His objections were not given any consideration. So he attempted an alliance with the French to root out the British from Ben-

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23 *Bengal and Madras Paper,* Part I, p. 469; S. C. Hill (ed.) *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. I, pp. 57 and 104.

24 S. C. Hill (ed.), *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. I, pp. XCV; *Bengal and Madras Paper,* Part I, p. 469.

25 *C. P. C.,* Vol. II, No. 1244.

26 *Bengal Secret Consultations,* 2 December, 1756.

27 S. C. Hill (ed.), *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. II, p. 14; *Bengal and Madras Paper,* Part I, p. 469.

gal; he corresponded with Monsieur Bussy, who was now looking to the affairs in Northern Sarkar.[28] According to the plan made by him Monsieur Bussy was to come with his force from Northern Sarkar as far as Balasore to which place Monsieur Law would go for his assistance.[29] Mirza Saleh was directed by Siraj-ud-daulah to render all possible assistance to Monsieur Bussy on his march through Orissa to assist Monsieur Renault, Governor of Chandannagar.[30] It appears that he was not interested to carry out such orders. Moreover the zamindars in Northern Sarkar created good deal of disturbances. Monsieur Bussy remained occupied in subjugating them. Consequently he failed to assist either the French in Bengal before the fall of Chandannagar in March, 1757 or Siraj-ud-daulah in the battle of Plassey on 23 June, 1757.[31]

This event made the British to give more importance to the affairs in Orissa. To keep information as to the movements of their enemies, they desired to establish a residency at Cuttack; this was approved by Mirza Saleh.[32]

Mirza Saleh not only helped the British but also entered into a conspiracy with them for the dethronement of Siraj-ud-daulah before the battle of Plassey. He had an eye on the throne of Bengal. In him the British had confidence; he was one of those leading persons whose names were enlisted for the Nawabship of Bengal in place of Siraj-ud-daulah.[33]

When the conspiracy of Mirza Saleh reached the knowledge of Siraj-ud-daulah and his secret dealings with the British were detected, he fled away from Orissa in fear of punishment. He took refuge with Raghuji at Nagpur.[34] He was, however, not reprimanded for his cowardly conduct.

28 S. C. Hill (ed.), *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. I, p. CLXXI, Vol. II, Letter Nos. 317, 319, 431 (pp. 313, 314, 402).
29 S. C. Hill (ed.), *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. II, Letter Nos. 317, 318 (pp. 313-4).
30 *Ibid.*, Letter No. 431 (p. 402).
31 *Ganjam District Gazetteer*, p. 97 B. S.
32 J. Long (ed.), *Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 390; *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 10 April, 1759.
33 S. C. Hill (ed.), *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. II, p. 207, Vol. III, p. 210.
34 C.P.C., Vol. II, No. 1244.

From Nagpur he went to the Deccan only a few months before the battle of Plassey. During his absence from Cuttack his son Dadar Ali acted as Nawab. He was also sympathetic to the British; he was ready to help them like his father.[35]

In the battle of Plassey Siraj-ud-daulah was defeated. The British declared Mir Jafar as Nawab. The news of the defeat of Siraj-ud-daulah gave great satisfaction to Mirza Saleh. From the Deccan he went to Banaras. Therefrom he proceeded to Murshidabad to win the favour of Mir Jafar and to secure his reinstatement as the Governor of Orissa.[36]

Meanwhile Dadar Ali acting as the Governor of Orissa could not discharge his duties to the satisfaction of the Marathas; he was therefore made prisoner.[37]

It appears that Mirza Saleh soon returned to Cuttack; he reinstated himself as the Governor and managed to release his son from the hands of the Marathas. He ruled over Orissa nearly three years more.

He could not meet the demand of the Raja of Nagpur for money in spite of his oppression for the same over some of the Rajas in Orissa. He was too friendly to the cause of the British. He was on very good terms with Mir Jafar. It is during his time that the payment of *chauth* was discontinued by the Nawab. All these went to discredit him as a Governor, unable to serve the interest of the Raja of Nagpur. He was therefore forced to resign at the end of 1759. It was considered to replace him by one from among the Marathas. This choice fell upon his successor, Sheo Bhatt Sathe.[38]

Mirza Saleh was clever, tactful, shrewd and ambitious. He managed to serve the Marathas for a period of about seven years. He was a link among the British, the Nawab and the Raja of Nagpur. He was the last Muslim Subahdar of Orissa appointed with the consent of two parties. His rule did not see repeated Maratha invasions of Ben-

35 J. Long (ed.), *Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 246.
36 *C. P. C.*, Vol. II, No. 1244.
37 *Ibid.*
38 *Orme Mss. (Manuscripts) India*, Vol. 18, pp. 5065, 5071.

gal. After his removal from office Orissa came under the direct control of the Marathas without leaving the least grourd for the Nawab of Bengal to even exercise the *de jure* power which he had exercised before.

Though out of his office, still he was sometimes a factor on behalf of Januji in the negotiation for collection of *chauth*. He went to Calcutta to meet the British Governor in July, 1761 during the governorship of Sheo Bhatt in Orissa.[39]

He later on was a confidant of Rao Malharzi Holkar and a confederate of Muhammad Yar Khan who, during the governorship of Bhawani Pandit in Orissa planned a conspiracy with him against the British. Towards the last part of his life he received a *khelat* and an elephant from the wazir (Shujauddaulah).[40] While he was going to Nyasapur to fetch troops he died on the way in June, 1765.[41]

(iii) SHEO BHATT SATHE

(1760-4)

Sheo Bhatt Sathe was well known in Orissa before he took charge of his office as its first Maratha Subahdar. On 14 February, 1755 Raghuji Bhonsla died. As soon as this news reached Orissa many feudatory chiefs and zamindars showed their spirit of insubordination and independence by creating disturbances. Some forts were occupied by the rebels. Mirza Saleh was the Governor of Orissa with the common consent of both Raghuji and the Nawab of Bengal. The situation appeared beyond his control. The Maratha soldiers stationed in the country failed to cope with the situation. This needed the reinforcement of soldiers from Nagpur. Januji, son of Raghuji entrusted Sheo Bhatt with the difficult task of regaining the prestige of Marathas in Orissa. He reached here at the head of a Maratha army. He recaptured and reconquered the forts from the hands of

39 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 1254.
40 Ibid., No. 2665.
41 Ibid., No. 2666.

the rebels. Some chiefs and zamindars were taken to task. Fathe Khan was in charge of the famous fort of Barabati. He had joined hands with the rebels. He was unwilling to surrender the fort to Sheo Bhatt. Sheo Bhatt fought with him for 27 days, and ultimately recovered the fort from his hands. This victory enhanced his reputation as a veteran commander both in Orissa as well as in the court of Nagpur.[42]

He used to be deputed by Raghuji from Nagpur to collect the *chauth* of twelve lakhs of rupees from the Nawab of Bengal. As Collector of *chauth* he was known in Orissa because he generally went to Bengal through Cuttack. For example, after recovering the fort of Barabati from Fathe Khan, he went to Murshidabad for the same purpose.[43]

, Mirza Saleh grew malicious at the enhanced reputation of Sheo Bhatt at the court of Nagpur. Mir Jafar, the Nawab of Bengal, was displeased by his repeated demand for the punctual payment of the *chauth*. Both of them conspired to pull him down. By their artifice Sheo Bhatt was displaced from his office.[44]

Sheo Bhatt was chagrined at their conspiracy. He was determined to take revenge on them. Sheo Bhatt pointed out to Januji that Mirza Saleh should then be asked to collect the full amount of *chauth* from Mir Jafar. But Mirza Saleh did not comply with it. Then Sheo Bhatt offered himself to collect the *chauth* from the Nawab if he was appointed as the Subahdar of Orissa. Januji agreed to this. But some affairs detained Sheo Bhatt at Nagpur. So he could not take charge of his office. He, however, got Januji to give his *parwana* to Chimna Sau[44a] for the governorship of Orissa. He arrived at Cuttack. He soon took possession of one part of the fort of Barabati with his force. Mirza Saleh was on good terms with the Nawab who was backed by the British. The British thought that if Chimna Sau would be

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42 *Vaidya Daftar*, Vol. V, 1755-6, L. No. 57.
43 *Ibid.*, No. 57.
44 *Additional Manuscripts in British Museum* (to be abbreviated as *Add. Mss.*, No. 29209.
44a Chimna Sau is called Chimna Bapu according to Marathi Sources.

the Subahdar of Orissa, they would lose their political influence over the country. So they persuaded Mirza Saleh to oppose Chimna Sau. Both the parties were read to fight.[45] Occasionally they fought with each other. This continued for about two years. Although Sheo Bhatt was anxious to come to Orissa as early as possible he could not do so because Januji was involved in troubles with his brother Mudoji. It was reported that Januji had intentions to assassinate his brother. So Mudoji collected his forces to take revenge on him. Consequently Sheo Bhatt was detained at Nagpur.[46] Towards the end of June, 1759 the relation between the two brothers improved a little. Sheo Bhatt arrived at Cuttack in July, 1759 with an army of about 700 horse and 1,200 foot.[47] Prior to his arrival at Cuttack a compromise was made between the two parties. Mirza Saleh and his party had yielded the Subahdarship to Chimna Sau. Sheo Bhatt took charge of the province from the latter.[48]

The first thing he had to do was to take measures for collecting *chauth* from Bengal. Now Mir Jafar was succeeded by Mir Qasim as the Nawab of Bengal. The new Nawab was reminded of the payment of *chauth;* but he kept silent. First Sheo Bhatt threatened to invade Bengal if *chauth* was not paid;[49] but that produced no desired result. Now Sheo Bhatt thought that the Nawab broke the terms of the treaty of 1751; so there was no reason why he could not violate the Maratha part of the agreement by resorting to the former practice of raiding into Bengal—beyond the river Subarnarekha.

Accordingly he proceeded to plunder Birbhum. The British requested Mir Qasim to oppose Sheo Bhatt. At the same time they stationed troops at Midnapur against the threatened Maratha plunder in Burdwan and Midnapur.[50] Sheo Bhatt demanded three lakhs of rupees from Tilak

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45 *Ibid.*, pp. 5063, 5066.
46 *Ibid.* p. 5071.
47 *Orme Mss. India*, Vol. 18, pp. 5045-5047.
48 *Ibid.*, pp. 5065, 5071.
49 *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 1099, 1109, 1246, 1445.
50 *Ibid.*, No. 699.

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Chand, Raja of Burdwan; but as his demand was not complied with, he sent troops to plunder his country; Midnapur was also attacked. A great deal of disturbance was created. As the British troops moved nearer, Sheo Bhatt with his forces retreated to Cuttack.[51]

Sheo Bhatt claimed that both Burdwan and Midnapur were a part of Orissa; they must not go to the hands of either the Nawab or the British. The British replied that "Burdwan has been granted to the Company for the expense of the troops by his Majesty and Mir Qasim."[52] "Midnapur has become independent of it (Orissa) for a long time and it has been made over to the Company for the maintenance of troops".[53]

In 1761 Sheo Bhatt again marched to Midnapur with a large number of troops and plundered it.[54] The British troops attacked the Marathas. They deprived them of the money collected from Pataspur, a *parganah* belonging to Sheo Bhatt.[55]

Sheo Bhatt in anger appointed Rai Govind to the zamindari of Chitnam Berda which belonged to Tilakchand. His object was to harass Tilakchand so that he would pay him three lakhs of rupees; but he could not succeed[56]

Thus there grew ill feelings between the Marathas and the British. But Sheo Bhatt who occasionally raided Burdwan and Midnapur was inclined to accommodate matters. At times he was prepared to show conciliatory attitude to the British.

The British appointed Khushal Chand at Cuttack to forward letters from Bengal to Madras. He was imprisoned;[57] Company's people were not allowed to despatch letters. When the British requested, Sheo Bhatt released Khushal

51 *Ibid.*, Nos. 783, 830, 900, 908.
52 *Ibid.*, No. 1082.
53 *Ibid.*, No. 1447; J. Long (ed.), *Selections from Unpublished Records*, No 555.
54 J. Long (ed.)—*Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 570.
55 *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, No. 1001.
56 *Ibid.*, Nos. 1447, 1464, 1487.
57 *Ibid.*, Nos. 956, 957.

Chand and granted Company's people *dastak* to despatch letters.[58] Again a British ship was drowned in the Bay of Bengal. Many people, however, survived and reached the shore near at Puri. The zamindar of the place did not allow them to pass through his zamindari. But Sheo Bhatt sent his own men and brought them safe to Cuttack. He was also prepared to send Diaram Husain Baig along with John Bristow to Calcutta to settle affairs relating to Pataspur and other *parganahs* dependent on Jaleswar.[59]

But the British had no reliance on the Marathas. They were always suspicious of the promises of Sheo Bhatt. They said, "Sheo Bhatt the Maratha chief obstinately continues his pretentions to the Midnapur province as well as his demand for *chauth* and although he pretends a desire to accommodate matters in an amicable manner, yet much to be feared from known treacherous disposition of that caste of people and if they can find an opportunity, they will attempt to send plundering parties into Bengal".[60]

Such impression of the Maratha character induced them to prepare a plan to drive out the Marathas from Orissa. At this time the British placed Mir Qasim as Nawab on the throne of Bengal in place of Mir Jafar. So they thought to take his help in this matter. They pointed out to the Nawab that the Marathas were frequently invading Bengal. The only measure to protect Bengal from Maratha invasion was to drive out the Marathas from Orissa.[61] In his interest, the Nawab should accept the British scheme. The scheme was that the Nawab should take lead in the expedition into Orissa. The British would assist him with their forces. The Nawab would bear all the expenses of the expedition;[62] he would assign out of the revenues of Cuttack such a part lying between Jaleswar and Cuttack to the British to defray the expenses of the expedition.[63] At

58 *Ibid.*, Nos. 1024, 1161.
59 *Ibid.*, No. 1352.
60 J. Long, *Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 552; *Select Committee Progs.*, 17 Sept., 1761.
61 *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 18 December, 1761; *Bengal and Madras Paper*, Part II, p. 1068; *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, No. 1325.
62 *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 17 Sept., 1761.
63 *Ibid.*, 18 Sept., 1761.

first the Nawab agreed to this proposal. Accordingly a British force at the command of Ellis was ordered to march as soon as the Nawab's army would move. But meanwhile the Nawab changed his mind. He expressed his inability to shoulder the burden of the expenses of the troops as suggested by the British. Consequently the scheme could not be executed.[64]

Thus the British diplomacy to drive out the Marathas enraged Sheo Bhatt to a considerable extent. In 1763, it was on the issue of the demand for large preferential terms for the British trade that Mir Qasim and the British came to differ and finally entered into a conflict. Now Sheo Bhatt corresponded with Mir Qasim. In response he received many letters from Mir Qasim who wrote that he had already destroyed the power of the British. If Sheo Bhatt was eager to collect the *chauth* he should act in collaboration with him. Mir Qasim also sent Sheo Bhatt a *sanad* for Jaleswar and Midnapur. Sheo Bhatt ordered Bhaskar Pandit and Buli Khan to march to Jaleswar to assist Mir Qasim. The situation grew alarming to the British. They therefore sent Aga Muhammad Ali, an inhabitant of Balasore, and Ghulam Mustafa *Munshi*, the Company's *gumashtah* at Balasore to the Marathas.[65] They assured them that the British would consider the payment of *chauth*. So they should not go against the British. Again Vansittart, British Governor of Bengal confirmed that assurance; he wrote to Sheo Bhatt that all arrears of *chauth* would be paid provided the Maratha forces would not join the troops of Mir Qasim.[66] Now Sheo Bhatt was convinced; he stopped helping Mir Qasim.[67] At the time of the British victory over Mir Qasim he congratulated the former with the hope that a closer friendship with them would result in the settlement of *chauth*. But he did not succeed in coming to a settlement with the British during his governorship.[68]

64 *Ibid.*, 16 Jan., 1762; 18 Feb., 1762; 8 Dec., 1761; *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, No. 1394.
65 *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 1948, 1951.
66 *Home Miscellaneous* (to be abbreviated as *Home Misc.*), Vol. 33, 10 Feb., 1768.
67 *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, 1868.
68 *Ibid.*, No. 1902.

In the year 1764, Sheo Bhatt fell into arrears; he could not pay the full amount as demanded by Januji. Januji therefore grew dissatisfied with him; he passed an order for his dismissal; he appointed Chimna Sau to take over the charge of the government of Orissa.[69] Chimna Sau arrived at Orissa with his detachment. Sheo Bhatt was imprisoned on 12 April, 1764 "in the house of one of his chief people by a party belonging to the *faujdar* of Barabati."[70] Mukund Pandit with some fighting men of Sheo Bhatt's party launched an attack on Chimna Sau's troops, but was defeated. Five or six people were killed in the scuffle.[71]

After the dismissal of Sheo Bhatt, a great deal of disorder prevailed all over Orissa. Some zamindars and chiefs of Orissa took advantage of the situation. The zamindar of the fort of Dhenkanal attacked and murdered Buli Khan, the adopted son of Sheo Bhatt and seized his horses and effects.[72]

Bhaskar Pandit, younger brother of Sheo Bhatt, had been appointed as the *faujdar* of Balasore and had been found in arrears in collection of revenue. Now Chimna Sau attempted to capture him for the non-payment of the arrears. But he entered into a confederacy with the zamindars of Mayurbhanj and Nilgiri; as a result he was carried away by them with his effects.[72a]

Sheo Bhatt was sent to Nagpur after being imprisoned in Orissa. But he, however, made his escape from Nagpur on the pretence of going on a pilgrimage to Deogarh.[73] From Deogarh he went to Oudh (*i.e.* Shujauddaulah's country). He made an attempt to meet Lord Clive there. But he found no encouragement from him. Perhaps it is during this time that he went to Delhi and "procured from the Imperial Court His Majesty's Parwana appointing the

69 *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 13 Apr., 1764; 26 Apr., 1764; *Bengal & Madras Paper*, 1746-85, Part II, p. 1088; *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 2178, 2204.

70 *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 13 April, 1764.

71 *Ibid.*

72 J. Long (ed.)—*Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 724; *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, No. 2484.

72a *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, No. 2484.

73 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 45.

Nizamat of the province of Orissa together with Midnapur to Janoji Bhonsla".[74] He also procured from Januji, a body of five hundred horse under the command of Azim•Khan assisted by other Maratha chiefs to march to Bengal. This he thought would reinstate him as Governor of Orissa. But Chimna Sau, the present Maratha Subhadar of Orissa could clearly understand Sheo Bhatt's scheme. To be friendly with the British he kept them informed as to the movements of Sheo Bhatt. He also took adequate precautions to see that he was not displaced by Sheo Bhatt.[75]

Sheo Bhatt entered into Orissa. He soon found a number of discontented zamindars gathering around him. He made his headquarters at Kunjar where the river Mahanadi falls into the sea. Now more of zamindars were won over to his side. Detachments were sent in boats up the river and set fire to the suburb of Cuttack. He told the zamindars that he came to take possession of Orissa; he had received the approval of the British by an order from Clive.[76] He sent a letter to Motte, who was sent to Sambalpur by Clive, asking him to act in conjunction with him in this matter. The British could see Sheo Bhatt's diplomacy. They proclaimed that they were not in concert with Sheo Bhatt. Besides they offered Chimna Sau (now represented in Orissa by Bhawani Pandit) to send troops to suppress Sheo Bhatt.[77]

Sheo Bhatt continued to challenge the Subhadarship of Chimna Sau. He occasionally fought against his opponents. He created disturbances in the country.[78] It was only in February, 1767 that he was finally defeated along with Shamji and other zamindars supporting him.[79] Thus the stormy career of Sheo Bhatt in Orissa came to an end.

Sheo Bhatt ruled over Orissa from about 1760 to 1764. He was the first Maratha Subahdar of Orissa appointed by the Raja of Nagpur. He was a capable admi-

74 *Bengal Secret Committee Progs.*, 5 July, 1764; C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 2326.
75 *Ibid.*, J. Long (ed.)—*Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 807.
Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories, p. 45.
Ibid., *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 7 Oct., 1766.
Ibid., *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 48.
C.P.C., Vol. II, No. 63.

nistrator; he was very active in suppressing the insubordinate forces.[80] He was a very popular Governor.[81] Although he was dismissed from his office in April, 1764, still he could enlist the sympathies of many zamindars of Orissa who supported him in his fruitless attempt to come back to power; this continued for about three years more.

He was ambitious and unscrupulously shrewd; he found no difference between friend and foe for the assumption of power. He was sympathetic and generous to the distressed. He was a Maratha Governor who struggled hard though with no effect for the realisation of *chauth* from the British.

He is more remembered for his reform in revenue administration than for anything else. His previous knowledge in financial matters helped him to bring a settlement of the revenues of Orissa; it was made nominally at 18,00,000 of Arcot rupees. Out of this total amount the regular land revenue covered 14,00,000 while the rest, *i.e.* 4,00,000 were imposts on various heads.[82]

(iv) BHAWANI PANDIT
(1764-1768)

After the dismissal of Sheo Bhatt Sathe, Chimna Sau (also called Chimna Bapu) obtained the Subahdari of Orissa in April, 1764.[83] His authority had been challenged by Sheo Bhatt Sathe. So he took steps to suppress the latter. Consequently the peace of the country was disturbed owing to the conflict between the two Maratha leaders. Some zamindars of the country took advantage of the situation, defied the authority of the Maratha Government and raised the standard of rebellion. Soon after his appointment the first duty he had to perform was to take measures for the suppression of the rebels. Ray Govind was employed in adjusting affairs at Mayurbhanj.[84] But he failed in his duty. So Chimna Sau wrote to Nagpur to send reinforcements of troops. Accordingly Bhawani Pandit reached Orissa in

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80 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 2010.
81 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 12.
82 A. Stirling, *An Account of Orissa Proper or Cuttack*, p. 91.
83 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 2173.
84 *Ibid.*, 2243.

July 1764 with 5,000 horse. It appears that Chimna Sau left the administration of Orissa in charge of Bhawani Pandit from the day of his arrival. He was the *de facto* Subahdar.[85] First the zamindars of Belagarh and Rampur who had rebelled were suppressed. Then Bhawani Pandit crossed the river Mahanadi. He marched in the direction of Dhenkanal in order to punish the Raja of that place, who during the imprisonment of Sheo Bhatt not only had killed Buli Khan but also took away his horses and effects.[86]

He put down the rebellion there. Then he proceeded to Balasore. From there he marched towards Hariharpur to chastise the Rajas of Mayurbhanj[87] and Nilgiri because during the troubled times they plundered some of the inhabitants of Balasore. These zamindars were punished. Collections were made from them for the maintenance of the Maratha troops.[88]

Sheo Bhatt threatened to invade Bengal and in fact invaded it at times. So the British encouraged Bhawani Pandit to expel him from Orissa. They sent some troops to help Bhawani Pandit, in suppressing the rebellion raised by Sheo Bhatt.[89] Because of the friendly attitude of the British Bhawani Pandit once permitted some English officers to raise some troops from the Maratha Orissa.[90] He also appears to have assisted Portsmouth for the survey of the British districts contiguous to the seashore of Orissa.[91] He entered into a treaty with Lord Clive by which he promised that the zamindars owning salt lands in Balasore and neighbouring districts would sell the salt to the British.[92] Passports were readily granted to the *kasid* when the Company desired.[93]

When Januji sent Bhawani Pandit with 5,000 horses to Orissa he suggested that these soldiers might be used to col-

85 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 2340, 2347, 2361, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2437, 6363. All correspondences were made in his name.
86 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 2841, 2484.
87 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 2481, 2484, 2494, 2497.
88 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, No. 2665.
89 *C.P.C.*, Vol. II, No. 77, *C.P.C.*, Vol. III, p. XIX.
90 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, No. 2789, Verelst sent Hasan Khan to raise troops for the Company.
91 *C.P.C.*, Vol. II, No. 725.
92 *C.P.C.*, Vol. II, No. 252.
93 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 2322, 2327.

lect *chauth* from the Bengal Government if it did not agree to it.[94] But the Maratha force was busy in fighting with the rebellious zamindars who joined hands with Sheo Bhatt.[95] Again it was found that the British were willing to consider the payment of *chauth*. That is why Bhawani Pandit thought that perhaps goodwill would win what force would fail to achieve. Hence he developed a friendly and conciliatory attitude towards the British.[96]

. Thus negotiation for settlement of *chauth* continued between the British and Januji in consultation with Bhawani Pandit. There were some servants of Januji who had no faith in British words and promises. Muhammad Yar Khan was one of them. He was a conspirator. He desired a confederacy to be formed with Januji, Mir Qasim, Shuja-ud-daulah and Malharji Holkar; that might help Januji in collecting *chauth* from Bengal. He therefore advised Bhawani Pandit that unless the British were expelled the *chauth* could not be realised from the Nawab. Just at this time the British chased Mir Qasim in the direction of Buxar. So he suggested that it was just possible that the British might have returned as far as Banaras. Malharji Holkar joined Shujauddaulah with a large force in the district of Farrukhabad. There was not the slightest difference between Maharaja Januji and Malharji Holkar. Yar Khan thought that if their assistance could be enlisted in expelling the British he would himself occupy Midnapur and Jaleswar and Bhawani Pandit should canton at Balasore. If this plan would be successful the British could not make much headway. He further advised Bhawani Pandit that letters to the concerned parties should be sent through any of the *fakirs* by payment of 5 or ten rupees as it would be safer than through the *kasids* or *harkaras*.[97]

The British could detect the plan of Yar Khan. As a matter of precaution they wrote many letters to Januji. They requested him not to support Mir Qasim nor his accomplices. They repeatedly assured him the considera-

94 C. P. C., Vol. I, Nos. 2359, 2362.
95 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 2481.
96 C. P. C., Vol. I, Nos. 2434, 2763.
97 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 2666; *harkara*, a messenger, *kasid*, a postman or courier.

tion of the payment of *chauth*. When Bhawani Pandit understood that Yar Khan's secret plan had been brought to the knowledge of the British, he apprehended that he might be regarded as one of the conspirators by the British. Moreover the British might complain against him before Januji. Therefore he sent the letter containing the secret plan to the British Governor in order to prove that he was not a party to such a treacherous move.[98]

Yet the British could not change their impression. Meanwhile ambassadors were sent from Nagpur and Bengal to carry on discussions on the settlement of *chauth*. When Mir Zainul Abadin went to the Court of Nagpur on behalf of the British, in course of conversation with the Raja he disliked the government of Bhawani Pandit. He stated that his government was not helping the cause of negotiation. Indirectly he suggested that a person (like Udepuri Gosain) of honourable birth and ready ability should be given the Subahdari of Orissa.[99] Januji took very seriously these remarks of the British *vakil*. He appointed Sambhaji Pandit in place of Bhawani Pandit with the hope that perhaps he would be able to come to a settlement in regard to *chauth*.[100]

Bhawani Pandit ruled Orissa from 1764 to 1768. He was the most unfortunate of the Maratha Subahdars because almost all the time of his administration was spent in fighting with Sheo Bhatt and his followers or in suppressing the rebellious zamindars. Hence he found little time to bring any improvement in the administration or in the condition of the people. On the other hand, the common people had to suffer from the consequences of ravages rendered as a result of marching of troops from one place to the other.

He was courteous and friendly in nature. He showed proper respect to the foreigners. When Motte returned from Sambalpur on his way to Bengal he was given a cor-

98 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 2665.
99 C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 712.
100 C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 892.

dial reception. Bhawani Pandit also presented him "a dress of muslin, stained, yellow".[101]

He was fond of horses and his conversation was lively.[102] But he was not a popular Governor like Sheo Bhatt. The difference between the two was that "Sehoo Butt [Sheo Bhatt] supported the national troops with the plunder of foreign countries; Bowannee Pundit [Bhawani Pandit] with the plunder of his own".[103]

(v) SAMBHAJI GANESH

(1768-1770)

Sambhaji Ganesh had been acquainted with the British, before he came to Orissa because he had shared in many transactions with them in Northern India. Therefore Januji appointed him as Governor of Orissa with the hope that he would be able to bring a satisfactory settlement in respect of *chauth* with the British. He was careful to strengthen the friendship with the British and helped them whenever necessary. Soon after his appointment he offered the services of 50,000 Maratha horse if the British desired them.[104] Again in response to the request made by the British Governor, Sambhaji Ganesh allowed the British troops under the command of Major Achmuty to march through Orissa. He appointed a person to conduct the British troops to the pass of Rajaghat in Balasore.[105]

Negotiation for settlement of *chauth* continued in this friendly atmosphere; at one time it appeared that both the parties would come to an agreement. But because the British did not help the Raja of Nagpur in his conflict with the Peshwa, and desired that cession of Orissa would not be subject to a defensive alliance with the Raja, therefore the negotiation ended in a failure.[106]

Yet Sambhaji Ganesh did not grow violent in taking revenge on the British for the failure of the negotiation.

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101 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 49.
102 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
103 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
104 C.P.C., Vol. II, 892; C.P.C., Vol. III, pp. XIX and XX.
105 C.P.C., Vol. III, No. 135; *Home Misc.*, Vol. 202(1), p. 34.
106 C.P.C., Vol. III, 208, 1388, 45, 1633, 1708.

Even if some conspirators were instigating some zamindars of Orissa to fight against the British on behalf of the French, yet Sambhaji kept himself aloof and dissociated his government from such proceedings.

In the third Carnatic war the French were defeated by the British. Pandicherry was surrendered. Yet the fear of further hostility with the French in India was not entirely removed from the British mind. It was apprehended that the French might strive for restoration of power with the help of the native chiefs. By 1770 A. D. the Marathas appeared once more in power after the battle of Panipat. They brought the helpless Delhi Emperor Shah Alam II under their control. Hyder Ali of Mysore had already defeated the Bombay troops and dictated peace to the British on 4 April, 1769. From that time the relationship between Hyder and the British continued to be strained. Again although in 1765 the British acquired Northern Sarkar from the French, yet the zamindars there were not reconciled to the new British administration.

When that was the state of affairs some ships and sloops arrived at Kujang about 60 miles to the north-east of Cuttack. Upon hearing this news, Rajaram, the Maratha head *harkara* went out with a number of attendants to verify the matter. John Peiarce, a British officer, engaged a number of *harkaras* at Cuttack for the purpose of communicating any news relating to British interest. One of them was Bishnu Nayak. He offered himself to be in the train of Maratha *harkaras*. He reached Kujang along with others. He saw three very large ships and two sloops. About 1,800 black troops landed from the ships and encamped on the shore near Kujang. Every day about 1,200 Europeans came and landed there on the shore. They exercised and went back in the evening on board their ships. They used to collect some rice from there before leaving. On 1 June, 1770 the *harkaras* left Kujang and returned to Cuttack. He informed all what he saw as witness to John Peiarce. John Peiarce sent a letter to Cartier, Governor of Bengal, intimating every information which he collected. In the same letter he added that he had been informed that 26 pieces of cannons had been transported from Cuttack about four

miles across the river and that 5,000 horse sent from Nagpur were within five days' march from Cuttack.[107]

It is during this time that certain Ibrahim Beg who was at or near about Hyderabad was busy in instigating some of the zamindars of Northern Sarkar to rise against the British. Particularly the zamindars of Ghumsar were informed that the British in Bengal would be attacked by a number of French ships and that the troops of the Nizam of Hyderabad would soon enter into the Northern Sarkar on receiving the news of French attack on Bengal. So Ibrahim Beg persuaded all the zamindars that they should get ready to take the fullest advantage of the situation and that they should not pay any tribute to the British. The zamindars of Ghumsar were encouraged at this news. They employed some of their troops in Ibrahim's service. Lakhmanji Jachak, the *kiladar* of Sambalpur was asked to join them.[108]

This information was collected by Edward Cotsford, a British officer in charge of Ganjam and sent it to the President, Fort St. George, Madras. When these matters were ultimately intimated to the British authorities in Bengal panic spread in that quarter. Thus the news of the rebellious dealings of the zamindars in the Northern Sarkar, alleged despatch of troops from Nagpur to Cuttack transfer of guns from Cuttack across the river, Ibrahim Beg's encouragement to zamindars of Ghumsar, his request for help from the Maratha Government of Orissa, the dropping of the idea of the cession of Orissa to the British after so many days of negotiation and the suspected anti-British behaviour of Hyder Ali brought together the impression that unless French ships had arrived at Kujang the Anti-British feeling would not have been so strong.

In their anxiety to ascertain the truth the British authorities took steps to carry on regular search on the coast. Henry Crawford was advised by the Company to examine the coast from Masulipatam to Ganjam and from Ganjam to Point Palmiras. In spite of his search throughout the

107 *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 16 June, 1770, p. 640.
108 *Select Committee Progs.*, 26 July, 1770, pp. 336-7.

coast he failed to gain any intelligence of the vessels that had appeared in that quarter.[109]

Captain Gordon, Commander of the Company's small vessel was also sent to look into all the ports in the south as far as Ganjam but he neither saw nor heard of any such vessels. Further search was continued for many days. After thorough and tiresome search it was ultimately reported that the ships that had appeared so many days ago at Kujang were trading vessels that had lost their passage to the coast; they belonged to Armenian and Mughal merchants at Chinsura.[110]

How did the news of the arrival of the alleged French ships originate? The President of Calcutta Council, Governor Cartier was "more inclined to think that whole to be a trumped up story of the Maratha Government either to discover what impression a report would make or to answer some unknown purpose." He does not say how or from whom he received the news of the arrival of the alleged French ships. The British *harkara* who went to Kujang at the time of the arrival of Armenian ships never heard from anybody that such ships belonged to the French. The only report he submitted before Peiarce was that there were many Europeans in the ships. Ships belonging to Armenians and the Mughals arrived at Kujang about the middle of May and proceeded on their respective voyages on 7 September, 1770. Edward Cotsford of Ganjam who informed the President of Fort St. George in respect of sailing away of ships from Kujang also added that Ibrahim Beg had informed the zamindars of Ghumsar that very shortly the British would be attacked in Bengal by a number of French ships. He never said that the ships that had arrived at Ganjam were French ships. Again from the evidences available to us it does not appear that Sambhaji Ganesh referred to the circulation of any such news in order to spread panic in British quarters. It is just possible that British psychological fear combined with coincidence of some events resulted in their belief in the arrival of the alleged French ships.

109 *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 5th Sept., 1770, pp. 142-3.
110 *Select Com. Progs.*, 28 June-29 Dec., 1770, pp. 640, 647.

It appears that Sambhaji Ganesh took steps to remove the oppression of the *amla* over the *mutassadis*.[111]

He forbade the entry of strangers into his province.[112]

Like other Maratha Subahdars he encouraged the pilgrims from other parts of India to visit the temple of Jagannath.[113]

It appears that Sambhaji Ganesh died on or about September, 1770.[114]

(vi) BABUJI NAIK
(1770-1773)

After the death of Sambhaji Ganesh, Rajaram Pandit was given the charge of the government of Orissa. During the administration of Sambhaji many zamindars did not pay off their dues to the government. They fell into arrears. At the request of Rajaram Pandit, Babuji Naik was sent from Nagpur with a number of sepoys and attendants. With his help Rajaram could collect the balances of money due from zamindars and Rajas.[115]

Rajaram Pandit[116] did not continue long in his office. Babuji Naik took the charge of administration of the country from his hands early in 1771.[117] He ruled Orissa till 1773.

He continued his friendly relation with the British like his predecessor. Allyn was a servant of the Company. He was in charge of the factory at Cuttack. He lent money to many persons. They refused to pay him back the money. As a result Allyn was pressed hard by his creditors to clear his dues. He informed Babuji Naik about this matter; the latter assisted him in realisation of the arrears.[118]

At this time there was scarcity of grains in Calcutta. The British desired to collect rice from Balasore.

111 *C. P. C.*, Vol. III, No. 64; *amla*, a native officer; *mutassadis*, a writer or clerk.
112 C. P. C., Vol. III, No. 135.
113 C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 1671.
114 C. P. C., Vol. III, Nos. 360, 442.
115 C. P. C., Vol. III, No. 775.
116 The detailed description of the career of Rajaram has been given in this book after the description of the career of Madhaji Hari.
117 C. P. C., Vol. III, No. 755.
118 C. P. C., Vol. III, No. 789, 886.

Babuji Naik instructed Abdullah Khan, *faujdar* of Balasore to help the British to purchase rice for Calcutta.[119]

His friendly help received response from the British hands. Some of the border zamindars were creating disturbances. When Babuji Naik desired the assistance of an English battalion for suppression of the disturbances that was readily granted by the Governor General.[120]

(vii) MADHAJI HARI

(1773-1777)

Madhaji Hari was the Governor of Orissa from 1773 to 1775. As Orissa is situated on the Bay of Bengal, many ships were passing along her coast. Occasionally some ships either carrying load or passengers were wrecked on the coast by storm over the sea. Particularly during the administration of Madhaji Hari many such ship-wrecks took place. Some ships were driven ashore and wrecked sometimes at southern or northern parts of the coast of Orissa.[121]

The attitude of many zamindars of these parts towards the inmates of the wrecked ships was not friendly. They, at times, plundered the properties of the passengers in the ships and put them into prison. For example, when a ship was stranded at Narasingpatna, the *faujdar* of Jagannath seized the masters of the sloop and the crew and threw them into prison. Similarly when some persons escaped from the ship wrecked at the coast of Malud, Kamal Muhammad the zamindar of the place seized and confined them.[122]

Generally the ships wrecked in the middle part of the coast of Orissa, *i.e.* near Kujang, Kanika and Ali were subject to more of oppression. That was so because the Rajas of these places enjoyed the status of feudatory chiefs. They were semi-independent. Their countries were filled with dense jungles; particularly in the rainy season communica-

119 *C.P.C.*, Vol. III, No. 1019.
120 *C.P.C.*, Vol. IV, No. 189.
121 *C.P.C.*, Vol. V, No. 680; *C.P.C.*, Vol. V, No. 395; *C.P.C.*, Vol. IV, No. 1480; *Ibid.*, No. 23.
122 *C.P.C.*, Vol. V, No. 680.

tion from outside was almost closed into these countries. Thus they considered themselves secure against any punishment from the Subahdar of Cuttack. So they indulged in these activities.

Two British ships were wrecked on the coast near Kujang. One of them was *Summerset* bound for Madras. The Captain, officers and passengers including two ladies managed to land in safety on the shore. It was reported that they all were confined by Kishen Chandra Sandh, the Raja of Kujang. The other was *Active* commanded by Captain Scot and coming from Madras to Calcutta. It foundered near Point Palmiras and Rogers, a British officer and the crew were alleged to have been imprisoned by the Raja of Kujang.[123]

The British sent Govardhan Bhattacharya to collect information in regard to the alleged plunder of the two British ships and murder of some men therein. From local enquiry it appeared that Gopinath Rao, Raja of Ali, 'Karara and Koldip' was involved in the plunder of the first ship. The second one was looted by the orders of the same Raja. Govardhan Bhattacharya informed the Governor General accordingly. But when the Governor General asked the Raja for explanation, he pleaded that he knew nothing of the wrecked ships. When the same matter was referred to the Raja of Kujang he likewise evaded the responsibility.[124]

It appears that these enquiries produced no effect on the activities of these Rajas; particularly the Raja of Kujang continued to behave as before. A British ship named *Verelst* was wrecked at 'Colon Dip' within the limits of the *thana* Talmal; three or four hundred bales of cotton which formed the part of the cargo was washed ashore. Instead of helping the Captain to recover the cotton bales, the Raja of Kujang seized the ship.[125] Again when another British ship named *Pembroke* reached Kujang, the Captain of the ship was seized and imprisoned. Similarly if

123 C.P.C., Vol. IV, Nos. 1170, 1109, 1479, 1859, 1950.
124 C.P.C., Vol. V, Nos. 1536, 1772, 1170.
125 C.P.C., Vol. V, Nos. 314, 382.

other European ships were wrecked on the coast their officers were captured and deprived of their properties.[126]

These notorious activities of these Rajas, particularly of the Raja of Kujang were considered to be a danger to the safety of the British ships passing near the coast. The British Government had already informed Madhaji Hari regarding this matter but without any effect.[127] Now it complained to the Maharaja Mudhoji Bhonsla that many ships were wrecked off the coast of Orissa and most of them at Kujang and Kanika and that the zamindars of those places who appeared to be lawless and 'rapacious savages' not only plundered the vessels and ill-treated and imprisoned the crew and passengers but also cruelly murdered Captain Rogers together with many of his comrades.[128]

The British Government pressed the Raja of Nagpur that for providing safety and protection of merchants, travellers and wayfarers, punishment should be inflicted on the Raja of Kujang who mostly indulged in plundering activities.[129]

As a remedy for similar evils in future the British wrote to the Raja of Nagpur that a *sanad* might be granted to the Company for "a perpetual possession of a strip of land which lies between the river of Kanika and the Mahanadi running in line with the sea coast" where the Company would erect with his permission a suitable building, accommodating men for safeguarding the coast, guarding the vessels on their passage and lastly for protecting the lives and properties of those who were ship-wrecked. That would promote and protect commerce.[130]

The British Government also suggested that to stop the cruelties of the Raja the power vested in him should be taken away. His authority at Kujang might be delegated to the British who would promote the stability of his government.[131]

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126 C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 1645; C.P.C., Vol. V, No. 728; C.P.C., Vol. V, No. 414.
127 C.P.C., Vol. IV, No. 1109.
128 C.P.C., Vol. V, No. 311.
129 *Ibid.*, No. 456.
130 *Ibid.*, No. 311.
131 *Ibid.*, No. 456.

The Raja of Nagpur did not permit the British to purchase a strip of land on the coast as it was considered that this would give the foreigners unnecessary extra privileges to build up their power there. He also did not authorise the British to stop cruelties as that would be a discredit to the Maratha administration. He considered the allegations of the British against the Raja of Kujang very seriously. He decided to punish the Raja severely if the charges were proved. Accordingly he asked Madhaji Hari to make proper enquiries and punish the Raja.[132] Madhaji Hari had already been informed by the British as to the atrocities of the Raja of Kujang. But he did not take these things very seriously. Now he sincerely conducted the enquiry. He could restore some of the plunders seized by the Raja. Some persons were also released. When the Raja expressed his sorrow for the past conduct Madhaji Hari was satisfied. He did not proceed any further to chastise Raja for his atrocious activities.[133] The British expressed disaffection against such measure. Consequently the Raja of Nagpur disliked the whole proceedings of Madhaji Hari and condemned him for shirking in his duty. He thought that his continuation in the office of the Subahdar was likely to strain his relation with the British. So he recalled him; the administration of the country together with the task of punishing the Raja was entrusted to Rajaram Pandit, a man of bravery, capability, valour and sound judgment.[134]

(viii) RAJARAM PANDIT

(1778-1793)

Rajaram Pandit succeeded Madhaji Hari as Maratha Governor of Orissa. He ruled from 1778 to 1792. He was very intelligent. He was both judicious and cautious in his dealings with the British. His valuable suggestion and advice to the Raja of Nagpur helped the latter in maintaining a friendly relation with the British.

The Raja of Nagpur was demanding the payment of '*chauth* from the British in Bengal. But that was not paid

132 *Ibid.*, No. 668.
133 *Ibid.*, No. 786.
134 *Ibid.*, Nos. 905, 911, 924, 931.

The Raja of Nagpur was long waiting for an opportunity to press the demand at a suitable time.

In 1781, Warren Hastings instructed Goddard to launch an attack on Gujrat. Nana Phadnavis, the leading Maratha leader at Poona Court, now approached Nizam of Hyderabad and Hyder Ali of Mysore to form an alliance against the British. The Raja of Nagpur took the opportunity and joined the Anti-British Confederacy. Thus the quadruple alliance was formed.[1]

The conflict with these four powers demanded movement of the British army from Bengal, which being the principal possession of the British had large army stationed there. The Bombay and Madras governments had not adequate powers and resources to fight with Hyder Ali, Nizam and the Poona Government without adequate help from the Bengal Government. A speedy march of soldiers from Bengal to Madras was not possible by land route as Orissa was occupied by the Raja of Nagpur who was a member of the Anti-British Confederacy. The Bhonsla who was also master of Nagpur was more feared and respected by the British for being the master of Orissa.[2]

In view of the situation Warren Hastings desired the Raja of Nagpur to withdraw from the Anti-British Confederacy. He thought that if through negotiation he could win the friendship of the Raja a British force could easily march through Orissa to Madras to check the attack of Hyder Ali. Moreover it would weaken the confederacy to a great extent.[3]

When his plan was not yet matured the British force met reverses at the hands of the enemy on the Corommandal coast. Taking advantage of this, Nana Phadnavis, who was the head of the Anti-British Confederacy,

[1] Sardesai, G. S., *History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 94.

[2] G. W. Forrest (ed.), *Selections from State Papers........Warren Hastings*, Vol. II, p. 202.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 201-2, 203-4.

instructed Mudoji, the Raja of Nagpur, to send immediately an army to attack Bengal.[4]

The Raja was not prepared to risk a war with the British for the cause of the allies. Yet he considered it wise to do his best to avoid the dread of resentment of his associates. In consultation with the Governor of Orissa he came to the conclusion that any war with the British would not benefit him. He thought that it would be better if he could utilise the distressing condition of the British to his fullest advantage. His object was to exact the payment of the *chauth* with all arrears from the British to satisfy his 'selfish aspiration' without caring for the success of the Confederacy. In view of this plan he sent about 40,000 horse under the command of his younger son on the day of Dashahara (11 August, 1779). Without any regard to the plan laid down by the Confederacy to march in the direction of Bihar, the army took a different route. Thus instead of marching to Azimabad via Mandla and Chhotanagpur and then making incursions to Bengal, the army first marched to Sambalpur and stayed there for one month. Then they deliberately delayed in coming to Cuttack on the plea that the roads were impassable owing to excessive rains. Naru Pandit, the *Peshwa's vakil,* was all along with them. He not only complained the slowness of the army but went to the extent of expressing his suspicion in regard to that there was a secret alliance between the British and the officers of the Raja.[5]

Then Chimnaji marched towards the river Brahmani at the head of his army which consisted of 30,000 horse. He stayed on the way for some time in the village of Taki near Lochanapur.[6] Here Rajaram Pandit with Biswamber Pandit joined him in his camp. Adequate provisions were not available; against the rebellion of some of the recalcitrant chiefs who were neglecting payment of revenue added to this difficulty. As a result, by the time he reached the bank of the Brahmani, 7,500 horse had

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 200-1.
5 *Ibid.*, p. 201.
6 C.P.C., Vol. V, Nos. 1701, 2070.

died.[7] The distress of the army was multiplying; the troops got nothing but plain bread and salt with much difficulty. Rajaram Pandit complained that while the requirements of the army amounted to four lakhs of rupees per month and according to this calculation 24 lakhs for six months, the collection of the whole year did not exceed 20 lakhs.[8]

A *peshkash* of sixty thousand *kahans* (of *kauris*) had been imposed by Rajaram Pandit on Trilochana Deva, the Raja of Dhenkanal. He was unable to pay it for two or three years. Rajaram pressed him hard for payment of it. But the Raja did not pay any regard to his demand. So Rajaram Pandit sent his forces to collect the arrears.[9] But the forces were compelled to retreat with heavy loss. Chimnaji was then in Orissa. He was persuaded by Rajaram Pandit to march to Dhenkanal to check the insubordination of the Raja and to collect the arrears, which might give him some relief in his distressing situation. Accordingly Chimnaji marched to Dhenkanal. Here the food grains were very dear; a rupee could not purchase even four seers of grains. Some hill men known as *Chuars* attacked some of his followers and robbed them of their belongings. In spite of these difficulties, the Marathas vigorously attacked the Raja. He was ultimately forced to accept the term dictated by the Marathas.[10]

Warren Hastings understood the sufferings of the Chimnaji's forces owing to scarcity of food. He sent them some supplies of food to develop a better relationship with the Marathas so that Colonel Pearse would be allowed to pass through Cuttack and Chimnaji would ultimately retire from Cuttack. But Chimnaji was not prepared to grant the wishes of Hastings without realising a large sum from him. In order to strengthen his army he desired more soldiers. Therefore from Dhenkanal he moved and

7 C. P. C., Vol. V, No. 2070.
8 C. P. C., Vol. V, No. 2069.
9 *Indian Historical Records Commission*, 19th Session, Trivandrum, 1942, pp. 162-3.
10 C. P. C., Vol. V, No. 2070.

encamped at Hajipur. Then he marched to Keonjhar. The Raja of Keonjhar along with his *diwan* and *vakil* came to pay his respects to Chimnaji. He supplied 20,000 *khandaits* to the Maratha forces.[11]

Meanwhile Warren Hastings carried on negotiations with Mudoji Bhonsla. He desired to avoid any rapture with the Marathas in Orissa. Therefore Anderson was appointed as a special minister to proceed to Chimnaji Bhonsla for further negotiations. As the state of affairs on the coast required the immediate despatch of the British detachment from Bengal, Warren Hastings felt the immediate need of sending a detachment under Colonel Pearse. He, therefore, ordered Colonel Pearse accordingly and the latter soon moved to Jaleswar at the command of an army.[12] He reached Jaleswar on 6 February, 1781. He then crossed the river Subarnarekha and encamped at Rajghat on the south bank of the river. The army reached Balasore on the 14th February, 1781.[13]

On hearing that Pearse had reached as far as Balasore, Chimnaji proceeded quickly through the jungles. He then encamped at Jajpur. He could have marched on to Balasore to force Colonel Pearse either to face a fight or to face starvation because his army was within a few miles of the road taken by Colonel Pearse.[14] But he avoided opposing him. The Poona chief could not appreciate the movements of the Maratha soldiers. So he was disgusted with them. From Jajpur Chimnaji reached Damnagar. He clearly circulated the news that he would oppose the progress of the British Force at the river Mahanadi.[15]

While Colonel Pearse's march was continuing, British negotiation with the Marathas was in progress. Anderson had already been ordered to leave Calcutta for Cut-

11 C. P. C., Vol. VI, No. 73.
12 G. W. Forrest (ed.), *Selections from State Papers—Warren Hastings*, Vol. II, p. 203.
13 *British Indian Military, Repository of Bengal Artillery—Colonel Pearse*, p. 187.
14 *Ibid.*, p. 187.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 201.

tack. He was instructed first to deliver the credentials and introductory letters from the Governor General to Chimnaji and Bhawani Pant Appa. Secondly he was to notify to the Raja the march of the British army under Colonel Pearse through Orissa into the Carnatic; thirdly he was to solicit the aid of 2,000 horse to accompany Colonel Pearse and fourthly to provide the Bengal Government with speedy and regular information of the Marathas in Orissa and their attitude and plan of opposition to Colonel Pearse's march.[16]

Anderson started from Calcutta on his mission. When he reached Balasore he came to understand that Chimnaji had already left Cuttack to attack the fort of Dhenkanal situated among the hills and jungles to the west of Cuttack road. He wished to find out a way to the camp of Chimnaji. But he was told that the communication was impossible in the impassable and dense jungle extending over 34 miles between Cuttack road and Dhenkanal.[17] Therefore he abandoned that idea. He took two or three sepoys with him from the *faujdar* of Balasore to avoid delay. He would otherwise have been detained by the *chaukidars* on the road. He proceeded towards Cuttack to meet Rajaram Pandit with Biswambar Pandit. On 28 January, 1781 he reached Cuttack. There he found that Rajaram Pandit had left Cuttack to join Chimnaji. He, however, met Manoji, *diwan* of Chimnaji, and Hurdi Ram, *diwan* at Cuttack. He handed over to them the letters of introduction and other despatches from the Governor General which were to be forwarded to Chimnaji. He then left Cuttack for Calcutta.[18]

Meanwhile Biswambar Pandit on behalf of Chimnaji conveyed to the Governor General a proposal for peaceful settlement of the matter. Consequently Anderson again came to Orissa to resume the negotiations. He was instructed to enter into an agreement for a supply of twelve lakhs

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[16] G. W. Forrest (ed.), *Selections from State Papers.........Warren Hastings*, Vol. II, p. 204.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 207.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

of rupees if Chimnaji would solemnly promise not to use the Maratha forces against the British.[19] He reached Balasore on 12 March, 1781. At Birkul he left his luggage including some presents of silk by Hastings because the coolies who were entrusted to carry such things fled away at the report of the depredations committed by a body of Marathas in Jaleswar.[20] Here he entered into a very long discussion with Chimnaji, his *diwan*, Bhawani Pandit and Rajaram Pandit. Anderson proposed to pay the Marathas twelve lakhs of rupees as instructed by the Governor General. But the Marathas pleaded that they had already spent two crores of rupees for their friendship with the British. Moreover they had the right to collect *chauth*.[21] In view of these demands twelve lakhs of rupees were quite inadequate. Thus both the parties could not come to an agreement. In this situation Rajaram Pandit proposed that the Marathas should go to Ramachandrapur. He and Biswambar Pandit together with Anderson would go to the Governor General at Calcutta to convince him of a larger supply of money to the Marathas. This proposal was accepted by both the parties. Then they proceeded to Calcutta.[22]

Rajaram Pandit explained the distress and misery of Chimnaji's forces to the Governor General. He suggested that the British should first pay fifty lakhs of rupees that might meet half the pay of Chimnaji's troops. Bhawani Pandit would come to finalise the terms of the treaty with the Governor General in British Camp at Danton or Narasinghgarh. But the Governor General was willing to pay only twelve lakhs of rupees provided 3,000 or at least 1,500 Maratha horse would join Colonel Pearse in his march towards Madras and the Maratha force then stationed in Orissa would leave it.[23]

In reply Rajaram Pandit said that he was willing to send 2,000 horse with Colonel Pearse. But a sum of

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19 *Ibid.*, p. 2?6.
20 *Ibid.*, p. 229.
21 *Ibid.*, pp. 241, 248.
22 *Ibid.*, p. 250.
23 *Ibid.*, pp. 251-2.

twelve lakhs of rupees should first be sent immediately to enable the Maratha forces to march towards Nagpur. Another sum of 25 lakhs of rupees was to be advanced to the Marathas as loan. Then the Maratha forces would quit.[24] The Governor General did not accept these propositions. But it was remarked that if the Marathas would assist Pearse's forces the British were ready to assist them with their forces in giving them possessions of Burhanpur, of Assur and of Garh Mandal. Hearing this Rajaram Pandit returned a new set of propositions. He said, "The sum formerly tendered to the government of Nagpur was 16 lakhs and that only three have yet been paid. That he will accept of the remaining thirteen lakhs which he will despatch to Syna Bander for the relief of this army. That he will cause the army to march immediately to Dhenkanal on the way to Gharrah Mundalah. That he will himself stay here for some time longer on his government giving him assurances that they will afterwards assist him in procuring a loan of ten or fifteen lakhs to be paid in two years from the money to be acquired from the conquest of Gharrah Mundalah and for which he as *naib* at Cuttack will be security. That he will for the present engage to send 2,000 horse to join Colonel Pearse and to assist in war against Hyder Ali."[25]

These propositions were lastly accepted by the Governor General-in-Council. As a result both the parties entered into an agreement. Accordingly a sum of 13 lakhs of rupees was advanced to Rajaram Pandit. A loan of ten lakhs was also advanced.[26]

The Marathas sent 2,000 horse along with Colonel Pearse. The British government had to bear the expense of 50,000 rupees per month for each 1,000 horse. The army under Chimnaji left Orissa and marched on an expedition against Garh Mandal.[27]

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 252.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 253.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 256.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

Meanwhile Colonel Pearse at the head of the British forces was proceeding through Orissa. He was assisted by Harihar Mahadeo a Maratha officer in crossing over a river (Gujury). Magun Chaudhuri, another Maratha officer accompanied him to the border of Ganjam. Thus he passed through Orissa to Madras without any difficulty.[28]

The part played by Rajaram Pandit in effecting a negotiation between both the parties was highly creditable. Warren Hastings remarked, "By acceding to Rajaram Pandit's propositions we have effectually detached one of the most powerful states from the general confederacy against us into which it had apparently entered."[29]

Now the relation between the Raja of Nagpur and the British was improved. Rajaram Pandit was very particular to see that the relationship so established was not strained owing to the notorious behaviour of any of his subordinate officers. Bhawani Das Chaudhuri was the *faujdar* of Balasore. He was also in charge of affairs at Pataspur. He was oppressive and unscrupulous. He occasionally used to harass the merchants to exact money from them. Generally he exploited the people. One of the instances of his oppression is given below.

Gangadhar Add was a merchant of Barabati in Balasore. He along with his family resided for about fifty or sixty years in the Company's factory. He used to carry on trade in Balasore by paying customary duties to the *faujdar* of Balasore.[30]

Gangadhar once sent a vessel towards the south loaded with rice. Prior to sending the vessel he claimed to have received necessary orders from the *faujdar* after paying the duties payable to him. But when the vessel had already sailed to sea Gangadhar was sent for by the *faujdar*

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28 *Ibid.*, p. 214; C. P. C., Vol. VI, No. 87; *British Indian Military. Repository of Bengal Artillery—Colonel Pearse*, p. 201.

29 G. W. Forrest (ed.), *Selections from State Papers—Warren Hastings*, Vol. II, p. 257.

30 *Translation of Persian Records*. (to be abbreviated as T. P. R.), Received, September, 1792, No. 360.

and questioned by whose order he despatched the ship to the sea. Although it was represented to the *faujdar* by Gangadhar that he had done so according to his previous orders, he was accused of disobedience. *Coss Bunder Mahasil* tax, on leaving the coast was again imposed on him even after the ship had left the coast. As a result a sum of 750 rupees was forcibly taken away from him.[31]

From that day Gangadhar incurred the displeasure of the *faujdar*. Gangadhar had a *gola* of rice and another of paddy at a place called 'Nulcooly.' Motiram, a nephew and an agent of Bhawani Das Chaudhury, one day forcibly caused the two *golas* to be broken with his men and seized all the rice and paddy preserved there. Gangadhar launched a complaint against his lawless and high-handed act before Bhawani Das Chaudhury. Bhawani Das Chaudhury told him that payment would be made for the rice and paddy taken from him. So Gangadhar approached him many times. But Bhawani Das Chaudhuri cleverly held out false hopes for payment but in actuality did not pay.[32]

After a few days of this incident Bhawani Das Chaudhury lodged a complaint against Gangadhar before Wilkinson, British resident at Balasore and put forth a claim on him for payment of a sum of Rs. 50,000 to the account of Murar Pandit and another sum of Rs. 10,000 to the account of Lalla Rajakishore Ray. Wilkinson called Gangadhar and asked him about this subject. Gangadhar replied that he had already settled the matter. So he had no account whatever left unadjusted with the Maratha Government. Wilkinson then informed Bhawani Das Chaudhuri that if he could produce any legal acknowledgment to that effect payment would be made instantly.[33]

Thus Bhawani Das Chaudhuri failed to harass Gangadhar in this way. Therefore he devised various other ways to put him into trouble.

31 *Ibid.*
32 *Ibid.*
33 *Ibid.*

Gangadhar kept a few repairing materials for the purpose of repairing his vessel. The *faujdar's* men went there and took away all that was kept there. Thirteen days after the *faujdar* employed *Barakandazes* around Barabati to seize the person of Gangadhar and extort money from him. Then some persons surrounded his house, climbed the walls, entered into the grounds, beat and abused his people. Then they placed a *chauki* there. Meanwhile Gangadhar had been to Wilkinson. So they could not find him at his house.[34]

Therefore Bhawani Das Chaudhury sent Motiram with forces who entered into the British factory. Gangadhar was seized and taken away in the very presence of Wilkinson. He was threatened and a sum of Rs. 25,000 was demanded from him. But he expressed his inability to pay such an amount. He told Motiram that his houses and effects were at his disposal if he wanted them. Then a peon on behalf of Bhawani Das Chaudhuri expostulated in private with Motiram saying, "What do you look in such a moment. Agree to give 10,000 rupees and I will interpose to adjust all matters and if you do not commit to give this you will suffer great hardship and be compelled to pay the sum". He was further told that if he would continue to be unwilling to pay the sum he would not enjoy 'free liberty.' Ultimately he agreed to pay 4,600 rupees and give an acknowledgment to that effect. Then he got his liberty and paid the contracted sum on the appointed day.[35]

Wilkinson could no longer brook the oppression of Bhawani Das Chaudhury over Gangadhar. He grew sympathetic towards the latter by arranging to save him from any further oppression. So Bhawani Das Chaudhury got angry with him. He harassed him by putting a stop to the *dak* carried into the factory. He also stopped the sale of commodities there.[36]

Wilkinson now reported to the Governor General that the *faujdar* of Balasore was showing disrespect towards

[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *T.P.R.*, Received, 3 September, 1792, No. 238.

him. He detained the *dak* between Calcutta and Madras. On the pretext of recovering money he caused the armed force to enter into the factory, seized Gangadhar and took him away. Wilkinson objected to such behaviour and wanton cruelty shown to a helpless merchant living in a British factory. In spite of his protest Bhawani Das Chaudhury continued to harass Gangadhar. He adopted all possible means to put him into trouble by "depriving him of the means of procuring the necessary subsistence for himself and the servants from the common bazar."[37]

This letter was received by Lord Cornwallis. He informed Raghuji Bhonsla of everything that was represented by Wilkinson against Bhawani Das Chaudhury. He vehemently condemned the misbehaviour and unfriendly dealings of the *faujdar* of Balasore. He further remarked that such oppression of the *raiyats* and travellers was bound to affect the revenue of the Raja". He demanded two things; one was a proper apology to Wilkinson from Bhawani Das Chaudhury; the other was the immediate removal of Bhawani Das Chaudhury from his office.[38]

He again sent a body of troops to march to Balasore and guard the factory. This body of troops was directed to seize the person of Bhawani Das Chaudhury in case of a repetition of such conduct.[39]

Raghuji Bhonsla wrote two letters to Rajaram Pandit to make proper enquiry into the allegations of the Governor General against the conduct of Bhawani Das Chaudhury.[40] Rajaram Pandit was not so long aware of such activities of Bhawani Das Chaudhury. After proper investigation into the case he was convinced that the latter was guilty. He, therefore, removed him from his charge of affairs of Pataspur and from his employment at Balasore. Some of his associates and accomplices were also removed from their offices.[41] Murar Pandit, who was well-

37 *Ibid.*
38 *T.P.R.*, Written, 3rd September, 1792, No. 238.
39 *Ibid.*
40 *T.P.R.*, Received, 2 November, 1792, No. 456; 6 November, 1702, No. 457.
41 *T.P.R.*, Received 20 December, 1792, No. 499.

versed in business and was a man of accommodating disposition was appointed in his place as *faujdar* of Balasore. He was previously fixed at Balasore for ten to fifteen years. He transacted his business in perfect union with Marriot and Wodesworth the former residents at Balasore.[42]

Although Bhawani Das Chaudhury was removed, the British sepoys sent to the factory at Balasore continued to stay. Rajaram Pandit thought that the presence of such sepoys put discredit on the Maratha government; further it was likely to create mischief and disgrace on the affairs of the collection and cultivation. In view of this he requested Cornwallis to recall the sepoys at the factory. Wilkinson was informed accordingly. In view of the changed situation there did not arise any necessity to station the sepoys. Thus with Wilkinson's concurrence the sepoys were removed from Balasore. The relation between the British resident at Balasore and the present *faujdar* of Balasore remained now friendly.[43]

Rajaram Pandit not only punished officers who were responsible for the strained relation between the Maratha government of Orissa and the British government, but also punished such Rajas who gave shelter and assistance to the refractory subjects from the British territory. Balaram Maharatha a refractory landholder of the British Company at Ganjam absconded and passed into the territory of the Raja of Khurda. Snodgrass, the British chief of Ganjam, informed Rajaram Pandit about this matter. He requested the latter to search for him. If he was seized he was to be handed over to him. Rajaram Pandit appointed his people to go in search of Balaram Maharatha. First no news about the movements of the absconder could be obtained. But later on it was found that Balaram Maharatha had clandestinely taken service under Divyasinha Deva, the Raja of Khurda. Balaram Maharatha was informed of the search made after him. So he came out of the fort at night and concealed himself along with his

42 *T.P.R.*, Received, 26 September, 1792, No. 499; *Ibid.*, 31 Oct., 1792, No. 459.
43 *T.P.R.*, Received 1792, Nos. 449, 538.

adherents in the neighbourhood of Cuttack. Yet he was seized; he was put in chains. Snodgrass was now informed accordingly. So he sent a few sepoys to take away the absconder. Moreover Rajaram Pandit offered some horse and foot to escort them as far as Mafud but that was rejected. The people from Snodgrass gave an acknowledgment to Rajaram Pandit for the person of Balaram Maharatha and took him along with them in the jungles belonging to the Raja of Khurda. They marched on the way throughout the day without a stop. But as soon as evening came suddenly a party of the *paiks* and *Barakandazes* appeared and attacked the sepoys. The sepoys were wounded and confused. They dispersed one after another; thus Balaram Maharatha was rescued. After this the attacking party ran away into the jungle and disappeared.[44]

As soon as Rajaram Pandit heard this, he informed Snodgrass accordingly. At the same time he led an expedition to chastise Divyasinha Deva because he was suspected of abetting such troubles. When he reached in the neighbourhood of the fort of Khurda, the Raja's *vakil* assured Rajaram Pandit that his brother alone was there and that Balaram Maharatha, who was wounded had died. This information was sent to Snodgrass accordingly. Thus Rajaram Pandit impressed upon the British that he was prepared to do anything that would avoid misunderstanding and conflict and strengthen the friendship with them.[45]

He was not only a clever politician but also a good administrator. He was always careful to suppress the insubordinate activities of the refractory Rajas. He inflicted punishment over such Rajas. It appears that Rajaram Pandit was the first Maratha Governor, who imposed tribute on the Raja of Khurda. Birakishore Deva the Raja of Khurda went mad. He murdered four of his own children. There was a clamour against his frightful deeds. Rajaram Pandit secured his person and put him into confinement in the fort of Barabati. He recognised his grandson Divyasinha Deva as his successor only when the family

[44] *T.P.R.*, Received 1792, No. 475; *Ibid.*, No. 332.
[45] *T.P.R.*, Received 1792, No. 538.

of the Raja agreed to the payment of the annual tribute of *sicca* rupees 10,000.[46]

He took special interest in religion. Pilgrims from various parts of India were encouraged to visit the temple of Jagannath. Grants from the public revenue were made to *Gosains* to perform religious ceremonies.[47] Many rich people were encouraged to grant lands for the *Bhog* to Lord Jagannath.[48]

Prior to his administration the usual practice was to collect revenue chiefly through the hereditary *Talukdars*. But he discouraged that practice. He removed many *Talukdars* from their services. He appointed his own men who collected revenue either from the tenants or from the headmen of the villages.[49] Stirling wrote: "His personal qualities and abilities were respectable and coupled with his extensive local knowledge, lent a character of dignity and stability to his administration with which no preceding one had been invested."[50]

He died in 1793 after discharging his duties as a very able Maratha Governor of Orissa.[51]

(ix) SADASHIV RAO

(1793-1803)

Rajaram Pandit's son, Sadashiv Rao, had already acted as *Naib Subahdar* of Orissa. Thus he gathered administrative experience. Now the Raja of Nagpur sent Diwan Harivansa Ray with a *sanad*, a *khelat* and a string of pearl to invest him (Sadashiv Rao) with the viceroyalty of Orissa.[1]

He was quite friendly to the British like his father. After the abolition of the British Residency at Balasore,

46 A Stirling. *An Account of Orissa Proper or Cuttack*, p. 93.
47 *C. P. C.*, Vol. VII, Nos. 201, 634, 731, 861.
48 *C. P. C.*, Vol. VII, No. 38.
49 13 May, 1818, Ewer to Government, *Bengal Revenue Consultations* 17 July, 1818, No. 15.
50 A Stirling. *An Account of Orissa Proper or Cuttack*, p. 93.
51 *T. P. R.*, Received 3 September, No. 442.
1 *T. P. R.*, Received 2 September, 1793, No. 441; *Ibid.*, 3 September 1793, No. 443.

Barabati which had been territorially within the Residency should normally have passed under the Marathas; but Sadashiv Rao relinquished his rights in respect of it[1] as a gesture of friendliness towards the British and in consequence, Barabati became attached to the British factory.[2]

He co-operated with the British in suppressing the hostile activities of some border Rajas. One of them was the Raja of Mayurbhanj. In 1795 one battalion belonging to the Company's army stationed at Midnapur mutinied. They refused to lay down their arms; they fired upon another battalion. Consequently the latter was obliged to retaliate them; some were killed; some taken prisoners; others fled. Some of them entered into the country of the Raja of Mayurbhanj. It was reported that 160 of the mutineers were maintained by the Raja; they received daily allowance of food from him. When the British asked him to deliver them in to their hands, he did not listen to them. When Sadashiv Rao was requested by the British to take action against the Raja he at once wrote to the Raja to desist from giving any protection to the mutineers. He also ordered the *faujdar* of Balasore to make a full search for the rebellious sepoys and drive them out of the limits of Mayurbhanj. Consequently the Raja ceased to indulge in those activities.[3]

Sadashiv Rao many times facilitated the march of British troops from Bengal to Madras. He assisted the march of one regiment under the command of Lt. Col. Higgens from Bengal to Ganjam through Orissa.[4] He supplied messengers and provisions to the troops under the command of Col. Erskine[5] and helped them in crossing the river. When Captain Kirkpatrick proceeded from Bengal to Madras he instructed the *Amils* to provide the British troops with shopping facilities.[6] He went to the extent of clearing some roads from the danger of tigers to facilitate

[2] *Public Consultations*—10 August, 1795, No. 1.
[3] *T.P.R.*, Received 24 December, 1795, No. 431.
[4] *T.P.R.*, Written, 1 February, 1799, No. 48.
[5] *Ibid.*, 11 December, 1795, No. 225.
[6] *T.P.R.*, Received 31 December, 1793, No. 119.

the march of British troops.[7] Peter Spike acting Governor General-in-Council, Fort William, said that Sadashiv's "Zeal is over-exemplary in carrying into execution the wishes of this *Sarkar*[•] (British government) with a view to improve system of union and harmony subsisting between us."[8]

The friendly attitude of the Marathas encouraged the British, who reorganised their postal system in Orissa in a better way than before. There was an increase of postal establishments between Calcutta and Jagannath. Additional *harkaras* were appointed at *tappal* stations.[9]

Sadashiv's friendly relation with the British did not stand in the way of his fighting for a just cause. He was ever prepared to protest against high-handed or unjust activities of the British officers or government when they went contrary to the legitimate interests of the Maratha Government or its people. When Divyasinha Deva II, the Raja of Khurda, died there was a contest for the succession to the throne between two rivals; one was Mukunda Deva, son of Divyasinha Deva; the other was Shyamsunder, second son of Birakishore Deva, hence the uncle of Mukunda Deva.[10]

During the life time of Divyasinha Deva Shyam Sundar had resided at Cuttack. Soon after the former's death the latter fled to a zamindar in the Northern Sarkars. He could persuade a British officer and could collect a body of men consisting of troops from the British battalion. He came as far as Chicacole. Then he planned to proceed to Khurda to seize the throne from his rival. Sadashiv Rao vehemently protested against the British help to Shyam Sundar. The Bengal Government was repeatedly asked to take action so that the fugitive would receive no assistance to fight against his rival in the Maratha country. Consequently Shyam Sundar's plan failed. Mukunda Deva's position as the ruler of Khurda was left secure.[11]

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7 *T. P. R.*, Written, 10 January, 1797, No. 10.
8 *T. P. R.*, Written, 1 February, 1799, No. 48.
9 *Public Consultations*, 28 July, 1794, No. 32.
10 *T. P. R.*, Received, 6 September, 1798, No. 398.
11 *Ibid.*

On another occasion some subjects of Sadashiv were proceeding to Murshidabad with some treasure as they used to do previously. The British officers stationed at Jaleswar suspected their *bona-fides* without sufficient reason, and did not allow them to pass. They obtained an order from the Magistrate of Midnapur for detaining the men with the treasure. When Sadashiv Rao learnt this he complained against the improper and unfriendly behaviour of the British officers. He demanded the release of the persons with the treasure. Accordingly the British released them with their treasure.[12]

On a third occasion he wrote strongly to the British Government to recover some treasure from a certain person to be handed over to Sri Ram Das, the *Mahant* of a *Math* at, Puri. That *Mahant* had appointed one Brindaban Das to collect the offerings made to Lord Jagannath by the devotees at Calcutta. Brindaban Das died there but the money and property collected by him in the name of Lord Jagannath were left in possession of Keshu Potdar an inhabitant of Calcutta. As he was not prepared to surrender them, Sadashiv Rao wrote to the British to direct the proper officers to recover the money and property from Keshu Potdar and transmit them to Puri through Sadhu Charan Das Vishnu, who was the authorised agent of the *Mahant*.[13]

On a fourth occasion Sadashiv Rao wrote to the British for the release of Ramanand Bhuyan. Ramanand Bhuyan was the zamindar of Jamukunda in Maratha territory. British vessels were driven by a stormy weather into the Jamukunda river. Ramananda Bhuyan plundered them. The British Government protested against this outrage to the Maratha Government. The Maratha Government assured the British that necessary action would be taken against Ramanand Bhuyan. Meanwhile Ramananda Bhuyan went to Gopi Ballavpur for the purpose of visiting Sri Govind Ji. He was seized there and carried to Midna-

12 *Public Consultations*, 31 August, 1795, No. 15; *T. P. R.*, Received 30 July, 1795, No. 261; *T. P. R.*, Written 13 August, 1795, No. 152.
13 *T. P. R.*, Received, 4 March, 1794, No. 153; *T. P. R.*, Received, 4 March, 1794, No. 154.

pur by the British police.[14] Sadashiv Rao wrote to the British that the imprisonment of Ramananda Bhuyan by the British officers was improper, as such punishment was within the competence of the Maratha Government. Moreover the property plundered from the British vessels had already been recovered. In view of this Sadashiv claimed that the British should set him free. He repeatedly pointed out the British mistake and ultimately secured the release of Ramanand Bhuyan[15]

During his administration, Sadashiv Rao many times complained against the oppression of the zamindars in British territory over the *raiyats* in Maratha territory. Particularly the zamindar of Kudai, a *pargana* in British territory was often oppressing the *raiyats* of Pataspur, a *pargana* in Maratha territory. He occasionally took bonds from them preventing them from cultivating the lands which they used to cultivate from time immemorial. He asked his tenants to build an embankment in the vicinity of Kahnupur which lay within Pataspur and this did not accord with earlier practice. Sadashiv Rao vehemently objected to these instances of oppression and asked the British Government to take measures against the wickedness of the zamindars in British territory.[16]

Sadashiv Rao was particular about the collection of the revenue punctually. The Raja of Khurda used to delay the payment of revenue to the Maratha Government. As a remedy against this Sadashiv Rao secured the services of an *Amil* from Nagpur to enforce the punctual payment of the revenue.[17]

In the month of February, 1798, Sadashiv Rao set out from Cuttack in order to pay his respects to Raghuji

14 *T.P.R.*, Received, 7 May, 1802, No. 136.

15 *T.P.R.*, Written 6 September, 1802, No. 72; *T.P.R.*, Received 13 January, 1803, No. 11; *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1803, No. 41, Letter dated 4 November, 1803; *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1803, No. 42, Letter, dated 17 November, 1803.

16 *T.P.R.*, Received, 28 July, 1802, No. 202; *T.P.R.*, Received, 28 July, 1802, No. 203.

17 *T.P.R.*, Received, 6 September, 1798, No. 398.

Bhonsla. He delivered the charge of his office to his brother Nilakanth Rao.[18] It appears that after his return from Nagpur he resumed charge of his office which he held up to 1803. In 1803 Ekaji Shukdeo perhaps the same as Vyakoji Shukdeo was acting as his deputy during his absence.[19] By the time Orissa was occupied by the British, Sadashiv Rao was absent and Ekaji Shukdeo had left the country.[20]

18 *T. P. R.*, Received, 24 April, 1798, No. 185.
19 *T. P. R.*, Received 18 May, 1803, No. 97; *Ibid.*, 18 May, 1803, No. 99.
20 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 21 June, 1804, No. 53, Encl., 24 March, 1804, M. S. Elphinstone.

CHAPTER III

ANGLO-MARATHA CONFLICT OF INTEREST

(i) *British attempt to settle boundary line between Bengal and Orissa.*

The question of settling the boundary line between Bengal occupied by the British and Orissa ruled by the Marathas was one of the most vexing problems in the second half of the eighteenth century. According to the treaty of 1751 which was concluded between Aliwardi Khan and the Raja of Nagpur, the frontier of Bengal was generally fixed at the river Subarnarekha.[1] Although in theory the Subarnarekha was considered as a demarcating line, still in actual practice it was not so. There were some Maratha territories on the north side of the river; similarly the Bengal government had certain lands on the southern side of it.[2] Some of the zamindars of the border villages and *parganas* did not give up the lands on one or other side of the river. They continued to collect revenue from the people of those lands in accordance with the long standing practice. Others had estates on both British and Maratha territories; they paid revenue to the governments of both the territories.[3]

Generally the zamindars were involved in disturbances which took place owing to a variety of reasons. If they were questioned, they attempted to seek protection from their own governments. As the governments had no power over the persons beyond their jurisdiction, they were quite helpless to remove the grievances of the party oppressed. So occasionally a dispute between two parties was referred, by one government to the other. But it was difficult to put adequate pressure over the refractory zamindar to abide by government's order as with the help of the people under his control he could give a variety of reasons for the origin

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1 *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 112-3.
2 C. P. C., Vol. VIII, No. 508.
3 C. P. C., Vol. V, Nos. 505, 506.

of dispute throwing the responsibility on his opponent. Generally an oppression of one zamindar was retaliated by that of the other. Force was replied by force. The matter was complicated. The governments were found to support their zamindars.

Peace in *parganas* on or near the border was occasionally disturbed owing to various reasons. One was related to land dispute. That will be evident from one instance given below. Once Lochana Chaudhuri, a zamindar in the Maratha territory, forcibly took possession of lands and other effects belonging to Asharam Chaudhuri, a zamindar in the Company's territory. So the latter referred the matter to the British authorities in Bengal. Ensign Campbell was sent to see justice done to Asharam. Lochana Chaudhuri could not, however, be induced to restitute lands in question nor the *faujdar* of Balasore showed any interest to take this matter into consideration. Therefore only by committing outrages and using violence Campbell could restore lands to Asharam.[4]

Peace was also disturbed owing to the stealing of cattle from the territory of one zamindar at the instigation of the zamindar of other territory. In 1779 Basant Khan of Balasore took away 404 heads of cattle from the British territory. A joint enquiry was made by Parameswari as an *amin* on behalf of the Marathas and by Imamuddin from the side of the British. It was found that the allegation was true. After the theft case was proved Parameswari on behalf of Basant Khan gave back 91 of the cattle. He also gave a written undertaking that the remaining 313 heads of the cattle would be returned in eight days' time. But such a promise could not be fulfilled. The British subjects grew impatient. In order to take revenge on the Maratha subjects, they seized the cattle particularly some buffaloes of Sagar Datt, an inhabitant of Balasore. When the Marathas referred the matter to the British they were unwilling to take action to restore the cattle as Parameswari had failed to comply with the terms. Thus the matter remained unsettled.[5]

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[4] *Ibid.*, No. 252.
[5] C.P.C., Vol. VI, No. 189.

The plundering of the territory of one zamindar by another zamindar similarly led to disturbances in the border. The zamindar of Jamukunda in Maratha territory was the most troublesome amongst them, on the border. He many times attacked the Company's warehouse at Birkul and plundered the British territory. He occasionally looted the property of the British subjects whose boats were driven by storms into the Jamukunda river.[6] When pursued by the British who demanded redress for the injury done by him to their subjects the zamindar of Jamukunda took shelter within the Maratha territory. The British Government therefore was quite helpless to take any measures against him.[7]

Not only many zamindars were interested in such plunder but also many people at times indulged in such activities. For example, the people of the zamindar of Bhograi once entered into a salt godown of the village of Nafri in the *pargana* of Birkul belonging to the British, seized and carried away five or six *amlas*, beat the *Darogha* nearly to death, manhandled a sepoy and one or two *paiks* and carried away money and other things found there. Consequently the work of the salt godown had to suffer because the persons employed at the godown were afraid for their very lives.[8]

Sometimes, some people from the British territory were acting in a similar manner. Once some traders from Pataspur went to the British territory to sell some quantity of salt. After procuring assistance from the zamindar of Kudai, a *pargana* of the British, some people seized the salt and bullocks from the traders and sold them away.[9]

The encouragement, and shelter given by some zamindars to robbers was another cause of disturbance. Here is an example. Bairam Gopal Das and Abdus Sakur and a few other *Sahukars* used to carry on their business at Cut-

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6 *T. P. R.*, Received, 1803, No. 11.
7 *T. P. R.*, Issued, 1802, No. 77.
8 *C. P. C.*, Vol. IX, No. 1713.
9 *T. P. R.*, Received, 1802, No. 203.

tack and Calcutta. Near Bhadrak a gang of robbers looted from them a sum of twenty-two thousand and six hundred rupees which was being despatched to Murshidabad. These robbers belonged to Midnapur. They were apprehended and were taken to Gokulanand, the zamindar of the place. Gokulanand realised the money, but he misappropriated it and paid no heed to the requests of the bankers to pay back the money.[10]

The fifth one was generally concerned with the imposition of duty on the people of one territory by the officers or zamindars of the other. As the boundaries of both the countries were at places overlapping each other, the officers or the zamindars often took advantage of the situation. In one instance the British officers set up a *chauki* near Narasingpur in Mayurbhanj; duties were imposed on the pilgrims visiting to Narasingpur. Such an act considerably dissuaded the pilgrims, from visiting the place, which resulted in the loss of revenue to the Maratha State.[11]

Maratha zamindars were also sometimes indulging in similar activities. For example, the Company's people in *pargana* Napochaur and *pargana* Lambajur (Laichanpur) were producing grains. When they exported their grains to Shahbandar, a *pargana* in Maratha territory, they were taxed by the zamindar of the place. Even if the grains were produced not to be imported to Shahbandar, still the zamindar of Shahbandar occasionally sent the *paiks* and *piadas;* they forcibly collected from the Company's people duty on grains.[12]

Some of the zamindars who were indulging in those plundering activities could manage to take shelter on the other side of the border to avoid punishment. They also adopted similar policy to avoid payment of revenue. The Raja of Mayurbhanj was one of them. He held lands as a zamindar in the territories of the English and Marathas.

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10 C.P.C., Vol. VII, No. 522.
11 C.P.C., Vol. IX, No. 1093.
12 *Home Misc.*, 201(1), pp. 51-2; C.P.C., Vol. III, No. 228.

He sometimes utilised his position to evade the just demand of either power by alternatively seeking shelter under the other. On one occasion the Raja took possession of the *pargana* of Belorchaur which was a part of the Company's territory. For some time he seized the three ghats of Rani Sarai, Mastani and Rajghat at Jaleswar and thus created disturbance. As a Company's vassal, he was summoned to the court of the Collector of Midnapur. But he paid no attention to it. On the other hand he sought protection from the Maratha *faujdar* at Balasore, which was granted. On another occasion the Raja could not pay the revenue to the Maratha government. Thus he fell into arrears of revenue amounting to Rs. 50,000|-. He was asked to pay the amount. But he absconded to Jaleswar in the Company's territory to avoid such payment. Similarly Jagabandhu Patnaik and Bairagi Bhanj, the Raja's agents who used to attend the office of the Maratha government for paying the land revenue had also fled to Jaleswar.[13]

It was very often a practice with many of Bhonsla's other defaulting zamindars, *talukdars* and *raiyats* to run away from the border districts like Pataspur, Bhograi, Kamarda and Shahbandar, etc. to Midnapur, Jaleswar, Hijli and Kanthe in the Company's territory. Similarly some of the people of the Company's territory sought protection in Maratha kingdom of Orissa.[14]

People ran away to the other side of the border not only to avoid payment of revenue but also to avoid payment of loan. For example, one Muhammad Ali lived in Orissa. He took a loan of Rs. 1,500 from Sadashiv Rao, son of Rajaram Pandit. He could not pay back the money and so fled to Murshidabad in Company's territory. When the money was demanded from him he refused to return the loan.[15]

In consequence of plunder, raid and various other disturbances, practised particularly by troublesome zamindars on the border, there occasionally was economic loss to the people in general. The people then could not extricate

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13 C. P. C., Vol. IX, No. 724.
14 C. P. C., Vol. VIII, Nos. 306, 317, 1,420, 1,508; C. P. C., Vol. IX, No. 310.
15 *Ibid.*

themselves from this difficult situation as they on both sides of the border were economically dependent on each other. Sometimes the trade of both the governments was seriously affected. Generally the life and property of the people near the border was often insecure. Particularly the poor people suffered most at the hands of the refractory zamindars. As there was no natural barrier between the two territories, it was difficult to establish any effective police guard against the occurrence of such disturbances.

The British conquered Bengal. But first, the boundary problem did not draw their proper attention. They were granted Burdwan and Midnapur by the Nawab of Bengal; thereafter they stationed for some time some soldiers near the border against the Maratha raid. In 1765 they were granted the *diwani* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Then, as the supreme power in Bengal, they continued negotiations with the Raja of Nagpur to purchase Orissa from the latter. Ambassadors were exchanged; money was spent and the terms of treaty were presented by one government to the other. Yet, at last the negotiations were broken off because the Raja of Nagpur was not willing to sell Orissa on the terms offered by the British. As long as the negotiation continued the border disturbances were not given any importance because it was thought that when Orissa would be ceded the border problems would be automatically solved. But after the failure of negotiations the British now turned their attention to the border problem. In June, 1788 Cornwallis sent Forster to the Court of Nagpur. Forster suggested to the Raja of Nagpur that there were many villages which were situated in such a way on both sides of the Subarnarekha that disturbances could occur at any time; the villages might be exchanged in such a way that the river would form the boundary line. It was further suggested that on examination the *jamas* of the villages on both sides of the river should be calculated, and the difference should be made good in cash. This proposal was patiently heard by the Raja. Bhawani Pandit, the *munshi* of the Governor of Orissa, was asked to investigate into the matter and give his opinion. After due enquiry Bhawani Pandit reported that "the villages re-

mained in their present situation for the last 40 years." The existing arrangement should not be disturbed and *status quo* should be maintained. Consequently the Raja of Nagpur did not agree to the British proposal.[16]

This matter was dropped for some years. The British sent Colebrooke to Nagpur; he arrived there on 18 March, 1799. G. W. Barlow, Secretary to the Government of India under Wellesley wrote to Colebrooke that he had enclosed the extract of a letter from Lieut. Col. Watson regarding a late inroad made by some marauders from the Maratha territories contiguous to the frontier of Midnapur. He further added that "the frays and disputes which occur between the zamindars on the Midnapur frontier and those under Maratha jurisdiction having been ascribed to a great degree to the villages and lands of respective states on the frontier being so intermingled that a village belonging to one state is often situated at a considerable distance within the general line of the other."[17] He thus suggested that negotiations with the Raja of Berar for an exchange of villages or lands in question should be made for a regular and uninterrupted line of frontier. Accordingly Colebrooke renewed the proposed exchange of lands for the purpose of adjusting a line of demarcation between Midnapur and Cuttack. A map sketched in Persian from Rennell's Atlas and exhibiting the situation of *parganas* like Pataspur was furnished to the Raja. The British thought that the Raja would not be disinclined to the proposed adjustment. The Raja, however, did not accept the British proposal because he saw that the value of the *parganas* like Pataspur and Kamarda which were to be ceded by him was trible the value of the lands he was to get from the British in return. Such villages which were a good source of revenue to the Marathas were not considered worth exchanging. Thus the negotiations failed.[18]

This boundary problem was over only when the British conquered Orissa in 1803.

16 *C. P. C.*, Vol. VI, No. 556; *C. P. C.*, Vol. VIII, No. 508; *C. P. C.*, Vol. VIII, No. 630; *C. P. C.*, Vol. IX, No. 605.
17 *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. V, 22, (p. 31.)
18 *Ibid.*, No. 56 (p. 86); *Ibid.*, No. 64 (p. 94).

(ii) *British attempt to check smuggling of Salt from Orissa into Bengal.*

Under the Marathas Orissa produced salt in plenty. The salt *Aurangs* or manufacturing tracts extended in a line along the shores of the Bay of Bengal from the Maratha enclosures east of the river Subarnarekha on the north to the Chilka Lake on the south. Most of the *Aurangs* were in the territories of the Rajas or the zamindars whose estates bordered on the coast. The salt produced in these *Aurangs* were of two kinds; one was *Punga,* the other was *Karkach*. The process of making the former was by solar evaporation, the latter by boiling.[1]

The salt-workers were known as *Malangis*. They manufactured salt at a very low rate, nearly four annas a maund. Usually the *Beparis* advanced them money for the manufacture of salt. When it was ready they purchased it.[2]

It was not only available in plenty, it was also cheap. An Arcot rupee could purchase about four and a half maunds of salt at the place of manufacture. The *Beparis* purchased the salt at this place at the rate of from three and a half to four annas per maund or less than one *kahan* of *kauris*. But they had to pay a *sayar* duty on the transit of salt; as a result of this the price of salt was enhanced to nearly three *kahans* per maund particularly in the interior. The information supplied by the *Nirkhi*[3] under the Marathas shows that salt averaged 22 seers *Katki*[4] or 28 seers Balasore or Calcutta weight[5] for a Chaupani rupee equivalent to two *kahans* and four *pans* of *kauris* in the last four years of the Maratha government. Some early British officers also refer to the cheapness of the article. J. Melville who entered Orissa at the time of British conquest stated that with five annas a person could easily purchase a maund of salt. Ewer, who had access to many Maratha

[1] Parliamentary Papers, 1856, *House of Commons*, Vol. 26, Part III, Bengal (Report.....upon salt in British India), pp. 484-5, 493.
[2] C.P.C., Vol. IX, No. 605.
[3] An officer, who records the prices of articles.
[4] Katki seer weighs 105 tolas.
[5] Calcutta seer weighs 80 tolas; formerly 82.

records was of opinion that the average price of salt during Maratha period was from two and a half to three *kahans* per maund.[6]

The cheapness, and abundance of the article helped the *Beparis* to make a good profit out of salt business.

About three lakh maunds of salt were exported to Berar every year. It was chiefly sent by way of the grand road along the Mahanadi.[7] The trade in salt was so profitable that Sambhu Bharati, a *Mahajan* of Cuttack, had salt *golas* in the territory of the Rajah of Khurda; he agreed to pay the Raja's *peshkash* of Rs. 1,000 to the Maratha government in return for the privilege, he was granted to carry on his commerce duty free.[8]

A good amount was sold in Bengal. But this was directly affected when the British occupied this territory.

After the British established their supremacy in Bengal, an attempt was made to increase income from salt trade. Clive formed an Exclusive Society. Sale of salt in great measure was considered an exclusive trade. From 1773 the Bengal government thought to derive maximum profit from salt trade. So it exercised full control over it. The salt *Aurangs* were leased to farmers for five years. The manufacturers of salt were given advances by the salt merchants.[9] The import of salt from neighbouring states was discouraged.

The Board of Trade was constituted in 1774. It assumed control over the sale of salt from 1776 to 1780. Sale of salt increased to £ 1,39,012 in 1776-77. But this was reduced to a great extent in 1780-81. The price of salt in Calcutta was about 117 rupees per 100 maunds. That fell

6 13 May, 1818, Ewer to Government, *Bengal Revenue Consultations* 17 July, 1818, No. 15.

7 Encl., 4 May, 1804, Government to Melville and Harcourt, *Benga Civil Judicial Consultations*, 5 September, 1805, No. 26; (No date) August, 1805, Melville and Harcourt to Government, Add. M.S.S 18,611.

8 13 May, 1818, Ewer to Government, *Bengal Revenue Consusitations* 17 July, 1818, No. 15.

9 N. K. Sinha (ed.), *Midnapur Salt Papers*, pp. 3-4.

to 87 rupees in 1779. The great import of cheaper salt from Orissa was found to be one of the main reasons for such fall in the price of salt.[10]

Hastings devised a remedy to check the decrease in the sale of salt. Several civil officers were appointed Salt Agents of the Company. They advanced money to the *Malangis*, who manufactured salt at their direction. The Agent stored the salt and sold it to the wholesale dealers at a price fixed by the government. The difference between the price which was paid to the *Malangis* and wholesale price paid by the salt merchants constituted the revenue of the Company. Cornwallis introduced a system of auction sales instead of selling at a fixed price. Thus the Government had a monopoly both over manufacture and over the sale of salt. This system, however, produced good result for some time. The revenue increased in 1784-85; government's income went upto £ 6,28,747. But in the following year it fell to £ 4,67,687.[11]

The attention of Bengal government was now drawn more seriously to this problem than before. Sufficient care was taken to prevent smuggling of salt from Orissa to Bengal. As a result the salt trade in Orissa was seriously affected.

The *Beparis* or the *Mahajans* of Orissa were accustomed to carry salt to Calcutta, by paying a salt duty to the Nawab or the Company. The British now introduced monopoly. An order was promulgated that except the Company's agents none would be permitted to import salt to Calcutta.[12] This produced adverse effect on salt trade in Orissa. Murar Mahadev the *faujdar* of Balasore wrote, "The revenue of the sarkar (Maharaja) has fallen since they (the Company) stopped its import to Calcutta by any other agency."[13] Rajaram Pandit, the Subahdar of Orissa calculated that such prohibition meant a loss of two

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[11] S. C. Aggarwal, *Salt Industry in India*, pp. 231-2; N. K. Sinha (ed.), *Midnapur Salt Papers*, p. 5.
[12] C. P. C., Vol. VI, No. 1,242.
[13] C. P. C., Vol. VII, No. 342.

lakhs of rupees annually to the Maratha government of Orissa.[14]

Rajaram Pandit carried on negotiations with the Bengal government, in respect of import of salt into Calcutta. He wrote to the Company that he had learnt that the latter sold this commodity at the rate of 145 rupees for one hundred maund. He was ready to sell the Company the salt manufactured at Cuttack at the rate of 90 or 110 rupees for every one hundred maund. Either this proposition might be accepted or a *parwana* might be "issued for the sale of salt manufactured in the district on the former footing."[15] Vansittart, on behalf of the British, demanded the exclusive right of being the sole purchaser of the salt available in Orissa. But that could not be accepted.[16]

A considerable quantity of salt was produced in the Maratha districts east of the river Subarnarekha. A good amount of that salt was smuggled into Bengal. The British had a resident at Balasore. He was directed to purchase the Maratha salt with a view to preventing the smuggling of it, through the eastern jungle. But the policy was to purchase as little as possible so that the monopoly of the manufacture of salt in Bengal would not be affected.[17] Again it was considered wise to see that the manufacture of salt in the Maratha district did not receive any sort of encouragement.[18]

This arrangement continued from 1785-86 to 1792-93. The Agent at Hijli took delivery of salt at Rasulpur. The price of salt varied from Rs. 70|- per hundred maunds to Rs. 100|- per hundred maunds. In these eight years 8,35,000 maunds were contracted to be supplied but only 4,05,591 maunds were delivered. After 1793 it was decided that the delivery of Orissa salt should be made at Sulkia. It was agreed that 30,000 maunds should be delivered at

14 *C.P.C.*, Vol. VI, No. 1,242.
15 *Ibid.*
16 *C.P.C.*, Vol. VII, No. 42, *C.P.C.*, Vol. VIII, No. 749.
17 N. K. Sinha, (ed.), *Midnapur Salt Papers*, pp. 20-2.
18 *Ibid.*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 18.

119 rupees per 100 maunds. But the Agent at Hijli objected to this because he was eager to see that the price paid for Orissa salt should not exceed the price he paid for his *Malangis*. In spite of all these arrangements, smuggling of salt from Balasore region and Maratha enclosure could not be prevented.[19]

This happened because the salt *Aurangs* in Maratha districts were situated in such a way that it was difficult to check smuggling. Moreover before the introduction of salt monopoly in Bengal, the *Beparis* or the *Mahajans* were making huge profits from salt trade. But now as the import of salt was publicly forbidden, they were more particular to resort to the export of salt into the Company's territory in a clandestine manner.[20]

The Subarnarekha was generally considered the boundary line between the British and Maratha territories. Both the powers acquired lands on the opposite side of the river. Pataspur,[21] Kamarda and Bhograi were some important Maratha *parganas* on the other side of the Subarnarekha. Pataspur was the largest of the Maratha enclaves within the British territory.[22]

Salt was manufactured in considerable quantity at Pataspur and Bhograi. Pataspur alone used to yield about 25,000 maunds annually on the average.[23] Salt from both the *parganas* was smuggled into British territory. Salt produced in the Balasore district could be carried into the Company's territory from any place from Janpur to Pipli. Again there was a stretch of jungle country about 80 miles in length and 60 miles in breadth to the west of Midnapur. It was inhabited by some wild tribes known as *Chuars*. The contraband salt was first taken "across the river at Jaleswar or further north at Janpur." Then the salt was carried to

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19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 75 and No. 76.

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22 *Ibid.*, p. 213.

23 *Ibid.*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 98.

Bengal through western jungle. Through one pass in this region 15,000 maunds were annually smuggled into Bengal.[24]

The salt manufactured in the *Aurangs* in Balasore district was brought in boats along the Subarnarekha to Woolmara in Maratha territory. The smuggler could avoid the *chaukis* at Nayabasan and Jaleswar. From there the salt was taken to Tomar forty miles north-west of Haldikupur and Bureah in Chhotanagpur.[25] Salt from Bhograi and Pipli was perhaps smuggled through this route. Some of the salt *Daroghas* at Haldikupur could see that contraband salt in thousand bullock-carts was carried through a route very close to their *chaukis*. One of them once remarked, "I am a traveller seated at *chokey;* by me nothing can be done." *Daroghas* were quite helpless to check smuggling mainly because the boundary line of the British territory was not clearly defined. So the smugglers could cross over to the Maratha territory; thus they avoided seizure.[26]

In spite of the vigilance of the British regarding the smuggling of salt into Bengal, they could not prevent it. When Forster in 1790 was deputed to the court of Maharaja Raghuji Bhonsla in order to explain him the necessity of the march of Colonel Cockerel's detachment, he was instructed to consult him on the most advisable method of supplying the Company with the salt manufactured in Balasore and other places and preventing of the clandestine import of it to the Company's territory.[27] Accordingly he begged the permission of the Maharaja to purchase all salt that was manufactured in Orissa, Ratanpur and Sambalpur to the exclusion of all other purchasers. But the Raja could not comply with the proposition of Forster as he found that the granting of monopoly in salt trade to the British would ruin the *Beparis* altogether.[28] Thus the negotiation failed. Smuggling continued. It was checked only after the British annexation of Orissa in 1803.[29]

24 N. K. Sinha (ed.), *Midnapur Salt Papers*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 13.
25 *Ibid.*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 37.
26 *Ibid.*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 52.
27 *C. P. C.*, Vol. IX, No. 177.
28 *C. P. C.*, Vol. IX, No. 605.
29 N. K. Sinha (ed.), *Midnapur Salt Papers*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 87.

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27 *C. P. C.*, Vol. IX, No. 177.
28 *C. P. C.*, Vol. IX, No. 605.
29 N. K. Sinha (ed.), *Midnapur Salt Papers*, Hijli Letters Issued, No. 87.

(iii) *British diplomacy to get possession of Orissa.*

Aliwardi Khan, the Nawab of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa fought with the Marathas under Raghuji Bhonsla of Nagpur and lastly entered into a treaty with the Maratha chief in 1751 by which he agreed to pay a *chauth* of twelve lakhs of rupees 'on condition that the Marathas would not set their foot within' his dominions. Mir Habib who was appointed as the governor of Orissa on behalf of Aliwardi was authorised to spend the surplus revenue of the province for the payment of arrears to Raghuji's troops, and Mir Habib agreed to pay four lakhs of rupees to the latter in this respect.[1]

A misunderstanding arose between Mir Habib and Januji, son of Raghuji, as a result of which the former was killed on 24 August, 1752.[2] Then Mirza Saleh was made the Governor of Orissa.

After the death of Aliwardi in April, 1756, Siraj-ud-daulah became the Nawab of Bengal. He entered into a conflict with the British and drove them from Bengal; Balaramgarhi near Balasore was for some time the seat of British Residency. At this time though there were specific instructions from Siraj-ud-daulah to Mirza Saleh not to help the British in any way yet he secretly offered the services of soldiers which the British needed.[3] He won their approval to such an extent that they considered him as one of the suitable candidates to be placed on the throne of Bengal in their intrigue against Siraj-ud-daulah.[4]

For some time Sheo Bhatt Sathe, a Maratha officer, was employed by Januji to collect *chauth* from the Nawab at Murshidabad. After the defeat and death of Siraj-ud-daulah, Mir Jafar became the Nawab. Mirza Saleh had some influence in the Nawab's Court because of his previous contact with the British. He was not on good terms with Shiv Bhatt Sathe. So, by his artifice he could arrange the dismissal of Shiv Bhatt Sathe from his office.[5]

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[1] *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. II, pp. 112-3; *Bengal Select Committee Progs.*, 10 February, 1768.
[2] *Siyar*, Eng. Tr., Vol. II, p. 116.
[3] *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 2 December, 1756.
[4] H. C. Hill (ed.), Bengal in 1756-57, No. 206.
[5] Add. M.S.S. 29,096.

Sheo Bhatt Sathe, therefore, got angry and offered Januji more tribute than Mirza Saleh used to pay and induced him to appoint him as Governor of Orissa. At that time the position of Mir Jafar was embarrassed because of the junction of the French and Shuja-ud-daulah for an attack over his territories. His position was further embarrassed when Ali Gauhar attacked the same. So Januji appointed Sheo Bhatt Sathe as Governor of Orissa to bring the country under his full control. He could not come at once to take possession of the country owing to some difficulties. He sent Chimna Sau with an army for that purpose. In November, 1757, Chimna Sau took possession of one part of the fort of Barabati at Cuttack. Mirza Saleh being absent, Dadar Ali, his son was there. But as he got his father's orders to proceed to Murshidabad; he was not prepared to offer any resistance to Chimna Sau.[6]

John Bristow, the British resident at Cuttack, did not like to see the country taken away from the control of Mir Jafar who was the protege of the British government in Bengal. He went to Dadar Ali, included him to keep possession of his part of the *kila* (fort) and encouraged him saying that should any disturbance happen he would send a thousand men to his assistance. He went to Lakshmanji Jachak, the *kiladar* of the fort of Barabati and Rama Pandit another Maratha officer; he attempted to gain them to his side; he represented to them that it was "the folly of Januji's endeavours to make himself the master of this province, they must expect nothing else but ruin as the English must certainly join Jaffir Ali Khan (Mir Jafar)." He further added that if they openly demanded more *chauth* than they were usually paid or objected to any decision made by Mir Jafar or gave any trouble to him he would think it his duty to act on behalf of Mir Jafar and the East India Company. He thus advised the Bengal Select Committee : "Ram Pandit and I have had several consultations and are of opinion that in order to secure this

6. *Orme M.S.S. India*, Vol. 18, p. 5,045 (5 November, 1757, John Bristow, Resident at Cuttack to Roger Drake, Governor of Fort William).

province entirely in ours and Mir Jafar's interest, it is best for Mirza Saleh to remain at Murshidabad with Mir Jafar's *parawana* as Subah of Orissa and send the proper *parwana* here to Rama Pandit to act as *naib;* this will effectually secure the province to us."[7]

Meanwhile Januji wrote to the leading Maratha officers supporting Dadar Ali that they should respect his orders. As a result, there was a compromise between the two contesting parties; Udepuri Gosain a Maratha leader on behalf of Dadar Ali yielded the subahship to Chimna Sau.[8] Thus the British plan could not be successful. The manner of securing the possession of Orissa by the Marathas so much annoyed Mir Jafar that he once told Rajballabh that he "had determined not to comply with the Marathas' demand on him of twelve lakhs."[9]

Mir Jafar began a conspiracy with the Dutch against the British, consequently he was driven out; Mir Qasim became the Nawab of Bengal in October, 1760. He granted Midnapur and Burdwan to the British for the maintenance of troops.[10]

Meanwhile the payment of *chauth* was stopped. Sheo Bhatt Sathe now the Governor of Orissa threatened to invade Bengal. He sent troops and plundered Midnapur towards the last part of 1760. As the British troops stationed there opposed them, they returned to Cuttack.[11] In the following year the tenants of Midnapur also suffered from the ravages of the Marathas.[12]

Towards the end of 1761, Januji sent Mirza Saleh with another person to Mir Qasim who was at Patna; they demanded payment of *chauth* for three years from the Nawab. Being questioned why the Marathas occupied

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7 *Ibid.*
8 *Orme M.S.S. India*, Vol. 18, p. 5,065.
9 *Ibid.*, p. 5,066.
10 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, Nos. 1082, 1447.
11 *Ibid.*, No. 908.
12 J. Long (ed.), *Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 570.

Cuttack, they replied that on payment of four lakhs of rupees, Januji would recall his people and evacuate that province. Two remedies appeared to the minds of the Nawab for stopping the Maratha incursions into Bengal. The first was to pay the *chauth* as demanded by the Marathas, the second was to lead an expedition against them and to take possession of Cuttack. As he himself could not come to a decision on this matter, he wrote a letter to Henry Vansittart,[13] the British Governor of Bengal, asking his advice.[14]

In a Select Committee the question of sending an expedition to Cuttack was considered as the only effectual means for preventing the ravages of the Marathas and accordingly Vansittart wrote a reply to the Nawab emphasising the Committee's decision in which he concluded, "So it is my advice to resolve from this time to pay them no *chauth,* to dismiss their *vakil* in a curt manner and possess without delay the province of Cuttack." He further informed him that the British army with artillery and stores were ready. When the Nawab would send a body of fifteen hundred or a thousand horse, the plan would be executed. As the campaign was to be led in the interest of the Nawab, *i.e.* for the defence of his country against Maratha inroads, expenses for such purpose would be borne by him; the British would be assigned such part of Orissa as might defray the expenses of the expedition and to keep a force for the defence of that frontier.[15]

Meanwhile it was calculated that the expense in this respect would amount to about one lakh of rupees per month.[16] Ellis, the British chief at Patna, was directed to get the troops ready to join the Nawab's soldiers when they started.[17] Letters were written to the King, the Nizam and Salabat Jang so that they might assist in executing the

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[13] He assumed the charge of Governor in July, 1760 from J. Z. Holwell, who was in office for six months, after the departure of Clive for England in January, 1760.

[14] *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 16 January, 1762.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 8 December, 1761.

[17] *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 18 February, 1762.

plan. The sister provinces of Bombay and Madras were informed accordingly.[18]

When Vansittart was expecting the march of the Nawab's troops, a letter was received from him, in which though he appeared eager to send some troops, he was quite unwilling to bear the expenses of the proposed expedition. Yet the plan was not completely abandoned because from the last account from Balasore, it was very likely that the Marathas would make incursions into the Company's territory. Thus if the British were forced by the Marathas to fight against them, then they would call upon the Nawab for his assistance and indemnify such places as they might take and afterwards deliver the country to the Nawab. In view of this "troops of Susars, Alla Reza Khan's troops and George Hay with 25 horse for Captain Spelman's dragoons" were called upon from Patna and stationed at Calcutta.[19]

Meanwhile a letter, dated 7th June, 1762 from the Select Committee of Bombay reached Vansittart which expressed the disapproval of both the Madras and the Bombay Governments of the proposed expedition to Cuttack. The former objected because an attack on Januji's possession would multiply their troubles with the French. The latter considered that the plan might bring Januji and the Poona government to a closer unity which might be contrary to British interests. The plan was, therefore, abandoned.[20]

Towards the middle of 1763, it was on the issue of the demand for highly preferential terms for the British trade that Mir Qasim and the British came to a difference and consequently entered into a conflict. Mir Qasim invited Sheo Bhatt Sathe to join hands with him against the British,[21] sent a man to Januji, offered him money and desired asylum in Orissa.[22] Sheo Bhatt Sathe now took this oppor-

18 *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 18 February, 1762.
19 *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 12 March 1762.
20 *Ibid.*, 9 July, 1762.
21 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 1,948. It is during this time that Mir Qaşim sent a *sanad* to Sheo Bhatt Sathe for Jaleswar and Midnapur.
22 *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Nos. 709, 712.

tunity and threatened an invasion of Bengal to press the collection of *chauth*.[23]

Perhaps in fear of Januji's alliance with Mir Qasim, Vansittart in 1763, made a promise to pay all the arrears of *chauth* on condition that Januji did not join his troops to those of Mir Qasim.[24] So Januji without giving any help to Mir Qasim, sent Raghunath Rao as his representative to Calcutta to enter into negotiations with the British for *chauth*. After a negotiation for some months, Januji was requested that considering the ruinous state of Bengal because of the war with Mir Qasim, the question of *chauth* should not be discussed at that time.[25]

The next year the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa[26] was granted to the British by Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor; Clive now became the *de facto* ruler of the country. Six years back the British had acquired the Northern Sarkar. In order to bring a continuity between the two British possessions, he intended to acquire Orissa. When in 1766, T. Motte was sent to the diamond mines at Sambalpur to open the diamond trade, he was directed "to sound the officers of Januji's court whether he would cede the province of Orissa for an annual tribute."[27] On his way to Sambalpur Motte met Bhawani Pandit, the Governor of Orissa at Cuttack and delivered him letters from Clive which desired him in general terms to pay attention to what Motte would say. In a discussion in regard to the demand of Januji on the Company, Motte said, "The revenues of Orissa were made to Januji in lieu of tribute of the three provinces and the best mode which

[23] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 1,948.

[24] *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 29 February, 1763.

[25] *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, No. 2,763.

[26] This grant was made on August 17, 1765. Orissa of this grant corresponded to the district of Midnapur (vide G. W. Forrest, *Selections from State Papers of Governor General of India.....*Warren Hastings, Vol. I, p. 2 footnote), which was included in Bengal during the time of Murshid Quli Khan. The name of Orissa found its place in *Diwani*, because Bengal, Bihar and Orissa formed one administrative unit for a long time under the Mughal Emperor and he was not prepared to admit the overthrow of his sovereign authority on any part of Orissa even though the country was now ruled by the Marathas.

[27] *Early European Travellers in the Nagpur Territories*, p. 1.

could be adopted was to restore Orissa to the Company, who would pay a stipulated sum." Bhawani Pandit replied that he would refer it to Januji.[28]

In the same year, Clive deputed Mir Zainul Abadin with suitable presents to the Court of Nagpur to negotiate the cession of Orissa.[29] He explained his plan to the Select Committee in the following terms : "With Januji it is our interest to be upon Terms of Friendship........we shall pay sixteen lakhs, upon condition that he appoint the Company, zamindar of the Balasore and Cuttack countries, which, tho' at present of little or no advantage to Januji, would, in our possession, produce nearly sufficient to pay the whole amount of *chauth*. Whatever deficiency may be, it will be overbalanced by the security we shall enjoy of a free and open passage by Land to and from Madras, all the countries between the two Presidencies being under our influence; but I would not by any means think of employing force to possess ourselves of those Districts. The grant of them must come from him with his own consent, and if that cannot be obtained, we must settle the *chauth* upon the most moderate terms we can."[30]

Shortly before his departure from India, he placed the matter before the Court of Directors, who approved of it with the caution that the treaty should be made with the proper man so that they would not subsequently hear of claims from any other branch of the Maratha power.[31]

In order to execute the scheme Verelst[32], who succeeded Clive as Governor of Bengal developed friendly relations which were reciprocated by Januji. When Sheo Bhatt Sathe created disturbances in Orissa a British force was sent to assist Bhawani Pandit in suppressing the rebellion.[33] Bhawani Pandit helped Husain Khan, who was sent by order of Verelst to Orissa to raise troops for the Company.[34]

28 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
29 C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 221.
30 *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 16 January, 1767.
31 *Bengal Despatches* (from Court), 20 March, 1767.
32 *Clive sailed for England* on 26 January, 1767 and Verelst succeeded him as Governor.
33 C. P. C.. Vol. I. Nos. 2,322, 2,327.
34 *Ibid.*, No. 2,789.

Mir Zainul Abadin returned to Calcutta after a preliminary talk with Januji on *chauth*.[35] Udepuri Gosain a *vakil* of Januji reached the same place in the early part of 1767. A conference was held amongst Verelst, Saif-ud-daulah,[36] the Nawab Muhammad Riza Khan, Zainul Abadin and Udepuri Gosain in order to come to a settlement over the payment of *chauth*.[37] Muhammad Riza Khan brought a proposal offering a payment of 13 lakhs of rupees as *chauth* of Bengal on condition of the evacuation of the province of Orissa by the Marathas. He further added that such a sum would be payable to Januji from the date of the settlement and that the Raja would have to forego the arrears. Mir Zainul Abadin, the *vakil* of the Company objected and emphasised that the old treaty between Aliwardi and Januji provided only for the payment of 12 lakhs of rupees as *chauth* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and that amount was to be paid if Orissa would be returned.[38] Udepuri Gosain all the while demanded the annual payment of sixteen lakhs, the sum promised by Clive if Orissa was to be ceded.[39] Thus the parties could not come to an agreement.

After several conferences, in a Select Committee held on 30th April, 1767, the President of the Committee was requested to proceed to the city of Cuttack for examining the books of the Sarkar, the rent roll and other particulars of the revenue[40]; after a few days he informed the Committee that a revenue of rupees 16 or 17 lakhs would be collected from Cuttack under good government.[41] Then it was settled that the British would pay annually 16 lakhs of rupees to Januji provided, he made the proposed cession. When the *vakil* of Januji was asked to conclude affairs, he

35 *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Nos. 76, 104.

36 After Mir Qasim was deposed, Mir Jafar was again made Nawab in February, 1764. He died on 6 February and was succeeded by his son Najm-ud-daulah after whom Saif-ud-daulah, second son of Mir Jafar became Nawab in May, 1766. Muhammad Riza Khan was appointed as *Naib Nazim* of Bengal by the British.

37 *C.P.C.*, Vol. II, No. 418.

38 *Ibid.*, Nos. 709, 712.

39 *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 6 July, 1767.

40 *Ibid.*, 30 April, 1767.

41 *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 14 July, 1767.

delayed on the plea that he had no authority to deliver up a country without further instruction from Nagpur but in reality he was endeavouring to bring about an offensive and defensive alliance between his master and the British against his master's enemy Madhava Rao, the *Peshwa.* But as the British, at that moment, were in alliance with the *Peshwa* Verelst was not in a mood to accept this. Yet he was not prepared to discourage it as from the latest intelligence from Bombay there was a high probability of a rupture with the Marathas there.[42]

Having been told of the willingness of the British to enter into a treaty Januji submitted the following detailed conditions for the cession of Orissa :

1. "That Jaggernaut Pagoda and all the duties collected from the pilgrims shall remain to the Marathas—that a Governor on their part shall be placed there, who shall have the supreme authority and the villages, lands, etc., which have been formerly allowed for the support of the Brahmins and place shall be continued to them.

2. In case of necessity advances of the stipulated sums to be made to the amount of three or two years as also to be assisted with our troops artillery, etc. when they may be wanted. If the English shall have occasion, they are to be assisted with 20 or 25,000 horse for which 20 lakhs or thereabout are to be paid as Naulbundy (money for getting ready) and on their joining the army are to receive two rupees per diem exclusive of an allowance suitable to the rank of a chief who commands them........

3. Alivardi Khan besides the 16 lakhs of rupees, now agreed to be paid, gave also elephants, fine clothes, jewells & ca. ca.

4. A lakh of rupees or thereabout was allowed for Mutassadis[43] of the collections and army, this is desired to be continued.

5. A duely authenticated treaty shall be procured from Europe under the hands and seal of the Directors of

[42] *Ibid.*, 6 July, 1767.
[43] Writers or clerks.

the Company; that under the most solemn engagements, we are become friends which is to be perpetual and never departed from to the latest posterity. Our enemies and friends to be common and our assistance to each other mutual. That in lieu of chauth and all demands 12 lakhs per annum shall be paid for Bengal and Bihar and four lakhs for Orissa now in the possession of the Marathas since the time of Alivardi Khan—that this sum shall be faithfully paid every year at two payments in Murshidabad siccas[44] of the year—the payment to commence from the year that every succeeding governor shall accede to this treaty and cause the money to be paid without delay or pretence—shall accede to Mr. Verelst's engagements in the Decan (Deccan?) and ca. ca. will act agreeably thereto. That the treaty shall be sealed with the Company's seal and signed by the chiefs thereof whose authority is supreme over the whole.

6. A similar treaty shall be executed by Mr. Verelst and witnessed Syfe-ut-Dowlah, Muhammad Reza Cawn and ca. by the principal Rajas and zamindars according to the same.

7. That a similar treaty shall be given by the Nabob, Syfe-ut-Dowlah engaging to pay 16 lakhs of rupees per annum from October, 1765 and discharge the present amount after deducting the sums collected in Orissa during that time.

8. There are many places bordering on Orissa such as ghat Bhesmule, Sumbelpoor, Khussumgher, Bhude Kund & etc., the Rajas of which have been long subject to the Marathas, their choukies and etc. are not to be interrupted or removed nor are the English to go to Sumbelpoor by water.

9. The guns lying at Sumbelpoor to be transported at the English expense to Chatter ghir (Chhatter garh).

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44 Sicca rupees—Stamped coins specially the designation of the silver currency of the Kings of Delhi, adopted by the Indian Princes and eventually by the *East India Company.*

10. Udepoory to bring the letters and ca. duly signed with him.

11. In the time of Meer Habbez Allah Cawn,[45] four lakhs were agreed for but 10 were collected. As friends, therefore, never can with each other's loss of four lakhs more be added to the present agreement or 3 or even 2 but not less, it would tend to strengthen the bonds of amity.

12. As larger balances are due to Sambhuji Ganesh[46] Subahdar of Orissa for the maintenance of his troops and ca. three years amount is desired to be advanced for which credit will be given. But not less than two years to be accepted.

13. Till the arrival of League[47] from Europe a treaty executed by Mr. Verelst and Syfe-ut-Dowlah to be sent with remittances by the hands of a person of confidence and character with Udepoory Gosain."[48]

Some of the demands in the proposals submitted by Januji were considered inadmissible by the British.[49] About ten months passed, yet no final decision on the above proposals was intimated to Januji.

It may be remembered that on the 23rd February, 1768, a treaty was concluded between Nizam Ali and the British which declared Hyder Ali as a usurper. Nizam Ali as the Mughal Viceroy in the Deccan took the Carnatic Balaghat from Hyder and conferred it upon the English on condition that they would pay him a tribute of seven lakhs of rupees annually. So Hyder was enraged and opened negotiation with Madhava Rao, the *Peshwa* and wrote to the French at Pondicherry and Mauritius to help him in a war with the British. The Bombay government sent Mostyn to Poona to form an alliance with the *Peshwa* against Hyder, but the *Peshwa* evaded all engagements.[50]

45 Same as Mir Habib (vide *Riyaz*, Eng. Tr., Cal., 1904, p. 428).
46 After Bhawani Pandit, Sambhaji Ganesh was appointed, Governor of Orissa in April, 1768, (C. P. C., Vol. II, Nos. 892, 1,027).
47 Covenant or compact between two parties.
48 *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 10 February, 1768, the language as found in the original is given.
49 *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 23 December, 1768.
50 J. G. Duff, *History of the Marathas*, Vol. II, pp. 195-9.

In this situation as the Madras government wrote to Bengal government for any assistance within their power to strengthen their hands against Hyder, the Bengal Select Committee on 13 December, 1768, decided "that the most effectual support which can be given to them (Madras government) will be the immediate conclusion of a treaty offensive and defensive with Januji on his ceding the province of Orissa", because firstly it would sow dissensions amongst the Maratha chiefs which might result in the decrease of their strength. Secondly, Januji was well known for his jealousy and differences with Madhava Rao. Lastly he solicited a *sanad* from the King to take away such lands as he might conquer from Madhava Rao. When the report of a junction of the British with Januji together with the King's and vizier's forces would reach Madhava Rao, he would refrain from accepting any offer from Hyder and might seek the safety of his possessions through the British friendship.[51]

So Januji's proposals for a treaty were soon discussed and the following resolutions were passed :

1. "For the preservation of the religious ceremony annually performed by the pilgrims of Jaggernaut Pagoda, a person may be allowed to reside there on behalf of Maharaja Janojee and another on the part of the Nabob, who shall jointly collect customs at that place and bring the amount so collected to the revenues of Orissa as a part thereof. That in case of misbehaviour in the Morattoe Resident, he shall be liable to punishment from and accountable such person or persons as may be appointed by the Nabob to the Government of that province; and shall even if judged necessary be removed from his office when some other Resident may be appointed by Janoojee, who must at all times be accountable as before specified to the Nabob's Government. All villages and lands formerly granted for the support of the Brahmins and ca. may be continued to them.

2. That payment of the sums stipulated by the treaty, shall be made as the state of the Nabob's Circarry[52], will

[51] *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 13 December, 1768.
[52] *Correctly Sarkar* (State or Government).

admit of it. That the Nabob may engage, to grant Janoojee, the assistance of the English troops living under his government when required by him, unless they should be wanted for the defence of these provinces or the possession of our allies. That the troops of Janoojee shall, also be sent to the Nabob's assistance when he may require them and that all extraordinary expenses incurred by the respective troops shall be defrayed by the party in whose cause they may be engaged.

The Committee are of opinion that the cause relative to Janoojee being promised, the assistance of the English troops is absolutely necessary to be inserted in a treaty with him in order to induce him the more readily to accept the Nabob's proposal and to avoid a delay which must be occasioned, if he should insist upon that Article being inserted. And they do not conceive it can be attended with the least risk or inconvenience to the Company's affairs in India since it reserves to them the power of refusing such assistance by pleading the security of their own possessions or those of their allies.

3. That the customary presents of the elephants, fine cloths and ca. may be agreed to, provided a suitable compliment be returned by Janoojee to the Nabob.

4. By the account delivered into the Company of the fourth Article of Janoojees' proposals by Oudy Pourry Gosain his vakil, it appears that one lakh of rupees was formerly given to Janoojee's servants on the settling of the chauth and the collections of Orissa in consideration of their being employed on those services, but the Committee are of opinion that this proposal should not be acceded to; and that only the sum 16 lakhs of rupees tendered in the proposals transmitted to Janoojee, the 10th February shall be allowed in lieu of all demands whatever.

5. The President and Council being fully invested with power to enter into any treaties, whatsoever the Committee are of opinion that the present treaty it concluded, should be entered into by the Nabob and his Ministers with

Janoojee and guaranteed in most solemn manner by the President and Council under their signatures and the great seal of the Company. That in lieu of chauth and ca. 12 lakhs shall be faithfully paid for Bengal and Bihar and 4 for Orissa. Every year at too (two?) payments in Murshidabad Siccas either at Cuttack or at Murshidabad as may be most convenient to the Circary (Sarkar) to such person or persons as may by Janoojee be duly authorised to receive those sums and that the payment of the foregoing sums shall commence from the first day of October, 1765.

6. 6th and 7th Article of Janoojee's proposal are replied to in the preceding Article.

7. Orissa should be ceded to the Nabob in as full and ample a manner, as it was ceded by Aliwardi Khan to the Morattoes and Janoojee should be told that as we are now in a League of perpetual friendship, it is expected hé shall consider those places, mentioned in the 8th Article of his proposals as belonging to that province though they should not have been immediately dependent on any Subah of Bengal. That he should consider them as places that may be convenient for the lodgement of a part of our force for the security of the province, and that by being thus situated, we shall have it more effectually in our power to confirm the bond of friendship, between us, should any power thereafter attempt to disturb the tranquillity of his possessions or our own.

8. Upon a discussion with Oudy Pourry Gosain of the 9th Article, proposed by Janoojee, it is found to be not a point insisted upon.

9. The Committee would propose that a Company servant, should accompany Oudy Pourry Gosain to Nagpur, Janoojee's capital with a treaty executed by the Nabob and guaranteed by the President and Council in order that no delay be occasioned in taking possession of the Province of Orissa, should Janoojee accede to the terms specified in the said treaty.

10. The eleventh Article is fully answered by our reply to the 4th Article of these proposals.

11. The 12th Article is replied to in the second Article of these proposals.

12. Twelve lakhs of rupees may be remitted by Bills, with the person, who may be appointed to take possession of Cuttack after the treaty, is finally concluded for the first payment.

13. As Janoojee has consented that the amount of the Revenues of Orissa from the 1st October, 1765, will be duly brought to the Nabob's credit, it is proposed that he shall allow a strict scrutiny, to be made into the accounts (accounts) of the collections in order that the actual receipts and necessary disbursements since the Company's Acquisition of the dewanee, be ascertained, in as accurate a manner as possible for the satisfaction of both parties."[53]

It was further decided in the Committee that when a Company's servant would be sent with the proposed treaty, "there should be a particular article in his instructions, directing him to confer with that chief on the subject of his taking part with us against military operation that may be undertaken by Madhava Rao against the Company's possession on the coast of Coromandal in order that we may be better, enabled to judge the practicability of such measure previous to the final conclusion of the treaty."[54]

In the meanwhile. Raghunath Rao, uncle of the *Peshwa*, raised a formidable rebellion against the Poona government in which he was allied with Januji. Madhava

[53] *Bengal Select Committee Consultations*, 13 December, 1768.
[54] *Ibid.*

The Court of Directors were so hopeful about the cession of Orissa that in one of their letters, dated 11 November, 1768, they wrote to the Governor of Bengal that "we see with pleasure the progress made in your negotiation for Orissa and hope the first ship of the next session will bring an account of your having concluded it and that you have taken care to be in possession of that province before you advance a rupee of the money to be paid."

"As soon as you in possession, it must be surveyed with a very exact and minute description of all the powers, who border on it and one or more of our principal servants, the most experienced in the business of collection be sent to establish the revenue there and it must be one of our servants, who can pursue the object for three or four years together that the products, value and situation may be as thoroughly investigated as those of Burdwan and Calcutta lands". (*Bengal Despatches*, Vol. IV, pp. 241-2).

Rao in anger attacked Januji. Januji in his distress appealed to the British for help through the Subahdar of Orissa.[55]

In a Secret Committee Verelst remarked, "We think it highly impolitic at this juncture to continue our negotiation with the chief (Januji)". It was considered that the support, which might have been given to Januji against Madhava Rao, if he went against the British, should now be extended to the relief of the Madras government which was in "a very critical and truely distressful situation."[56] When the hostilities between Madhava Rao and Januji were going to be closed, Verelst replied to the latter that there did not appear then any necessity for sending the Company's arms.[57]

Then a person was sent by Verelst to Januji with two agreements, one signed and sealed by the Nawab, Saif-ud-daulah and the other by the Bengal government with the hope that he would send in return a similar agreement containing his pledges to carry out his part of the treaty. But Januji accused the British of duplicity, time-serving and procrastination and sent his own *vakil* to Calcutta empty-handed, "who was empowered only to negotiate but not to sign a treaty."[58]

When Verelst lost his patience in negotiation, he remarked, "I once flattered myself that Januji Bhonsla would have acceded to a treaty for the session of Orissa, but his evasive and artful behaviour has convinced me that the Marathas will never desert their old and characteristic manners."[59]

After Verelst John Cartier became the Governor of Bengal from whom Warren Hastings took the administration of the presidency on 20 October, 1774. He was so much busy with political troubles in different parts of India that he could hardly find time to think a plan for the acquisition of Orissa and rather he took steps in avoiding

55 C.P.C., Vol. II, No. 1,388.
56 *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 21st March, 1769.
57 C.P.C., Vol. II, No. 1,393.
58 *Ibid.*, Vol. III, No. 203.
59 *Bengal Secret Consultations*, 15 December, 1769.

troubles which he might have faced from Orissa in overcoming difficulties in other parts of India.

This may be remembered that the Bombay Government by supporting the cause of Raghunath Rao as *Peshwa* entered into a conflict (in 1778 A. D.) with the Marathas at Poona and consequently by the initiative of Nana Phernavis, a powerful Maratha leader, a quadruple alliance was formed against the British and this consisted of the Poona Government, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Hyder Ali of Mysore and the Bhonsla of Nagpur. Thus the British were entangled in a war.[60]

As according to the plan of confederacy Mudoji, the Raja of Berar had to invade Bengal, therefore, he sent 30 to 40 thousand horse under the command of his second son, Chimnaji Bapu from Nagpur, which reached Cuttack on 11 August, 1779.[61] Under these circumstances, though the political situation in the south, demanded to send a detachment by land to Madras, Warren Hastings first postponed the plan, "because its route lay through the territory of Mudoji Bhonsla and it must necessarily pass by that part of his army, which was lying at Cuttack — circumstances, which without being obtained previous concurrence of Mudoji might on the unsettled state of connection with the prince, not only expose the detachment to difficulties and opposition in the march, but lead it into operations very different from the intention of its equipment and draw us in a decided enmity of Mudoji, whose power when exerted against us, would prove an important acquisition to the strength of Hyder and ministers at Poona."[62]

In the month of September, Hyder invaded the Carnatic and the news of the 'melancholy fate of Colonel Baillie's detachment' and the retreat of the army under General Munro reached Warren Hastings; so he, by partially modifying his old plan, sent General Sir Eyre Coote at the head of a strong detachment to Madras by sea and for sending a further reinforcement by land in the

60 G. W. Forrest (ed.), *Selection from State Papers........(Warren Hastings)*, Vol. I, p. XVII.
61 *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 200.
62 *Ibid.*, pp. 202-3.

same direction, ordered Colonel Pearse to be ready with five thousand sepoys at Midnapur.[63]

Anderson was appointed as a special minister to Chimnaji at Cuttack, in order to reconcile the government of Nagpur, to the passage of Colonel Pearse's detachment through Orissa. He reached Cuttack on 28 January, 1781, but it was not found practicable for him to have an interview with Chimnaji because he, being absent at that time from Cuttack, was busy in reducing the Raja of Dhenkanal, who rose against the Maratha government and encamped with his whole army in the midst of hills and forests about 24 miles from the headquarters.[64] Anderson was not even able to meet Rajaram Pandit, the Governor of Orissa as he was now with Chimnaji. However, he had a conference with Manoji, *diwan* of Chimnaji's *daftar* and Hurdy Ram, *diwan* at Cuttack. They said that Mudoji had sent his son, Chimnaji to command the troops and in spite of pressing demand of Peshwa and his ministers, Chimnaji had long avoided an invasion of "British territory and even now under the pretence of reducing some petty Rajas, removed his army to a considerable distance on purpose that the English troops might the more easily pass." They also further promised to send orders to all the *thanadars* and officers on the road not only to avoid doing anything, which might be productive of disputes but to assist as far as possible in supplying the detachment with provisions in the route of the British army. At the request of these Maratha officers, Anderson delivered them the letters which he brought from Warren Hastings and Beniram Pandit and returned to Bengal as his presence was immediately needed at the presidency.[65]

The army under Colonel Pearse, first ordered not to cross the river Subarnarekha, was now ordered to proceed towards Cuttack.[66]

During this time, the Maratha force under the command of Chimnaji left Dhenkanal towards Jajpur; then he

63 *Ibid.*, p. 200.
64 *Bengal Secret and Military Consultations*, 29 January, 1781.
65 *Ibid.*, 12 February, 1781.
66 *Ibid.*, 14 January, 1781.

encamped near Balasore, proceeding to the north. Colonel Pearse took a road, which was not very far from Chimnaji's camp; he was not opposed; Harihar Mahadeva, a Maratha officer, was ordered to proceed immediately to Ganesh Nagar ghat with the object of preparing ferry boats for the British army to cross the river (Gunjury); Mangun Chaudhuri, another Maratha officer, was instructed to accompany the British army to the border of Ganjam.[67]

On 7th March, 1781, about 200 Maratha horse entered into Company's districts by the village of Patna, Jaleswar and plundered some villages in Ismailpur and Sampochour. Then they went to Mohanpur, plundered the merchants, robbed the *Beparis* and houses of the *raiyats*. At Utubera, they pillaged one of the *Chaudhuris* and wounded many people on the way. The people were so much panic-stricken, that some fled from their inhabitations. When a British force was sent by order of Major Macpherson, to drive the Marathas, they recrossed the Subarnarekha and fled away.[68]

Meanwhile Biswambhar Pandit, who was sent by Chimnaji to Calcutta, represented to Warren Hastings to settle matters with the Marathas. So Anderson was directed to proceed to the Maratha camp. He entered into a long conversation with Chimnaji. Chimnaji demanded two crores of rupees towards the expense of the Maratha army; he insisted on payment of *chauth*. Anderson offered only 12 lakhs. Rajaram Pandit proposed that the Maratha army should go to Ramchandrapur and that he and Biswambar Pandit together with Anderson would go to the Governor General at Calcutta to convince him a larger supply to the Marathas.[69] Accordingly Rajaram Pandit with others met the Governor General and gave a complete picture of the distress and miseries of Chimnaji's forces and asked for fifty lakhs of rupees. After some arguments on both sides, the demand of 50 lakhs came down as far as to a demand of twelve lakhs and a loan of 25 lakhs. Hastings finally

67 C.P.C., Vol. VI, No. 87.
68 *Bengal Secret and Military Consultations*, 15 March, 1781.
69 G. W. Forrest (ed.), *Selections from State Papers.....Warren Hastings*, Vol. II, p. 225.

paid thirteen lakhs of rupees to Chimnaji and a loan of another ten lakhs was also advanced to him;[70] then the Maratha forces left Orissa in the direction of Garh Mandal. Hastings justified this means of securing the withdrawal of Maratha forces from Orissa by saying, "if the treaty would not have been made, what might have been the real intention of Chimnaji or the dictates of his father, Mudoji Bhonsla, his unpaid troops had long been kept quiet only by the hopes, which were held out to them of acquiring wealth from the plunder of Bengal. If no supply would have been granted to them even though they might have been expelled, the frontier of Bengal, would have been invaded and much mischief would have been practised in the province of Midnapur and Burdwan causing alarm against the inhabitants."[71]

After the departure of Warren Hastings from India, Cornwallis became Governor General in 1786 A.D. Finding that Mudoji, the Raja of Nagpur was entirely dependent on the Poona government, he considered it more practicable to acquire the province of Orissa through the help of the Poona Court rather than through any direct negotiation with Mudoji and wrote to Malet, the British resident at Poona intimating his desire that "......province of Cuttack would be of most desireable acquisition as our communication would then be complete upon our own territories between Bengal and Carnatic and by obtaining the possession of the sea coast of that district and of the passes of the hills, which lead to Cuttack, it would be rendered much more difficult than it is at present for an enemy to disturb Bengal from that quarter."[72] While Malet was thinking how to take the help of Poona Court in the fulfilment of his master's wish, Bishnu Pant, the minister at the Poona Court, opened a discussion for the acquisition of Salsette from the British and asked Malet to find out an equivalent. When the map was produced, Bishnu Pant made a mention to Garh Mandal. This was a strong place on the Narmada for which a *sanad* was granted by the

70. *Bengal Secret and Military Consultations*, 29 March, 1781.
71 G. W. Forrest (ed.), *Selections from State Papers.....Warren Hastings......*Vol. II, pp. 258-9.
72 *Bengal Political Consultations*, 21 January, 1789.

Peshwa to Mudoji Bhonsla, a few years back. But the *sanad* remained unexecuted because in the meanwhile Balaji and Gangadhar, two servants of the Poona government seized the possession of the place. From the recent information obtained from Forster, the British resident at the Court of Nagpur, it was evident that Mudoji had a great desire to get possession of Garh Mandal. In view of this situation, Malet pointed out to Bishnu Pant that owing to the distance and rapid increase of power Balaji and Gangadhar were growing fast into independence and it would be an act of justice if Garh Mandal was returned to the Bhonsla and a land contiguous to our territory, might be procured from him for an exchange for Salsette and it was found from the map that Cuttack was very suitable for this purpose.[73]

Bishnu Pant placed before him six alternatives for exchange of Salsette. They were Broach, Tumbossur, Goge, a *chauth* of Surat and a territory adjacent and territory in the neighbourhood of Calpy or on the border of Calpy. The first was objected on the plea that the British were in delicate predicament in regard to it with Maharaja Sindhia. The second had no fort and the third was not in actual gift of the Poona government. The fourth stood no comparison with Salsette and the fifth and sixth were inconvenient both for distance and situation.[74]

Thus, when Bishnu Pant noticed that Malet desired nothing but Cuttack as an exchange for Salsette, he told him that previously Colonel Upton, brought a proposal to Poona Court for 'obtaining from Bhonsla, the province of Cuttack for the British', the Poona government referred this matter to the Bhonsla, who replied that he would not give up that province on any ground. In view of this, he concluded, 'he saw very little prospect of the secrets of negotiation.'[75]

Yet Cornwallis did not give up the idea and continued to instruct Malet by writing that "it may be wise in this government to devise means for encouraging a spirit of pil-

[73] *Bengal Political Consultations*, 9 January, 1789.
[74] *Ibid.*
[75] *Ibid.*

grimage among Hindus of Hindustan and the Deccan to the Company's dominions and for that reason, if you could come to the discussion of condition for cession of Cuttack, I should not have objection to grant particular privileges or exceptions from all government duties to Maratha subjects on religious visits and pilgrimage to Banaras, Gaya and to Jagannath when surrendered to us...... I should not scruple to furnish you with means of making any liberal presents in the money to any of the ministers, who could give a decisive assistance in forwarding the accomplishment of the object in question.[76]

The Siddi of Gingera died. His son, Ballu 'Meah', was obliged to fly from Gingera, in consequence of it, being brought under the possession of Siddi of Jouhir, son-in-law of the late Siddi of Gingera. Ballu 'Meah' with his brother entered the Court of Poona; in a discussion over this matter, the Peshwa expressed a desire for the acquisition of Gingera; Malet, in consultation with Cornwallis, desired to exploit the situation for the possession of Cuttack. The plan described by Malet in a letter to Cornwallis was, "If Ballu Meah were to assent to ceding Gingera to the East India Company and the Peshwa were to assent to our receiving it on condition of our surrendering it to him for an equivalent to be given by him (Peshwa) to Ballu Meah, I must go the additional step of stipulating to give this state (Poona) any assistance in wrestling it from the usurper, if thereby the acquisition of Cuttack can be essentially forwarded."[77] Another plan in this respect was an arrangement for exchange of Tellichery for Orissa.[78] But owing to the inability of the Poona government to influence the Court of Nagpur to that end, those plans could not succeed. Cornwallis's attempt to come to a settlement in exchange of lands on both sides of river Subarnarekha with the Raja of Nagpur met with failure, and similarly he failed to obtain monopoly of salt trade in Orissa from the Raja of Nagpur.[79]

76 *Bengal Political Consultations*, 25 February, 1789.
77 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 3 April, 1789.
78 *Ibid.*, 21 January, 1789.
79 *C. P. C.*, Vol. IX, No. 605.

CHAPTER IV

MARATHA EXPULSION FROM ORISSA

Cornwallis failed to acquire Orissa through diplomacy. As soon as Wellesley was the Governor General of India, he revived the same old policy of entering into negotiation with the Raja of Nagpur to that end. On 16 April, 1800, Colonel Kirkpatrick, Secretary to the government wrote to Colebrooke, the Resident at Nagpur, that the Company desired the acquisition of Cuttack "for an equivalent in money or otherwise" and asked him to influence the Court of Nagpur to that effect.[1]

At the same time a proposal was brought before the Raja of Nagpur for the establishment of a British subsidiary force in his territories. The Resident was told that the Governor General "would readily accept a security for the payment of the subsidy of the troops and even prefer to any other arrangement an assignment of such part of the province of Cuttack as should be adequate to the purpose, and should place under the management of the Company such a tract of the territory as should establish the continuity of their dominions from Bengal to Northern Circars."[2] But the negotiations proved a failure, partly because of the Raja of Nagpur's apprehension of losing his independence by maintaining a British force and partly because of his resentment at the British alliance with the Nizam of Hyderabad a country, which had so long been subject to Maratha plunder.[3] It now appeared to the Governor General that nothing short of a war would give him an opportunity to fulfil his cherished desire.

On 27 June, 1803, the Governor General wrote to Arther Wellesley, "From the Raja of Berar I wish to acquire the whole province of Cuttack so as to unite the Nor-

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1 16 April, 1800, Government to Colebrooke, Y. M. Kale, (ed.), *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. V, p. 48.

2 *Ibid.*

3 T. E. Colebrooke, *Life & Essays of H. T. Colebrooke,* Vol. I, pp. 118-22.

thern Circars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal. This cession including Balasore, etc. to be made either absolutely or upon payment of a moderate rent or a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominions of the Raja of Berar." He further instructed Arthur Wellesley that in the event of a war with the Raja of Berar this object could be easily achieved; he should not make peace with the Raja unless Orissa was secured.[4]

It may be remembered that on 31 December, 1802, the treaty of Bassein was signed by the Peshwa and the British as a consequence of which the Peshwa was obliged to accept a subsidiary alliance. This was a cause for resentment among the Maratha chiefs, particularly Sindhia and Raghuji. Having collected an army at Ujjain, Sindhia crossed the Narmada; Raghuji approached Sindhia's camp at Chikhli, and on 4 June there was a juncture of the confederate forces but they avoided any open rupture with the British.[5]

On 18 July, Arthur Wellesley demanded that Raghuji and Daulat Rao Sindhia should immediately retire from the Nizam's frontier near Ajanta. On 1 August, the Governor General-in-Council reported to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors that he had made arrangements for the occupation of Cuttack,[6] explaining that "By the reduction of Cuttack in Orissa, an effectual blow would be struck against the Raja of Berar's resources, the only maritime territory of the Marathas on the eastern side of the peninsula of India, would be secured from all intercourse with the French, a valuable addition would be made to our revenue and a strong barrier added to the frontier of Bengal against predatory incursions; the intercourse between Bengal and the territories of Fort St. George would also be protected from interruption."[7]

4 *Bengal......Papers relative to the Maratha War* in 1803, p. 165.
5 *Ibid.*, p. 181.
6 1 August, 1803, Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, M. Martin, (ed.), the Despatches, *Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley*, Vol. III, pp. 225-6.
7 *Bengal......papers relative to the Maratha War* in 1803, p. 235.

War was declared against the Maratha confederates on 3 August. Colonel Campbell of His Majesty's 74th regiment, commanding the northern division of the army of Fort St. George, had already been directed to prepare for an invasion of Cuttack.

On 21 August, he was told to invade because it was thought that during the absence of the Raja of Berar from the centre of his dominions, the seizure of a place as celebrated as Jagannath would produce an early impression on the minds of the confederate chieftains.[8] W. Thorn rightly remarked, "The occupation of the maritime district of Cuttack formed a principal part of the general plan of attack against the confederates."[9]

The plan of invasion consisted in the movement and joint operation of forces from four different directions from Ganjam, Kedigree, Jaleswar and Midnapur.

First the main force under Campbell consisting of about 1,500 native troops assembled at Ganjam. In addition, a detachment of two companies of His Majesty's 22nd regiment with artillery was detached from Bengal by sea. The British were so sure of success that they appointed John Melville, Civil Commissioner for the settlement of the revenue at Cuttack. Captain Blunt, an engineer who had some local knowledge of the country, accompanied them.[10]

In view of the military equipment and arrangements directed against Cuttack, there was no fear of any successful resistance on the part of the Marathas, but the Governor General wanted a peaceable surrender of the province. From the character of the Maratha administration it

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8 21 August, 1803, Clive Governor of Madras to Campbell, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 Dec., 1803, No. 161.

9 W. Thorn, *Memoir of the War in India*, p. 253. Sir William was born in 1781; joined the 29th Light Dragoons in India 1799; served in the Maratha War under Lord Lake 1803; at Laswari 1 November, 1803; in the capture of Mauritius 1810 and of Java 1811 and Palembaug in Sumatra 1812; returned to England 1814; one of his other works is "Memoir of the conquest of Java"; C. E. Buckland, Dictionary of Indian Biography, p. 423.

10 3 August, 1803, Government to Melville. *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 1; Add. M.S.S. 13,608, pp. 2-4 (same letter as above).

appeared probable that the Maratha officers might be induced to surrender the province in return for pensions or donations of money from the British government. Letters were therefore addressed to Bungaji Pandit, under whose management lay ten-sixteenths of the province and Harbansa Ray who managed the rest of the country;[11] both Campbell and Melville were authorised to open negotiations with them. Considering that a considerable portion of the province of Cuttack was occupied by chieftains many of whom acknowledged no superior authority or were merely tributary to the Maratha state, they were instructed to negotiate engagements on similar terms with such chieftains as possessed the means of embarrassing the progress of the British force.[12]

Campbell and Melville were instructed that they "should employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the temple of Jagannath and to the religious prejudices of the Brahmins and pilgrims."[13] To persuade the Brahmans at Puri that they could have confidence in placing the temple under the British administration, a letter was obtained from Jagannath of Tribeni, the oldest and the most eminent of the Pandits in Bengal to Ram Chand and other Brahmans residing at Jagannath which recommended that "they need not be afraid to form connection with the British Government, which is distinguished for. . . .benevolence to its subjects." This letter was transmitted to Campbell to deliver to them at a suitable time.[14]

On 30 August, news having been received that Maratha reinforcements from Nagpur were expected, another

11 3 September, 1803, Government to Melville and Campbell. Add M.S.S. 13,608 pp. 13-4; 7 September, 1803, Government to Bungaji Pandit and Harbansa Ray, *Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence* (trans.), Letters sent 1803, Nos. 123 and 124.

12 3 September, 1803, Government to Melville and Campbell, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 11.

13 9 September, 1803, Government to Melville and Harcourt, Add M.S.S. 13,608, p. 13.

14 Encl. 3 September, 1803, Government to Melville & Campbell, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 12A; Abstract of the contents of the letter from Jagannath of Tribeni to priests at Jagannath, *Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence* (trans.), Letters received 1803, No. 180.

detachment consisting of 500 Bengal native volunteers, commanded by Captain Dick, which had first been intended for the occupation of the port of Balasore, was sent with some additional battering guns to reinforce the main body of troops at Ganjam.[15]

The reason why the main force was despatched from Ganjam was to enable it to reach Cuttack quickly, take the fort of Barabati, the Chief Maratha stronghold and then to send a detachment to secure the Barmul Pass, which was called "the key or the western gate of Orissa," because it occupied a strategically defensible position through which the Marathas entered Orissa. It appeared that several advantages would be derived from the occupation of that important pass. First it would probably attract the attention of the government of Berar and induce them to detach a force towards the pass in order to keep the British troops in check. This would diminish their means of opposition to any attack which might be directed by the British from Allahabad and Hyderabad. Secondly it would establish the security of the province of Cuttack by closing it against predatory Maratha attacks from that quarter. Thirdly it would enable the British to complete their arrangements for an invasion of Berar from the side of Cuttack and transport troops and equipment without difficulty to the western extremity of the pass.[16]

After collecting provisions, Campbell marched from Ganjam. But high fever endangered his life. He was therefore carried back to Ganjam and Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt of His Majesty's 12th regiment proceeded to Prayagi. There he took command of the troops on 11 September.[17] At this place he heard from a Brahman that

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15 31 August, 1803, Government to Campbell, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 51; 30 August, 1803, Government to Harcourt, Add. M.S.S. 13,608, p. 11.

16 Add. M.S.S. 13,608, pp. 151, 155-6, (*a memorandum sent to Harcourt*, no date or author).

17 1 November, 1804, Governor-General-in-Council to the Court of Directors, *Bengal Military Letters Received*, 11 August, 1803, 24 January, 1805, Vol. I, pp. 538-9; 11 September, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March 1804, No. 55.

"the Brahmins at the holy place consulted and applied to Jagannath to inform them what power was now to have this temple under his protection and that he had given a decided answer that the British government was in future to be his guardian."[18] He utilised this as a divine message worth communicating in his letters to numerous chiefs and zamindars, in order to encourage them to submit to the British Authority.[19] Although no treaty had yet been made with the Marathas, Sayed Rahimutullah, a *Munshi,* acting on Melville's instruction, circulated a report amongst the people of Cuttack that the Maratha chiefs had delivered up the country to the British in writing.[20]

On the other hand Maratha government at Cuttack offered to all the tributary Rajas to relinquish a whole year's revenue if they would assist in preventing the British from obtaining the possession of the province. But there was no response.[21] The Marathas also made other defence arrangements. The Maratha chief at Balasore was appointed to the command of forces stationed at Guzurghat, Narasingpur, Ramchandrapur, Khathipur in Mayurbhanj and Phulwar Pass, which in all consisted of more than 1,000 matchlockmen, 100 horse and a number of *paiks.*[22] It appears that he was in charge of guarding the northern frontier of Orissa from British attack. One detachment consisting of 3,000 cavalry and infantry under the command of Balaji Kunar crossed the Mahanadi and took post on the north bank. He occasionally circulated a report that he would invade Bengal. Another detachment was placed in the fort of Barabati in Cuttack. A third under the command of Dharma Rai Pandit was posted at 'Piplipur' (Pipli) to oppose the British army from the south. 3,000 Maratha troops were also

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18 11 September, 1803, Melville to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 13.

19 19 September, 1803, Melville to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 14.

20 Encl., 24 September, 1803, *Lieutenant Col. Archibold Ferguson, Commanding* a detachment on the bank of the Subarnarekha to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations,* 1 March, 1804, No. 191.

21 *Ibid.*

22 Add. M.S.S. 13,609, pp. 43-5 (a report from Bhagaban *Naik*, Kotwal of the Company's factory at Balasore no date).

reported to have left Cuttack with the intention of disputing the passage of Harcourt at Manikpatna.[23]

When Harcourt reached Mithakua on 13 September, the reported strength of the Marathas marching towards Manikpatna rose to 5,000 infantry. But when Harcourt fired a volley with blank cartridges the Maratha force intending to oppose his passage fled away. The British force took possession of Manikpatna on 14 September.[24] Fateh Muhammed, the Maratha officer, commanding the south-west frontier of Cuttack, agreed to the proposed terms offered by Harcourt.[25] He sent his brother to the British camp. His brother accompanied the British force for some distance and helped them considerably by his local knowledge.[26]

By the time the British force reached Narasingpatna on 17 September, they faced some difficulty in transporting adequate stores and provisions by land. It had been thought that they might be carried by water to Cuttack. But now it was found that the boats had to be unloaded owing to the shallowness of the water. In view of these obstacles the idea of transporting anything further by water was abandoned.[27] Moreover four-fifths of the road through which the detachment would have to pass belonged to the Raja of Khurda. What was apprehended most was that the Raja might be in secret alliance with the Maratha government.[28] Therefore, Harcourt discussed the matter with Melville. Melville suggested that the Raja should be requested to afford every assistance to the British to expedite the advance of the stores, baggage and artillery and send 3,000 fighting men to co-operate with them to expel the Marathas,

23 Encl. 24 September, 1803, Ferguson to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 191.

24 13 September, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 56.

25 17 September, 1804, *Harcourt to M. Shawe*, Private Secretary to Wellesley, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, p. 68.

26 19 September, 1803, Melville to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 14.

27 3 October, 1803, Melville to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 17.

28 5 November, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 28.

for which he should be paid one lakh of rupees. This proposal was accepted by Harcourt. Accordingly, a letter was written to the Raja to that effect. As a result the Raja helped the British.[29]

From Narasingpatna Harcourt moved to Puri, passing through highly cultivated country. He took possession of the city on 18 September. A very conciliatory attitude was shown to the people here. A guard of Hindus was stationed in the temple of Jagannath. Measures were taken to give the Brahmans and the chief officers of the temple, confidence in the British administration.[30]

Then Lieutenant Ogilvie commanding a detachment of 2nd battalion of the 17th regiment Madras native infantry was directed to take post at Manikpatna because it commanded the passage of a river and was the chief means of entrance into the province to the southwards; it was also important as commanding a convenient landing place. He was instructed to protect that part of the country from Maratha predatory raids and to forward with proper escorts such stores and treasures as might be sent from Ganjam for the troops under Harcourt.[31]

A force was placed under the command of Major Fletcher,[32] who was ordered to remain at Jagannath. He was directed to post centries on the road to Cuttack as a precautionary measure against the Marathas. He was to keep a watch on what was passing to the southwards of the *Pagoda*.[33]

Some stores which Harcourt found it impracticable to carry with him were left at Jagannath. Then he proceeded in the direction of Ahmadpur, crossing the rising *nalas* and rivers with great difficulty.[34] The Marathas attempted to

29 3 October, 1803, Melville to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 28.
30 18 September, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 59.
31 21 September, 1803, *Harcourt to Ogilvie*, Add M.S.S. 13,609, p. 80.
32 Robert Fletcher, Captain 17th, *Regiment Madras Native Infantry*.
33 20 September, 1803, *Harcourt to Fletcher*, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, pp. 84-5.
34 19 September, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 60.

harass the British force on the way, but after a few skirmishes here and there they were driven off by the advanced guard under Captain Hutchinson of the 20th Bengal regiment. The Marathas lost twenty men. On the British side only three were wounded. The bad weather and the inundated state of the country together with the attack of the Maratha foraging party delayed the passage of the heavy guns and baggage for five days before Harcourt reached Birapurusottampur.[35] In view of these difficulties a force was detached under Hutchinson to occupy a position near Mukundapur. As soon as he left the camp he was confronted with serious opposition from the Maratha forces, both horse and infantry, on his flank. The charge of the Marathas was so vigorous that Hutchinson could save his position only by a heavy discharge of grape shot from six-pounders. This dispersed the Marathas. On the British side 21 were wounded and two killed.[36]

The next resistance to the British force was offered by the Marathas on 4 October, when the advance guard under Colonel Clayton[37] was marching to Mukundapur. But well-directed fire from the British guns forced the Marathas to retreat towards Balakati. In this skirmish the British loss was one pioneer wounded.[38]

From Balakati the Marathas took shelter in the fort of Barabati, situated on the north of the island—like Cuttack and commanding to the northward the Mahanadi and the ferry.[39]

Soon after his arrival at Cuttack, Harcourt took possession of the fort of Lalbag, which was on the south side of the 'island' and covered the town which lay between it and the fort of Barabati. This fort also commanded occa-

35 4 October, 1805, *Harcourt to Shawe*, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, p. 100; 27 September, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 62.

36 24 October, 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 80.

37 Thomas William Clayton, Lieutenant Colonel, 18th *Bengal Native Infantry*.

38 24 October, 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 80.

39 29 October, 1803, *Harcourt to Shawe*, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, p. 162.

sionally the ferry and always the ford over the river Kathjuri which "bounds the Island to the Southward as the Mahanuddy does to the northward." Then Harcourt pitched camp 1,000 yards in front of the south face of Barabati from which the Marathas were very weakly firing at his camp.[40]

Harcourt in consultation with Melville was prepared to take the fort by negotiation by paying the garrison up to half a lakh of rupees. But he received no response from the Marathas. So arrangements were made to besiege the fort. All the boats on the Mahanadi were assembled and an officer was placed over them with instructions to prevent the Marathas from throwing supplies to the garrison.[41] A spot was fixed at a distance of 500 yards from the outer gate of the fort. A battery was completed on 13 October, and a twelve-pounder, two howitzers and two six-pounders were placed in it. After a heavy fire the Maratha guns were silenced at 11 o'clock in the forenoon, and most of the defences on the south face of the fort were taken off. Clayton had to pass over a narrow bridge with one six-pounder and a party of artillery men. He ultimately succeeded in blowing up the wicket only after being exposed for forty minutes to a heavy and ill-directed fire of musketry from the Marathas inside the fort. No sooner was this work complete than a storming party entered singly with much boldness into the fort proceeding in two different directions although it had to face desperate resistance from the hands of the enemy in the defence of the inner gates. The Marathas fled, leaving three elephants and 120 guns of different calibres behind in the fort.[42] While some of them were making efforts to escape they were drowned in the ditch.[43]

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[40] 29 October, 1803, *Harcourt to Shawe*, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, p. 102.

[41] 11th October, 1803, *Harcourt to Shawe*, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, p. 102; 13 October, 1803, *Melville to Harcourt*, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, p. 123.

[42] 15 October, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 70; 27 October, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 90.

[43] 15 October, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 70.

Meanwhile, Harcourt carried on negotiations with Shiva Prasad, a Hindu chief at the head of a corps of infantry, who were considered by the Marathas as amongst their best troops, he was ultimately successful in detaching him from the Marathas, and utilised his services in taking possession of the fort of Sarangagarh.[44]

Secondly it was decided to send a detachment to Balasore from Calcutta by sea. The object of sending this force was first to induce a Maratha force to be detached in that direction, which would facilitate the progress of the army under Harcourt to Cuttack, and secondly to open communications between Jaleswar and Balasore and between Balasore and Cuttack which would co-ordinate the actions of the British forces against the Marathas on both the north and the south of Balasore. For this purpose Captain Morgan of the 15th Bengal native infantry was appointed to the command of a force consisting of five companies of volunteers, 500 men, one artillery officer, thirteen artillery men with guns, *lashkars* and artificiers, and one assistant surgeon.[45] The Governor-General had been informed that a considerable number of Pathan adventurers from the British possessions were employed in the military service of the Maratha government at Cuttack. He wanted to induce them to desert.[46] With this in view, a Muhammadan Subahdar belonging to the bodyguard of the Governor General was ordered to act under the orders of Captain Grant, who accompanied Morgan.[47] Morgan was instructed to use force should he fail to obtain possession of Balasore by amicable means. He was ordered to be cautious not to interrupt such pilgrims passing to and from Jagannath. Considering the difficult navigation of the Balasore

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44 27 September, 1803, Harcourt to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 62.

45 6 September, 1803, Government to Morgan, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804. No. 209; 4 September, 1803, Government to Morgan, Add. M.S.S. 13,608, p. 96.

46 6 September, 1803, Government to Morgan, Add. M.S.S. 13,608, p. 105.

47 6 September, 1803, Government to Morgan, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 209; 7 September, 1803, Government to Morgan, Add. M.S.S. 13,608, pp. 109-110.

river Mathew Wright, an experienced pilot was ordered to attend him.[48]

Morgan with the fleet[49] of transport left Kedegree on 14 September and reached the Nilgiri hills in the afternoon of the 17th at a distance of about sixteen miles from the bar of the river at Balasore. Because of adverse winds, he could not reach this place as early as he had expected.[50]

The bar at the entrance of the river had ordinarily only two feet of water at low tide and ten feet at high tide, and was considered unsafe for larger vessels without the assistance of the local pilots who had some knowledge of depth of the water.[51] So Wright, on the morning of the 18th, went out to explore the bar and wished to obtain a native pilot if possible. He came as near as Balramgarhi house, where there was a Maratha post of infantry. The Marathas suspected the identities of the party headed by Wright and fired into their boat but without causing any injury. The party thus managed to return to their place of anchorage. Later on, with the help of Pike, the pilot from the *George* Wright was successful in finding a channel for the transport. Leaving the two large vessels, *Alex-*

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48 4 September, 1803, Government to Morgan, *Bengal Political Consultultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 208; same letter as above, Add. M.S.S. 13,608, pp. 97, 101.

The original idea for sending a force by sea to Balasore was explained by Harcourt to the Governor General in Council and accepted on 19 August, 1803. This expedition was considered to be most secret. During the preparations for it the letters from John Shore, Secretary, Marine Board, to Harcourt were sent without mentioning the name of the place; only a long line was drawn in the letters in place of Balasore. In one of his letters Harcourt wrote to the Military Secretary to the Governor General, "if you will be kind enough to call me at the Government House this morning (25 August), we will settle the whole business: you will, of course, not mention anything which will tend to the discovery of the destination of this little expedition". (*Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 27 October, 1803, No. 59).

49 It consisted of *Alexander*, *George*, *Charles*, *Fairlie*, *Lizard*, *Anne* and two long boats (Letter 4 October, Shore to E. Lowes, *Commander of Company's Cruiser Teighmouth*, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 27 October, 1803.

50 20 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 218; 22 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 219.

51 19 August, 1803, Shore to Harcourt, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 27 October, 1803, No. 58.

ander and *Anne*, at anchor, other transports moved on the 19th. They all crossed the bar at a favourable flood tide, except one of them, the *Lizard*, which was deeply laden. Two of the six-pounders and a number of the detachment from her were taken off and placed in one of the long boats. Then the party entered the Balasore river and anchored nearly opposite the Balramghari house on the 20th.[52]

Some of the inhabitants of the villagers near the entrance of the river approached the vessels; they supplied native pilots. The fleet proceeded up the river but, owing to the darkness of the night and a very heavy fall of rain, they were forced to anchor for that day.[53]

The next day (21st morning) it was reported that a party of Marathas who had been posted at the ghats between the river and Jaleswar were making rapid maches either to defend the town of Balasore or to destroy it. At this Morgan and Grant left the transport behind. They took with them two six-pounders and as many fighting men as a few boats could hold, and went up the river for two hours till they reached a clear spot of ground, where they were informed that it was only four miles by land to Balasore. Here Morgan consulted Grant. Both agreed that the enemy should be attacked without waiting for the guns. Accordingly with nearly 300 rank and file they landed from the boats. Then after crossing over paddy fields inundated from one to three feet in water they halted at the town of Balasore.[54]

Meanwhile, the Marathas had put Moro Pandit, the *faujdar* of Balasore, into confinement in the Maratha fort outside the town because he had been attempting to go over

[52] 20 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 218; 22 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 219.

[53] 20 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March 1804, No. 218.

[54] 22 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 219; Same letter as above, *Calcutta Gazette*, Thursday, 3 November, 1803, pp. 260-1 (I.O.C. Vol., Year 1803).

to the British in consequence of their intrigue with him. Now, in order to resist the attack of the enemy, they advanced on a place where the ground was elavated and commanding. The inner space contained several spacious buildings well adapted to the accommodation of troops, perfectly dry and sufficiently large to receive from 400 to 500 men.[55] This continuous long defile stretching from the entrance of the town up to the neighbourhood of the factory house was cleverly lined by the Maratha cavalry and infantry in order to oppose the march of the British into the town and the factory house.[56]

A British advance party was ordered to move on the Marathas. But the Marathas opened fire on it. So a flanking party was detached to assist the British advance in consequence of which, well-directed fire poured on the Marathas from both the parties, which drove them from their first positions; ten to twelve of them fell to the ground. Finding the British detachment moving forward the Marathas as a desperate last attempt poured fire on it from the entrances of the lanes, from the tops of the houses and from behind the walls and heights. Yet the detachment continued to proceed on its way and returned a spirited fire at intervals. Then it took possession of the factory house. Soon parties were posted in all directions outside it to ward off the Marathas. The Marathas sniped at the British for some time; they then moved towards the south. Grant tried to seduce a party of Pathan horse from the Maratha detachment but without success.[57]

After the Maratha departure a part of the outside of the town called the Maratha fort was brought under the British possession. It was found that the Marathas had left there three-old unserviceable guns on decayed carriages, one that appeared to be a six-pounder, a small quantity of grain of different kinds and two chests with papers relating to the administration.[58]

55 23 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 220.

56 22 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 219.

57 *Ibid.*

58 *Ibid.*

Soon after occupying the town of Balasore, Morgan sent a detachment against a party of Marathas; but they evaded it. On 26 September, there was a rumour that a party of Marathas, hiding in some part of Balasore were determined to burn and plunder the town; further it was learnt that a large body of Maratha had been encamped at the village of Ramnath eight miles from Balasore.[59] In order to reassure public opinion Lieutenant Tanner,[60] at the head of a small detachment was ordered to proceed to that village. Before he reached the place the weather had cleared up; so a large body of Marathas, who had been encamped there had left on the 26th and marched to a small fort called Deoghur in a jungle about seven miles from Bamanaghati. So Tanner with his men returned to Balasore.[61]

Meanwhile the *dak* to the south of Balasore was not able to pass Suranga. So to open communication between Balasore and Cuttack, two companies, under the command of Captain Slye[62] were sent in that direction.[63] Slye reached 'Haetierpur'. He left it on 29th September; encamped at Begunia the next day, where he was informed that the Marathas had left the town and were encamped about two miles to the south. He marched on and gave the Marathas, consisting of 500 foot, a surprise attack on 1st October. After a short resistance the Marathas abandoned their position. Fifteen or twenty of them were killed or wounded. Five were taken prisoner.[64]

By the time he reached Damnagar, he received news that between 2,000 and 3,000 Marathas had assembled at Suranga. The country there was covered with jungles and had a road generally no more than a narrow defile. With a small detachment, he was not prepared to risk a

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59 27 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 224.

60 Henry Tanner, Captain 24th, *Bengal Native Infantry*.

61 17 September, 1803, Tanner to Morgan, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 225.

62 Charles Slye, Captain 28th, *Bengal Native Infantry*.

63 28 September, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 226.

64 30 September, 1803, Slye to Morgan, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 228.

fight. He wrote to Morgan for reinforcements;[65] in response to his letter, Ensign Scot, at the command of a company passing through Begunia, joined him;[66] the combined forces now took possession of Suranga; the Marathas left it and fled towards Bhadrak.[67]

At Suranga one of the sepoys belonging to the British detachment informed Slye that Maratha forces to the number of 2,000 horse and foot were collected a place called Jajpur about fourteen coss towards the south and situated on the bank of a large *nala* which was there fordable. Slye desired some verification of this news. So he sent Chait Singh and Baku Singh, two sepoys of his detachment in the disguise of *fakirs* to Jajpur.[68] They returned with the news that the forces amounted to 500 well-mounted horse and 600 irregular foot. They also added that they heard from the Maratha camp that a force consisting of 10,000 men under Raghunath Bakhshi was on his way from Nagpur and within a few days' march from Cuttack. The Raja of Athgarh was proposing to send soldiers to assist the Marathas; some zamindars and rich people were in league with them to oppose the British.[69] But at the news of the advance of the British force under Harcourt from the south, Marathas at Jajpur and on the north of the river Mahanadi fell back towards the river in the direction of the fort of Barabati. So Slye had no further encounter with the Marathas.[70]

Thirdly an attack was planned from Midnapur; so a force was ordered to be ready at Jaleswar under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson.[71] Soon he was

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65 *Ibid.*

66 2 October, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 228.

67 3 October, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 231.

68 6 October, 1803, Slye to Ferguson, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 198.

69 9 October, 1803, Slye to Ferguson, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 202.

70 9 October, 1803, Ferguson to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 199.

71 Archibald Ferguson, Colonel, 24, *Bengal Native Infantry.*

joined by a detachment from the Governor General's bodyguard, with guns, tumbrils, ammunition, draught, carriage, cattle and so on.[72] He was instructed to have correspondence with the commanding officer at Cuttack, not to interrupt the pilgrims going to the temple of Jagannath, and to be very conciliatary to the inhabitants of Orissa when he passed the Maratha frontier. The object of sending this detachment was first to drive out the Marathas from the immediate frontier of Bengal and the country between Balasore and Jaleswar and secondly to remove all obstacles on the way from Jaleswar to Cuttack and to reinforce the main force under Harcourt.[73]

As soon as Ferguson received the intelligence of Morgan's possession of the town of Balasore, he moved in that direction to reach the place "within the shortest period of of time". But owing to rain and bad weather his progress was hampered.[74] In consequence of the attack of the force under Morgan at Balasore, the Marathas stationed at the ghats between Jaleswar and Balasore had fled.[75] So Ferguson without receiving any opposition from the Marathas arrived at Balasore. He left it on 10th October on his way to Cuttack. By the time he reached Suranga, he received the news of fall of the Barabati. His detachment finally reached Cuttack without opposition.[76]

Fourthly, a plan was made for an immediate occupation of the Maratha territory on the north-east of the Subarnarekha which chiefly consisted of Pataspur, Shahbandur, Kamarda, Bhograi, Rajichand and Kirchand because they were long desired by the British for a natural boundary between Bengal and Orissa. Therefore Colonel

72 17 September, 1803, Ferguson to Government. *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 177.

73 5 September, 1803, Government to Ferguson, Add. M.S.S. 13,608, No. 87, pp. 90-2.

74 28 September, 1803, Ferguson to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 195.

75 26 September, 1803, Grant to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 258.

76 7 December, 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 149.

Fenwick[77] commanding at Midnapur was directed to take measures for that purpose.[78]

It was apprehended that the Marathas with the help of the powerful zamindars on the border might make incursions into the Company's territory. Therefore Fenwick was instructed to encourage the zamindars on the frontier to oppose such an attack; similar instructions were also given to T. H. Ernst, the acting Magistrate at Midnapur.[79] Sumitra Dei, the Rani of Mayurbhanj, had lands both in the Maratha and in the Company's territories. As a tenant of the Company, she was in arrears to the extent of Rs. 1,600 owing to losses, she had sustained from inundations during the last two years. Now the payment of these arrears was suspended by the order of the Governor General.[80] Similar friendly intercourse was maintained with Jagannath Dhall of Dholbhum and other zamindars.[81] Ernst, by a proclamation, offered the protection of the Company to such of the zamindars as might choose to become its subjects.[82] Accordingly most of the zamindars in the Maratha territories either sought this protection or showed a more submissive attitude. But Ramanand Bhuyan of Jamukunda, who had for some years created disturbances in Company's land remained adamant. Raghunath Paikara Bhuyan, another zamindar of Kirchand who on many previous occasions had plundered the British territory was also not ready to listen to the British proclamation. Rather he preferred to be secure in his

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77 John Fenwick, Colonel, 5th *Bengal Native Infantry.*

78 16 July, 1803, Government to Fenwick, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1803, No. 180; 5 September, 1803, Government to Fenwick, Add. M.S.S. 13,608, pp. 82-3.

79 8 September, 1803, Ernst to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 November, 1803, No. 118; 17 September, 1803, Government to Ernst, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 November, 1803, No. 19.

80 16 July, 1803, Government to Fenwick, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1803, No. 18C.

81 17 September, 1803, Government to Board of Revenue, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 November, 1803, No. 120; 8 September, 1803, Ernst to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 November, 1803, No. 118.

82 17 September, 1803, Government to Ernst, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 November, 1803, No. 119; 28 September, Government to Ernst, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 November, 1803, No. 123.

fort, which was said by Ernst to be "the strongest on the southern frontier."[83]

On 23 September, 1803, by order of Fenwick, Captain Lamb of the 5th regiment, at the head of a detachment proceeded to the parganas Pataspur, Kamarda, Shahbandar and Bhograi, to establish the police *Daroghas* and *tahsildars* appointed by Ernst.[84] Being frightened at the approach of the British force, Ramanand Bhuyan surrendered to Lamb who made him prisoner and sent him to Midnapur. His forts were destroyed.[85]

Another detachment under Lieutenant Cooper, was sent against Raghunath Paikara. All that belonged to him on both sides of the Subarnarekha was soon occupied. The bamboo fences surrounding the forts were burnt. The mud forts were at once delivered up. But Raghunath Paikara managed to retire with a few attendants into the thickest part of the jungle.[86]

The whole of the Maratha territories on the north-east of the Subarnarekha was soon brought under British rule.

Thus the total number of troops employed for the conquest of Orissa amounted to 4,916 men. Out of this number some 3,041 constituted the main force which marched from Ganjam and 500 men under Dick reinforced the main force later; 521 including 21 artillery men formed a party under Morgan to occupy Balasore; 854 were ready at Jaleswar with a view to move whenever it would be necessary; 1,300 were stationed at Midnapur in order to render assistance to troops at Balasore and Jaleswar.[87]

In consequence of the attack and march of the British troops from different sides whatever Marathas were found

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83 8 September, 1803, Ernst to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 November, 1803, No. 118.

84 24 September, 1803, Fenwick to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 144.

85 4 November, 1803, Ernst to Fenwick, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1803, No. 41; 17 November, 1803, Government to Ernst, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1803, No. 42.

86 *Ibid.*

87 *Bengal......Papers relative to the Maratha War* in 1803, p. 244.

in the country fled away in fear. After the fall of the fort of Barabati, a party of the Marathas under Balaji Kunar, consisting of 200 horse and 300 foot, retreated towards Barmul Pass.[88] Major Forbes, at the head of a detachment was sent to chase them;[89] but they evaded him. He occupied the Barmul pass, and the entrance of the Marathas to Cuttack was closed. Now a commanding position was available to him to watch the behaviour of the hill Rajas in the vicinity. As this station was unhealthy, it was arranged that the garrison of 500 men would be relieved from Cuttack every fortnight.[90]

After securing possession of the country, the British stationed troops near the passes and at different strategic places to maintain order and prevent Maratha raids from any direction. First a force consisting of 1,000 men exclusive of the Europeans was stationed on the 'island' of Cuttack of which 300 formed the garrison for Lalbag, to be relieved weekly from the principal strength in Barabati. Secondly, the post established at Manikpatna was reinforced. Thirdly, it was arranged to maintain a regular force at Jagannath. Fourthly, a force of 300 men with a field six-pounder was placed at Pipli. Fifthly, the post established at Suranga was abolished, a force of 300 to 400 men stationed at Jajpur and Bhadrak. Sixthly, a post nearly of the same strength was established at Balasore. Seventhly, a strong detachment was stationed at Kendrapara, which commanded the most material points towards the sea, in order to check the Raja of Kujang and some subordinate chiefs in that part of the country.[91]

After completing these security measures, Harcourt posted the 9th Madras Native Infantry in the fort of Barabati. This consisted of about 450 men. Shiva Prasad's

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88 *Encl.*, 24 March, 1804, M. S. Elphinstone, *Resident at Nagpur* to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 21 June, 1804, No. 53.

89 18 October, 1803, Harcourt to Forbes, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 87.

90 29 October, 1803, *Harcourt to Shawe*, Add. M.S.S. 13,609, p. 137.

91 3 December, 1803, Morgan to Government, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 244; 7 December, 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1803, No. 249; 29 October, 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add.

irregular corps gave him 100 more. To it, he wished to add 400 or 500 Europeans, 140 troopers with gallopers, four six-pounders and two howitzers. With a force thus formed, he planned to proceed direct to Sonpur. From that place, he wished to march along the Sambalpur route to secure the possession of Ratanpur and the valuable district of Chhatisgarh, because he thought their acquisition would afford security to the whole of the possessions of the British Government from Banaras to Ganjam. In fact this was not done, because peace was established shortly afterwards.[92]

On 30 November, 1803. Jaswanta Rao Ramchandar, an ambassador of the Raja of Berar met Arthur Wellesley at a conference at Deogan for the conclusion of peace. In course of discussions on various points Arthur Wellesley said that he would require the province of Cuttack to be connected by a convenient frontier with the Company's other territories. The *vakil* made no objection except to the point that "Jagannath was his (Raja's) own Pagoda, he was desirous to retain it, that his honour was involved in this point." Arthur Wellesley replied that the whole province of Cuttack was absolutely necessary, that the Company had long been desirous to obtain this province in order that there might not be any break in communications between Calcutta and Madras and to take only half of it, or to allow the Raja to take half of it, would entirely defeat that great object.[93] The *vakil* was now convinced on this point. The treaties were prepared during the night of 16 December, 1803. They were signed on 17th by both Arthur Wellesley and Jaswant Rao Ramachandar. The British occupation of Orissa was confirmed.[94]

M.S.S. 13,609, pp. 162-70.

92 1 December, 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. M.S.S. 13609, pp. 217-8.

93 *Home Miscellaneous*, Vol. 623, pp. 86, 103.

94 *Ibid.*, p. 111; Proclamation, 9 January, 1804, *Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence* (trans.), Letters sent, 1804, No. 1.

CHAPTER V

ADMINISTRATION AND GENERAL CONDITION

Some aspects of administration and society.

Orissa under the Marathas was divided into two political divisions, one of which was distinguished by the name of Garjat and the other by that of Mughalbandi. These united possessions were bounded by sea on the east, the Maratha province of Chhatisgarh on the west, the Chilka lake and Ganjam district on the south and the districts, Jaleswar and Midnapur and Birbhum on the north;[1] more than one-third of the country was covered with jungles.[2]

The Garjat was held by 24 tributary chieftains.[3]

The Raja of Khurda was the descendant of the royal family of Orissa. He was most powerful of all the chiefs. He continued to exercise the regal privilege of conferring titles on the inhabitants of Mughalbandi and Garjat countries, which was never objected to by the Marathas. It is said that no title granted by the Maratha Government was considered to confer any distinction in Orissa until confirmed by the Raja of Khurda.[4] Nearly the whole of Khurda which from the days of its rule under the native princes was parcelled out into *jagirs* continued so during the Maratha government. The holders of the *jagirs* known as *jagirdars* were bound by the terms of their tenure to perform certain services about the person and the court of the Raja. They were required to pay a light quit rent in

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1 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 41.

2 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 April, 1804, No. 13.

3 They were the possessors of "Khurda, Kanika with Kirwa and Koel Dip, Nikhuria, Dashapalla with Mohanpur, Khandapara, Narasinghpur, Dhenkanal, Ranapur, Bunagur, Talcher, Baramba, Mayerbhanj, Nilgiri, Angul, Hindol, Athgarh, Marichpur, Harishpur, Bishenpur, Kujang and Pattia;" *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 42 A.

4 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 14,189, p. 1.

kauris denominated *tanki* or provided certain amount of grains, cloth, etc. for the table, ward robe or household expenditure. A very numerous and important class of the *jagirdars,* who were of course, the hereditary chiefs of the military of the country were *Dalabeheras*. Next subordinate to them were *Dalais*. Every estate, they possessed had a principal garh or fortress of brick, stone or mud to which was attached a band of paiks, a native hereditary militia. These *paiks* were trained in the use of arms, such as bows, arrows, swords and also matchlocks: they were always ready to follow the command of their hereditary chiefs.[5]

The *paiks* held lands from the *jagirdars* on lowest terms; in ordinary times, they appear to have been employed in agricultural labour as common *raiyats*.[6]

More or less similar type of feudal government, however liable to variation in detail from local peculiarities existed in all other feudatory states of Orissa.

These tributary chiefs were intermediate superiors between the Maratha government and the tenants of the soil; they were paying a stipulated light quit rent either in money or in kind. While a smaller state like Nilgiri paid an annual tribute of 30,000 rupees,[7] a comparative bigger state like Mayurbhanj was paying a tribute of Rs. 6,000.[8] No tribute was paid by the Raja of Dashapalla in consideration of the Raja supplying free of cost all the timber annually required at Puri for the cars of Lord Jagannath.[9] It appears that there was perhaps no definite principle for collecting tribute from the feudatory chiefs.

The Maratha government acted as an umpire in case of boundary disputes between two chieftains. In 1775 A.D. Padmanava Deva Birabar Mangaraj Mahapatra was ruler

5 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 14,189, pp. 88-95; *Ibid.*, Vol. 587, No. 14,190, pp. 291-300.
6 *Ibid.*
7 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 6.
8 *Selections from official letters and records relating to the history of Mayurbhanj* (to be abbreviated as Selections from official letters ......Mayurbhanj), Vol. I, Letter, No. 241.
9 *Orissa Tributary States, Bengal Gazetteer*, p. 159.

of Baramba. His state was invaded by the Raja of Narasinghpur; two important forts of Kharod and Ratapat fell into his hands. The Raja of Baramba in his distress appealed to the Maratha government which settled the boundary disputes between the contesting parties by restoring Kharod and Ratapat to the Raja of Baramba. Another example may be given here. Once there arose a dispute for the possession of Jormuha between the Raja of Angul and the Raja of Dashapalla. Raghuji Bhonsla was intimated this matter; he settled the dispute by granting a *sanad* for the contested place in favour of the Raja of Dashapalla.[10]

The Maratha government seldom interfered in the internal administration of the feudatory chiefs. But in case of lunacy or inability to rule a chief was occasionally replaced by another suitable person chosen from the same family. Birakishore Deva, the Raja of Khurda, went mad[11] and beheaded his two sons, Jagannath Rao and Balavadra Rao. In view of such violence committed by the Raja, the Maratha government deposed him from the *gaddi* (throne), confined him in the fort of Barabati and raised Divyasinha Deva, son of Jagannath Rao to the throne.[12]

Being secure in their forts, most of which were surrounded by dense jungles and confident of their strength to resist any attack, many of the feudatory chiefs were often irregular in payment of tribute or occasionally showed a spirit of insubordination to the supreme government in Orissa. During the Mughal rule, particularly in the beginning of the reign of Aurangzeb most of the tributary chiefs of Orissa refused to pay tribute and even declared war against Khan-i-Dauran, the Governor of Orissa. The Mughal Governor took the trouble of leading a series of campaigns to suppress the chiefs the most important of whom were the Rajas of Khurda, Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, Narasinghpur and Nilgiri.[13] Such instances were not rare

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30, 159.
11 A. Mahanty (ed.), *Madalapanji*, p. 79.
12 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 585, No. 14,185, p. 250; A. Mahanty (ed.), *Madalapanji*, p. 18.
13 J. Sarkar, *Studies in Mughal India*, pp. 205-14.

during the Maratha rule. During the time of the dismissal of Sheo Bhatt Sathe (in 1764) from the subahdari of Orissa, the Raja of Dhenkanal murdered Buli Khan, an adopted son of Sheo Bhatt and seized his horses and effects. At the same time the Raja of Nilgiri with another chief plundered the inhabitants of some parts of Balasore. Bhaskar Pandit, the former *faujdar* of Balasore, who fell into arrears, was asked by the Governor of Orissa to make payment. The Raja of Nilgiri offered Bhaskar Pandit protection; he also took the latter away with his effects.[14]

In the middle of 1769 Jai Narain, the Raja of Dhenkanal wrote to Muhammad Riza Khan, *Naib Nazim* of Bengal, appointed by the British. "His country has been plundered by the Marathas. Sambhaji Ganesh, who is staying at Jajpur has rebelled against Raja Januji. Consequently the Raja's people have come from the Deccan to summon him to Nagpur. The whole country from Balasore to Cuttack is undefended and Sambhuji has design to loot it. Should a letter of encouragement be sent to the writer, he will stay in his country with a satisfied heart. Sends to Murshidabad his brother, who will relate all particulars to the Khan.[15]" In 1781 the Raja stopped the payment of tribute and rebelled against the Maratha government. Chimna Sau with a large force marched to suppress the rebellion.[16]

During the rule of Sheo Bhatt Sathe, the Maratha Governor of Orissa, Narayan Deo, the zamindar of Kimedi, a descendant of the royal family of Orissa, put his claim on the throne of Khurda and invaded it. Birakishore Deva, the Raja of Khurda, in his distress, sought the help of the Marathas, which was granted to him on condition of a payment of one lakh of rupees.[17] The Raja of Kimedi was driven out of Khurda. But Birakishore Deva was unable to pay off the money bargained for; he first evaded the payment and afterwards was forced to surrender to the Marathas, the *parganas* of Lembai,

[14] C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 2,484.
[15] C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 1,483.
[16] *Bengal Political Consultations*, 29 January, 1781.
[17] *Bengal Political Consultations*, 4 December, 1759.

Rahang, Purushottam Chattar, *i.e.* the country lying between the Daya river, the Chilka lake and the sea together with the tribute of fourteen *khandaits* of the hills subject to his control.[18] Thus took place the dismemberment of the territory of Khurda. Even the management of the temple of Jagannath, a privilege which was so long enjoyed by the Raja from a very ancient time was taken away from his hands to be placed under the Maratha government; the Raja was allowed only a pension from the Subahdars of Orissa. These matters so much annoyed the Raja that he was once attempting to invade Puri with his army and was trying to obtain five hundred Telingas and provisions from the Chief of Ganjam for purposes of war. It is only on the representation of Raja Ram Pandit, the Maratha Governor of Orissa to the Governor General at Bengal that the chief of Ganjam was dissuaded from helping the Raja, who ultimately met with a failure[19] in his efforts in this direction.

The Raja of Mayurbhanj whose country extended over the northern border of Orissa was found occasionally guilty of non-payment of tributes and of instigating rebels against the Marathas.[20] His disloyalty to the Maratha government is evident from a letter written by G. Vansittart an English Officer at Midnapur to the Governor in Bengal, which said that Damodar Bhanj, the Raja of Mayurbhanj "is desirous of shaking off the yoke of the Morattas and becoming a dependent of the English and that his country is so advantageously situated, that with a very little assistance from us, he would at any time be able to prevent the Morattas from entering into Bengal from the southward."[21] On 28 February, 1769 Vansittart in another letter to Governor says, "If authentic intelligence (about Maratha invasion) should hereafter arrive........ would you choose that I should enter into a negotiation with the Mohrbunge Raja and engage our protection for his support? I have reason to believe that he would be

18 A. B. Mohanty (ed.), *Madalapanji*, p. 79.
19 *C.P.C.*, Vol. V, No. 1,224.
20 *Selections from official letters....Mayurbhanj*, Vol. I, letter, No. 7.
21 *Ibid.*, Letter, No. 20.

glad of such an opportunity to shake off the Moratta yoke and the position of this country would in case of Moratta troubles render it extremely convenient to us."[22]

The Raja of Kujang was habituated in plundering vessels wrecked on the coast and thus acquired vast wealth and he was paying little attention to the orders of the Maratha Subahdar of Orissa asking him to refrain from such practices.[23]

Briefly speaking the Rajas of Khurda, Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, Kujang, Kanika, Dhenkanal, Talcher, Hindol and Angul were troublesome while the rest of the feudatory states were either under full control or more submissive than the others.[24]

Mughalbandi comprised the plain and open part of the country which extended from the Subarnarekha to the border of Khurda and was actually in possession of the government as the royal domain and paid a regular assessment.[25] It was the policy of the Maratha government to destroy as far as practicable the smaller *garhs* owned by the zamindars in this part, if they created any trouble at all.[26]

Mughalbandi was divided into 150 *parganas* under the management of 32 *Amils*. Each *pargana* was generally sub-divided into two, three, four or more of *mahals* or allotments.[27]

The *Amil* or the Revenue Commissioner was responsible for the revenue assessed in his division entrusted to his

22 *Ibid*., Letter, No. 26.
23 *C. P. C.*, Vol. V, No. 314; *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 April, 1804, No. 13.
24 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 April, 1804, No. 13.
25 *Ibid*., 1st March, 1804, No. 41.
26 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 14,189, p. 96.
27 *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 1 August, 1822, No. 5, 15 October, 1821 Stirling to Government. A. Stirling was an assistant to the Commissioners for affairs at Cuttack, soon after its conquest by the British. He later on served as Secretary to the Commissioners at Cuttack till the year 1822, when he left the province to take charge of the Persian Department at the Presidency. He had access to all state papers delivered to the British by Gopal Pandit and Narayan Rao Mahashay, two Maratha officers; he ably helped the Commissioner, who submitted the first report on the Maratha administration to the authority at Bengal. He submitted the minutes to the government which was published as Stirling's minutes in 1882.

charge. Under him were a number of hereditary revenue collectors, who were generally termed as *Chaudhuris, Kanungoes,* or *Talukdars,* each in charge of a *taluka* or sub-division.[28]

The *Talukdars* collected revenue from the *raiyats* of *Pahikasht* villages and through the *Mukaddams* from the *Mukaddami* ones. They were required to keep the *raiyats* happy, prosperous and contented. In case of oppression over them, they were punished. For example, Magun Chaudhuri, who, owing to his oppressive conduct caused the *raiyats* to abscond was removed from office; another man named Narayan Chhotaray was given in his place, the office of zamindari of *pargana* Culguri with Kuthmul.[29]

In return of the services, they rendered to the State, the *Amils* as well as the *Talukdars* were given rent-free lands known as *Nankar* as remuneration and were allowed on adjustment of accounts certain perquisites and deductions of account on expenses of collection.[30] For example, the *Chaudhuris and Kanungoes, Talukdars* of *pargana* Jhankar with *Sadar jama, sicca* rupees 9,293 enjoyed the deduction of 5,000 *kahans* (*kauris*) as zamindari *kharch* or *Rusum* from a *sanad* granted by Mania Bapu, uncle of Raghuji Bhonsla.[31]

The *Mukaddams* also enjoyed some hereditary right of office and received a portion of land as *Nankar* known as *Pitrali* or patrimonial property.[32]

The Marathas respected neither zamindari or *Mukaddami* tenures when it was considered suitable for them to collect direct from the cultivators of the soil. During the governorship of Rajaram Pandit, many hereditary *Chaudhuris* and *Kanungos,* i.e. *Talukdars* of Mughalbandi were dismissed and rents were collected direct from the *raiyats* or through the heads of the villages.[33] For example, the

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28 *Ibid.*
29 *Ibid.*
30 *Board's Collections,* Vol. 586, No. 14,189, p. 300.
31 A. Stirling. *An Account of Orissa Proper,* Appendix p. XXXVIII.
32 *Board's Collections,* Vol. 586, No. 14,189, p. 300.
33 *Ibid.*

Raja of Patia-Sarangagarh had *pargana* Saibir *Sadar Jama* Rs. 13,900) as a zamindari which was conferred on him by a minister of Akbar. He was dispossessed of it and allowed by the Marathas a penson and certain rent-free villages for the purpose of collecting revenue from the heads of the villages.[34]

It is said that the Maratha landholders scarcely had proprietary rights in their estates. The right which was generally recognised by the Maratha government was that the legal course of descent was seldom altered and interrupted. Every transfer of land, however, was attended with difficulties and expenses. The legal heir could not obtain the estate of his ancestors without paying a fine. But the payments made by the heir were not regulated by any fixed principles. A fine was exacted for every transfer of property whether it came up from the operation of law or from the act of the landholders; this formed the part of the revenue of the government.[35]

A settlement known as *Hustabud* settlement was yearly made; the amount accruing therefrom was duly reported to the government. The demand of the government was based on the amount of land actually under cultivation.[36]

The gross collection of land revenue of Orissa of the last twelve years of the Maratha rule including that from the tributary states shows that the revenue of the last four years was higher than that of preceding years rising up to 15,00,000 rupees of sorts.[37] It is difficult to give any satisfactory reason for such an increase. One point which may go for a little augmentation of the whole revenue was an increase in the revenue of the *parganas*, Pataspur, Kamardachaur, and Bhograi, during this time under peculiar circumstances. The zamindars of these *parganas* on various pretences were exacting money from the landholders, who paid their revenue through them. That amount was more

34 A. Stirling, *An Account of Orissa Proper*, Appendix, p. XI; p. 93.
35 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1803, No. 45.
36 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 14,189, p. 300.
37 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 14,189, pp. 182-3.

than what the zamindars paid to the officers of the government. The landholders in a body went to Cuttack. They represented to the Subahdar of Orissa that the zamindars' estates were capable of paying a larger revenue than ever received them; they were willing to pay to the government more than the government had so far received from them through the zamindars. The Subahdar was satisfied that the lands would very well bear the increase; so he passed an order in presence of both the parties for an increase of *sicca* Rs. 20,000 in the revenue to be paid to the government.[38]

If we take the average of the last twelve years' gross collection it comes to about 13,90,000 rupees of sorts.[39]

The country being watered by a large number of rivers was occasionally subject to violent inundations which resulted in crop-failure leading to scarcity and famine.[40] The government constructed embankments at those places where banks were specially low in order to guard against spill of the rivers during flood. One of them constructed at the mouth of river Subarnarekha did immense good to the people.[41] But the measures taken were not adequate to ward off such calamities from the country. During the outbreak of a famine in 1769-70 rice was so dear that it was to be had for two seers per rupee. In 1182 Amali (1775 A. D.) another dreadful scarcity of grains was experienced at Cuttack. Rice was hardly to be purchased in the *bazar* of Cuttack at 10 *pans* (*kauris*) for Cuttack seer. In the *Muffasil* paddy rose as high as 12 *pans* per *gaun*. Considering its destructive effect a remission of seven lakhs of rupees was granted from the revenue of that year.[42] It was a general practice with the government, to grant deduction of revenue from the *raiyats* and so also from the zamindars, in the event of sudden inundation, excessive rain, drought

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38 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 29 December, 1804, No. 45.
39 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 1,489, pp. 182-3.
40 *C. P. C.*, Vol. VIII, No. 1,018.
41 *Bengal District Gazetteer*, Balasore (Cal. 1907), p. 111.
42 A. Stirling, *An Account of Orissa Proper*, p. 93.

or other calamities.[43] The government also made provisions for giving *takavi* advances to the cultivators.[44]

Besides land revenue, the pilgrim tax was adding to the source of income of the country. There were only two inlets to the town and the temple of Jagannath and these were on the high road lying from the north to the south of India which passed through the province. The southern inlet was close to the town while the northern one was within a distance of less than a mile. The Maratha government appointed some officers and guards where the tax was collected. The amount of collection annually made from the pilgrims at these outlets is estimated to have ranged from 2½ to 5 lakhs of rupees.[45]

In the pre-Maratha period weaving industries flourished in various parts of the country most important of which were at Hariharpur, Balasore and Soro. At Hariharpur alone about three thousand weavers were engaged in manufacturing cloth of all sorts which were exported to the foreign countries.[46] Calicoes of Balasore and Soro were much appreciated particularly by the merchants of England and France. The profitable trade which brought a good deal of money to the country had met its gradual decline during Maratha rule chiefly because of the decline of the English, Dutch and Danish factories which were patronising the weaving industries for purposes of trade. Yet the weavers as a class continued their business and made good profits.[47]

Paddy was much cultivated and was cheaply available to be exported to Bengal[48] and to Madras through the small ports of Golrah, Harishpur, Bishenpur and Manikpatna at Chilka,[49] the export being greater to Madras than to Bengal.

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43 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 14,187, p. 24.
44 *Fifth Report from the Select Com.*, p. 435.
45 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*—1 March, 1804, No. 16; *In Orme's Manuscripts*, the fees collected by the Marathas from the pilgrims have been stated to be three lakhs; Orme's M.S.S. India Vol. 18, p. 5,120.
46 Wilson, *Early Annals of the English in Bengal* (London 1895), Vol. I., p. 15.
47 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, pp. 52-53.
48 J. Long (ed.), *Selections from Unpublished Records*, p. 538.
49 *Board's Collections*, Vol. 587, No. 14,190, p. 193; Orme M.S.S. India, Vol. XV, p. 1,133.

Salt was manufactured in plenty along the sea coast of Orissa; it was available very cheaply at four and a half maunds per Arcot rupee at the place of manufacture.[50] The amount of salt exported to Berar was three lakh maunds per annum.[51] The whole amount of salt exported to Bengal is not known. The British Company was in the habit of importing salt from Orissa at the average rate of 68,269 maunds per annum during a period of ten years prior to the British conquest.[52] From a statement made by Rajaram Pandit, the Maratha Governor of Orissa, it appears that the income of the Maratha government from the salt sold in Bengal amounted to two lakhs of rupees per annum.[53]

A flourishing trade existed between Cuttack and the regions, west of Orissa. Contillo (Collo) was an important centre of trade. Merchants of Berar and inland parts of India (Hindustan) brought cotton and other goods to this place where they met the traders of the coast. While returning, after the sale of their commodities, they were loaded with salt manufactured in the *Aurangs* in Chilka.[54] The duty upon salt, exported from the *Aurangs* in Chilka lake into the Western regions, alone amounted to Rs. 4,500 in *kauris*.[55] The extensiveness of the above trade may be understood from the following example.[56]

Sambhu Bharti was a *Mahajan* of Cuttack who had *kothis* (salt *golas*) in different parts of the territories of the Raja of Khurda and stood security to pay Khurda-Raja's *peshkash* to Maratha government to 10,000 rupees on condition of being permitted to carry on his commerce duty-free.

50 *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 17 July, 1818, No. 15, 13 May, 1818, Ewer to Government.

51 *Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations*, 5 September, 1805, No. 26, *Encl.*, 4 May, 1804, Government to Melville and Harcourt. Add M.S.S. 13,611, p. 57, no date. August, 1865, Melville and Harcourt to Government.

52 *Bengal Salt and Opium Consultations*, 26 December, 1817, No. 3, 9 December, 1817, Board of Trade to Government.

53 C. P. C., Vol. VI, No. 1,242.

54 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 21.

55 *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 17 July, 1818, No. 15, 13 May, 1818, Ewer to Government.

56 *Ibid.*

The following information is available to form an idea of the total revenue of the state. According to Forster's account Cuttack produced 17 lakhs of rupees out of which 7 lakhs were deducted for military expenses at Cuttack and the rest was sent to the Nagpur treasury.[57] Rennell (in 1793 A.D.) says "the sum of his (Mudoji's) revenue is variously stated. Some have reckoned his part of Berar (Nagpur territories) at 84 lakhs of rupees per annum and Cuttack at 24, etc."[58] Leckie says "he (Rajaram, the Maratha Governor of Orissa) pays the Raja of Nagpur 10 lakhs of rupees out of the collections which is estimated at 22 lakhs including what is sent from Balasore."[59] In a letter on 29 December, 1780 Rajaram Pandit writes to Beniram Pandit, "the army requires for its maintenance for lakhs rupees a month at this rate the expenses of six months amount to 25 *sicca* lakhs) whereas the collections of Cuttack for the whole year do not exceed 20 lakhs."[60] According to Orme's M.S.S., the whole revenue of the country amounted from 20 lakhs to 25 lakhs rupees.[61]

Forster's account shows the lowest figure while the statements of Rennell, Leckie and Orme's M.S.S. put the collections at a higher rate. The statement made by Rajaram Pandit perhaps tends to show the normal income of the country. In view of the conflicting opinions given by various authorities the only thing that can be generalised is that while the normal income of the country did not exceed 20 lakhs of rupees, at times, the amount rose to the maximum amount of 25 lakhs of rupees at the time of prosperity.

In the absence of suitable bridges over the rivers for effectually opening a communication and intercourse between one part of the country with the other, the general improvements of roads and ferries received the special attention of the Maratha government. The Marathas

57 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 2 May, 1788, Appendix.
58 J. Rennell, *Memoir of a map of Hindustan*, pp. Cxxix, Cxxxi
59 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 55.
60 *C. P. C.*, Vol. V, No. 2,069.
61 Orme M.S.S. India, Vol. 18, p. 5,119.

granted *jagirs* for the support of ferries most important of which were at the rivers Mahanadi and Kathjuri. The lands granted for the maintenance of the ferry at the river Mahanadi amounted to 12 battis or 240 bighas while the grant for the support of the ferry at the river Kathjuri was 10 *battis* or 200 bighas. The persons who accepted the grants were bound to keep boats for the public purpose; such boats were provided by the owners themselves. The troops, the public officers and stores were crossed without toll but the grantees enjoyed the liberty of accepting reasonable toll for the carriage of other men and cattle. E. Watson, Judge of Circuit Court says, "Under the grants thus assigned by the Maratha government, the ferries flourished by far the best I ever saw in any part of India, they were decked and capable of carrying several elephants, carriages and *palanquins* together; they must have been built at a considerable cost and kept up at a very great expense. All the purpose of a ferry as a common high way amply and fully assured under this arrangement." If the grantees did not discharge their duties to the satisfaction of the public, the punishment which was inflicted on them was to confiscate some of the lands secured by them.[62]

The Subahdar of the province was at the head of both civil and military administration with his headquarters at Cuttack. Under him was a *kiladar* in the charge of the fort of Barabati with a reserve which was composed of musketeers, horse and foot. The number of the forces stationed at the fort of Barabati was not the same at all times. By the time Lackie travelled through the country the forces consisted of 1,000 Maratha and 150 Sikh horsemen and 500 irregular foot.[63] From the information given by an Englishman who visited Cuttack in the latter part of the eighteenth century the garrison composed of 300 musketeers and 20 or 30 horse.[64]

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62 *Board's Collections*, No. 14,178, pp. 239-241.

63 *Early European Travellers in the Nagpur Territories*, p. 2.

64 Orme India M.S.S., Vol. 18, p. 5,119. This is an information given by an English man, who visited Cuttack in the latter part of the 18th Century; the name is not mentioned in M.S.S.

Under the control of the Subahdar there were a number of military stations each under the charge of a *faujdar* with some horse and foot. There were some *chaukis* under him; each of them consisted of a *thanadar* with some men. Garrisons were placed in some parts of the country, one of them was in charge of a *faujdar* commanding the fort of Aurangabad.[65] A party of thirty-six horse and five hundred foot was usually stationed at Balasore. A strong Maratha station at Fulwar ghat guarded the entrance of the town of Balasore. Some other important military stations that may be mentioned here were at Soro, Padmapur and Jajpur on the southern side of the river Brahmani.[66] According to Forster the number of cavalry stationed in Orissa numbered 2,000.[67] It appears that when the British attacked Orissa the military strength was increased. 1,000 matchlockmen at the command of a Marátha chief were stationed at Guzur ghat, Narasinghpur, Ramachandrapur and Kathipur in Mayurbhanj. One detachment consisting of 3,000 cavalry and infantry, under the command of Balaji took post on the north bank of the Mahanadi to fight against the British. An army of about 5,000 infantry marched towards Manikpatna for the same purpose.[68]

The *faujdar* enjoyed both military and civil authority. He looked to the general order and discipline of his division watched the movements of the strangers, supervised trade and collection of duties on grains and other commodities on the way.[69] Particularly the *faujdar* of Balasore exercised his power over a large area, collected revenue from the tributary states of Nilgiri and Mayurbhanj and remitted it to Cuttack.[70] He checked the disturbances in

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65 *Early European Travellers in the Nagpur Territories*, pp. 3, 14.
66 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, pp. 4, 8-12.
67 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 2 May, 1788—Appendix.
68 Add. M.S.S. 13,609, pp. 43-5 (a report from Bhagaban *Naik* Kotwal of the Company's factory at Balasore, no date); *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 56, *Encl.*, 24 September, 1803, Ferguson to Government.
69 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, No. 827; *T.P.R.*, Received 1792, No. 303; *T.P.R.*, Issued 1792, No. 312.
70 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 52.

the frontier[71] and also suppressed the rebellion in the neighbouring feudatory states.[72]

The *faujdars* were given lands as their remuneration.[73] The *sanads* granted to the zamindars required them to attend the *faujdars* with the contingent of *paiks* on all occasions for subduing refractory subjects.[74]

The *Amil* was empowered to investigate and try both civil and criminal cases. Minor cases were settled by the zamindar in his revenue jurisdiction or when referred to by the Amil. The popular mode of disposing of cases was to refer them to arbitration. Harcourt, the British Commissioner of Cuttack, observed, "even in felonies as in civil disputes all was arranged by compromise." The court of arbitration or *Panchayat* generally consisted of five members chosen by the parties themselves or by the officer to whom the matter was referred. More heinous crimes were brought before the Subahdar of Cuttack.[75]

There was no distinction between civil and criminal cases. Proceedings were simple. Ewer wrote "all proceedings were summary, no written deposition taken and no form of trial observed." He was of opinion that the Oriya could "make his complaint heard without a prospect of incurring a loss neither of time and money." Justice was available quickly. Ewer also thought that under the Maratha government. "Heinous offences were exceedingly rare."[76]

Generally the time-old customs were followed in determining the nature of punishment. A person committing a petty offence like stealing firewood was often punished with a small fine.[77] For serious offences the offender was gene-

71 C. P. C., Vol. VI, No. 556.
72 C. P. C., Vol. I, No. 1,763.
73 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 12.
74 A. Stirling, *An Account of Orissa Proper*. Appendix, p. XI.
75 *Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations*, L. P. 28 April. 1818, No. 37, 27 February, 1818, Ewer to Government; Add. M.S.S. 13,610, p. 223, 22 March, 1805, Harcourt to Shawe.
76 *Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations*, L.P. 28 April. 1818, No. 37, 27 February, 1818, Ewer to Government.
77 *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, January-April, 1791, pp. 626-7 (Resolution of Government).

rally imprisoned or mutilated.[78] In default of human evidence the *Panchayat* sometimes resorted to trial by ordeal like holding a red-hot iron or putting a hand in boiling ghee.[79]

The *Amil* was responsible to the government for maintaining law and order in his revenue jurisdiction. The zamindars or other revenue officers exercised police powers under the *Amil*.. The *khandaits* were responsible for maintaining law and order under the zamindars. One of their chief duties was to seize offenders and produce them before the zamindar. Under the *khandait* were a number of *chaukidars*.[80]

During the Muslim period the worship of Lord Jagannath could not be performed with security because of the occasional raid of the Muslims over Hindu gods. The priests of the temple of Jagannath often removed the idol of Jagannath to a place of safety very often towards the south in fear of its being dishonoured at the hands of the Muslims.[81] But the Marathas, being Hindus were much interested in encouraging the worship of Hindu gods. The government introduced the practice of paying annually 20,000 *kahans* or *kauris* (about Rs. 6,000) for charitable

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78 C.P.C., Vol. V, No. 1,977.

79 *Bengal Revenue Consultations*—January-April, 1791, pp. 626-7 (Resolutions of Government).

A person was once accused of theft and brought under confinement by the zamindars of Dhi Bhograi. As he insisted on his innocence an ordeal was arranged in presence of a panchayat in the following manner.

The accused was brought to a place where the Thakur (God) was situated; and axe having weight of five seers was made red hot in fire and seven leaves of Pipal tree together with seven threads of silk were tied to it. The iron smith took it up with his song and placed it on the hand of the accused; in front were drawn seven lines on the ground at the termination of which was placed a sheaf of grass. The accused then took the axe in his hand, walked over the seven lines and threw it on the grass according to the instruction of some Brahmins.

The Ordeal of ghee was performed in the following way. Ghee was put to flame; when it was too hot a ring was placed in it which the accused was to take out in his hand. If his hand did not burn he was declared not guilty. All the above ordeals were to be performed according to Sastra (Scripture).

80 *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, August, 1822, 15 October, 1821; Stirling to Government.

81 J. Sarkar. *Studies of Aurangzeb's Reign*. p. 247; Riyaz (Eng. Tr.), p. 303; A. B. Mahanty (ed.), *Madalapanji*, pp. 65-7, 76.

purposes. This charity on the part of the government was known as Annachhatra. The money was paid chiefly to the following types of persons by monthly instalments.[82]

Some amount was given to the Brahmins, who were in charge of 32 *Thakurs* or idols and were also in charge of religious ceremonies connected with their worship. A certain amount of money was spent for persons most of whom were old widows while the rest was expended for giving cooked food and clothes to the poor travellers. Money was also granted to mosques for their maintenance. Kadam Rasul alone was given a monthly grant of about Rs. 73.[83]

Brahmins were sometimes given lands as rewards and *Gosains* were occasionally given money for pilgrimage. When Motiger Summer and other *Gosains* came to Cuttack in the rains in 1784 for the performance of religious ceremony at the temple of Jagannath, they were given one lakh of rupees in charity by Rajaram Pandit, the Governor of Orissa, by the instruction of Mudoji Bhonsla to that purpose.[84]

Particularly the worship of Jagannath and the management of the temple received the special attention of the Maratha government. In order to add to the prosperity of this religious institution every encouragement was shown to the pilgrims intending to visit the temple by readily issuing pass-ports for this purpose and often requesting the government of other States to issue the same in the interest of the pilgrims.[85] As a result, pilgrims from all parts of India particularly from Bengal, Banaras, Rajputana and central province came in large number to visit Jagannath.[86] Assignment of lands to the temple of Jagannath by the religious people was common. For example, in 1773 A. D. Raja Raj Narain, zamindar of Kashijora in Midnapur

82 Letter, Dt. 28-2-1847 from Gouldesburg, Commissioner at Cuttack to Secretary, Government of Bengal, regarding history of Annachhatra fund file in the Record Room of Board of Revenue, Cuttack, Orissa.
83 *Ibid.*
84 C. P. C., Vol. VII, No. 38.
85 C. P. C., Vol. VII, Nos. 371, 861.
86 C. P. C., Vol. IV, Nos. 1,094, 1,104, 1,224, 1,367, 1,395, 1,473, 1,591; Vol. V, Nos. 10, 604, 1,247, 1,386; Vol. VI, 927; Vol. VII, 188, 189.

assigned 960 bighas of land in the village of Purusottampur for *Bhog* (offering) to Jagannath in the name of Govinda Das a representative of *Mahant* Sukdeo Das of the temple of Jagannath.[87] Another example may be given here. The Rajas of Nagpur and Khurda assigned the annual assessment of certain villages, which amounted to the large sum of k. 1,48,373 g.9 k.8 (in *kauris*) to provide Jagannath with *Bhog*.[88]

Brahmachari Gosain, a Maratha *guru*, got prepared one statue of goddess Lakshmi in gold and another statue of Narayan Deva in silver. He placed the former on the left side of Jagannath on the throne; the latter was kept in the southern chamber. The temple was white-washed; many presents were made to Jagannath.[89] Offerings of an elephant, cloths and jewels to Jagannath were also made by Chimnaji Sau during his visit to Puri.[90]

Formerly the Raja of Khurda was the Superintendent of the temple of Jagannath. He was removed from this office during the rule of Sheo Bhatt Sathe. Then the temple was brought under the direct administration of the Marathas. A person was appointed on behalf of the government for the management of land rents attached to the temple and for the general superintendence of receipts and disbursements. He also acted as the controlling authority regarding the regular discharge of the respective duties of the officers attached to the temple.[91]

Whatever offerings were given by the pilgrims to the priests and officers of the temple while they were inside the temple were utilised for the maintenance of the temple. At the annual celebration of two particular festivals the extra expense incurred by the government amounted from 30 to 40 thousand rupees annually.[92]

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87 C.P.C., Vol. VII, No. 1,428; Vol. VIII, No. 142.

88 Letter, 10 June, 1805 from C. Groeme, Collector, Jagannath Revenue Department to Thomas Fortesque, Secretary to Commissioner for affairs of Cuttack, Vol. II, Issue II, 1805—Orissa National Archives, Bhubaneswar, Orissa.

89 A. B. Mahanty (ed.), *Madalapanji*, p. 81.

90 C.P.C., Vol. V, No. 1,950.

91 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1 March, 1804, No. 16.

92 *Ibid.*

All persons working in the temple of Jagannath were the servants of the Maratha government; all disputes in respect of duties of the *Sebaks* were to be referred to that government for final decision. The offices of the *Sebaks* were ordinarily hereditary. But sometimes some of the offices of the *Sebaks* could be purchased by payment to the Government. For example, Gopabandhu Mahapatra once went to the Raja of Nagpur from the Court of Raja Birakishore Deva of Khurda. He purchased the office of Chhatisa Niyoga Naik in the temple of Jagannath; so he was given a state *palanquin* with golden pots, one pair of *shawls, turbans,* an ornamented umbrella, *chauri,* fan of peacock's feather and two torches to be used in the procession.[93]

The Maratha government was not in favour of effecting any change in the time-old custom of the worship of Lord Jagannath. Once an attempt was made under the leadership of Lakshman Nath Krishna Goswami, a disciple of Sankaracharya, to place one *idol* on the jewelled throne of Lord Jagannath. In consequence of the dispute arising between the Vaishnavapanthis and Sankaracharyapanthis, the saint and the chief of the order of Srikhetra stopped worshipping Jagannath. He sent a Vaishnav to Raja of Nagpur to launch a protest. As a result, Lakshmana Nath Krishna Goswami was warned not to introduce anything new and asked to pay due regard to the old practice and to create confidence in the head of the order, so that he would continue the worship of Jagannath.[94]

Puri, the seat of the temple of Jagannath for long saw the rise of a number of religious institutions or monastic houses which were known as *Maths*. The object of establishing these *Maths* was to feed the beggars and ascetics and to give religious instructions to their disciples. So they received generally encouragement from the Maratha government, either by occasional grant of lands or some privileges. The abot of Sri Ram Das or Dakhin Parusa *Math* was the *guru* (preceptor) of the Maratha Governor of Orissa. He made rich endowments of land, etc. to this

93 P. R. Letter No. 1 from *Chhatisa Niyog Naik* family at Puri.
94 Letter No. 245 (*A document preserved in Orissa National Archives*).

Math. Another *Math* known as Uttar Parusa *Math* was granted by Raghuji Bhonsla, a rent-free estate known as Kodhar. The revenue of the estate was to be devoted to the expenses of *Mohan Bhog* of Jagannath.[95] Braja Deva Goswami, a preacher of Chaitanya cult had a *Math* at Puri; he was exempted from paying any tax for all the goods, he brought from the Garjats for the religious purpose.[96] The government also took interest in assisting some heads of the *Maths* for recovering money and property belonging to Jagannath, which were outside Orissa.[97]

With the advent of the Marathas in the country a new type of nobility developed. That class of people rose into prominence owing to the grace and favour of the Maratha Subahdar. They strengthened the hold of the Maratha government over this country.

Rich men or the people of higher status used horses and mares for dignity and fashion to cover distance at an age when there were no modern vehicles. People on horseback were looked upon with respect by the people of lower status. The higher class people who had some property or power were generally allowed to enjoy some exclusive rights over the others in the state. One of them was the use of *palanquin;* only big Maratha officers, kings and zamindars were authorised to use *palanquins* while the people of lower status were forbidden to do so.[98]

It was a general custom in the country that if a person desired an interview with a superior officer or a person of very high status, he should not approach him emptyhanded. He had to make presents as befitting to the status or rank of the person interviewed. Such presents were known as *nazarana.* If a respected foreigner had to interview a Maratha officer exchange of presents was also not uncommon. All the Subahdars of Orissa, who went to Nagpur had to make presents to the Raja; similarly all the people in Orissa, who sought interviews with the Subahdar

95 *Bengal District Gazetteer,* Puri, Vol. XIII (Cal. 1908), pp. 122, 270.
96 *Journal of Kalinga Historical Research Society,* Vol. I, September, 1946, No. 2, pp. 138-42.
97 *T. P. R.,* Received 1794, No. 153.
98 *C. P. C.,* Vol. V, Nos. 1,977, 2,070.

had to make like presents. Such practices were also not unknown in the feudatory states of Orissa where the kings interviewed were formally offered presents.[99]

Generally the hosts entertained their guests at their houses by requesting them to sit on the mat spread for that purpose; but in case of rich ones, they were seated on cloth spread on a carpet.[100] It was a usual practice that the guests were offered *pan* and *attar* as soon as they took their seats. In the like manner after the ceremony of the distribution of *pan* and *attar* was over the company broke up.[101]

Hunting was a favourite pastime with the higher section of the people. Orissa was considered as a natural zoological garden for its rich store of various animals. Sometimes there was demand from the neighbouring states for supply of some animals such as the lion.[102]

Pan was commonly chewed by the people; people of higher status smoked *tobacco*;[103] *opium* was also taken by many.[104]

Music and dance received patronage from the kings and the rich people. Dancing boys appeared in public to show their performances in royal ceremonies. Dancing girls also amused the kings and nobles by their dancing performances. Most of the songs sung by the dancing boys or girls related to the achievements of Vishnu in his several incarnations.[105]

There were story-tellers who could amuse the people by their interesting stories.[106]

People believed in superstitions. If a man suffered from fever occasionally five or six men held the patient in a sitting *posture* while the physician spoke some enchanted

99 *C. P. C.*, Vol. VIII, 620.
100 *Early English Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 56.
101 *Ibid; C. P. C.*, Vol. VIII, No. 630; *C. P. C.*, Vol. V, No. 1,977.
102 *C. P. C.*, Vol. V, No. 1,978.
103 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 13.
104 *Ibid.*, p. 5; H. R. Ghosal, *Economic Transaction in Bengal Residency*, p. 127.
105 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, pp. 39-40.
106 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

words with blowing at his face at short intervals. Sometimes a burning substance such as a horse's hoof was held before him so that all the smoke could go up his nostrils.[107]

At Bhadrak weary pilgrims, who slept in the mango groves woke up often stark naked being robbed under the influence of an intoxicating preparation put into their noses in order to make them senseless. Such things were generally attributed to some supernatural power.[108]

Due examination of documents including the religious grants reveals that three types of languages were used in them. Both Persian and Maratha languages were used in Court and public offices. Most of the records found in the Orissa government Archives or in private custody of some old families of Orissa are written either in Persian or in Marathi or in both. Others are of trilingual character being in Marathi, Persian and Oriya.

People used commonly quill pens and ink prepared locally to write chiefly on country-made papers.[109]

The time-old practice of writing on bundle of palm leaves with the iron pen continued during the Maratha period. Paper was hardly used by the common man for his purpose. It was considered that palm leaves would last longer than the papers written over. So poems composed, translations made from Sanskrit works, and accounts kept, were recorded in the palm leaves. While voluminous works appear to have been written on palm leaves during the Maratha period, yet palm leaves received scant regard from the Maratha government to be used for official purposes.[110]

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[107] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[108] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[109] G. B. Toynbee, *A Sketch of the History of Orissa*, p. 70.
[110] *Ibid.*

Communication in Orissa during Maratha Rule

In the Orissa of the eighteenth century, there was no want of communication along roads and rivers for the purposes of travel and mercantile traffic. The country was intersected by a number of roads. The main routes of land travel and water routes for commercial purposes were clearly defined. Cuttack being situated on the river Mahanadi and occupying a strategic point served the purpose of a connecting link between Bengal, Madras and Nagpur. Because it was on the only road between Bengal and Northern Sarkars, the possession of this city and its dependencies gave the Berar Raja more consequence in the eyes of the Bengal government than ever his extensive *domain* in other parts of India.[1]

The well-known road that connected Bengal with Cuttack ran through Midnapur, Jaleswar, Busta, Ramchandrapur, Balasore, Soro, Bhadrak, Damnagar, Burwa, Arakpur and Padmapur.[2] This was not only the route that was usually taken up by most of the pilgrims from Northern India to proceed towards Puri but this was the same route that was frequently used for the march of army from Bengal to Cuttack. Raja Man Singh in his Orissa campaign of 1591-92 marched from Bengal and crossing the river Subarnarekha at Benapur or Malnapur came to Cuttack through Jaleswar and Bhadrak.[3] During the rule of Aurangzeb, Khan-i-Dauran in his campaign (1660-1663) against the recalcitrant chiefs of Orissa followed the same route as far as Cuttack, as he passed from Midnapur via Jaleswar to Balasore from where, he marched to Cuttack through Bhadrak.[4] The same road was also taken by Motte in his march to Sambhalpur in 1766 and Elliot and Leckie towards Nagpur through Cuttack in 1778 and 1790 respectively.

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1 James Rennell, *Memoir of a map of Hindustan or the Mughal Empire*, p. CXXX.

2 *Ibid.*

3 J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 208.

4 J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 227.

There was a regular road from Cuttack to Nagpur. It passed through Banki, Baideswar, Padmavati, Contillo, Belpara, Barmul, Baud, Sonpur, Sarangagarh, Mohra, Ratanpur, Maro, Lanji, Tirora and Tharsa to Nagpur that was followed by the party led by Elliot in 1778. After the death of Elliot at Sarangagarh, Campbell and Anderson proceeded to their destination from that place. Although Leckie followed the same route from Cuttack as far as Sonpur, from Sonpur he took up a shorter route to Nagpur. Leckie writes at Sonpur, "We struck off the usual road to Nagpur which is by Sambalpur and Sarangagarh, to go to Borasamber district which is shorter by six stages than the former." The route he followed passed through Bank Berja, Lachhinpur, Mursund, Salebhatta, Surangapur, Borasamber, Surmul, Kansebera, Khultary, Balasoura, Raipur and Ratanpur to Nagpur.

There were two roads from Nagpur to Sambalpur. The lower road that passed through Raipur pointed out the course and navigable part of the Mahanadi. The upper road ran through Dumdah and Sarangapur. The road crossed the Mahanadi near the conflux of the Hutfu river which was also navigable to Dungong.[5] The road from Nagpur towards Cuttack was bifurcated at Sarangapur one leading to Sambalpur and the other to Sonpur.[6]

It appears that the Marathas did not follow one particular route from Nagpur for making incursions into the heart of Orissa or into Bengal through Orissa; but being well acquainted with the forest-clad and hill-bound region of western border of Orissa, they followed probably any of the routes referred to above according to their convenience. In 1745 Raghuji Bhonsla wrote to Vaidya that he entered Orissa leaving Sambalpur on the left and reached Cuttack.[7] It cannot be definitely said whether he used the route through Raipur, Borasamber, Surangapur, Sonpur and Barmul to Cuttack as was followed by Leckie in 1790

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5 James Rennell, *Memoir of a map of Hindustan or the Mughal Empire*, pp. 160-61.
6 *Ibid.*, p. 162.
7 *Vaidya Daftar*, Vol. IV, 12 May, 1745, No. 22.

or that from Raipur which passed through Fuljhar to Belpara and at that place crossing the river Mahanadi went through Narasinghpur, Baramba, Tigiria, and Athgarh to Cuttack.[8] It is also not ascertained what route was taken up by Bhaskar Pandit. As regards his march from Cuttack to Panchet it appears that he selected the direct route through the hill tracts of eastern Keonjhar and western Mayurbhanj and Singhbhum and Manbhum districts as Badshahi road was followed by Aliwardi Khan on his way back to Murshidabad from Cuttack.[9]

That a road connected Manbhum with Sambalpur which ran to Nagpur is evident from the fact that on 10 April, 1743 when Raghuji Bhonsla heard of the two allies (Aliwardi and the Peshwa) advancing against him he decamped from Katwah and then as he passed through Manbhum and took the road to Sambalpur, the Peshwa gave up the chase.[10]

There were two other routes from Cuttack to Nagpur which were not frequently used. People desirous of going to Nagpur had to proceed from the neighbourhood of Cuttack through the 'desert' of Surguja. From Surguja they had to pass through Chutia to Amarakantak where the Narmada emerges. From that place one had to find the route to Bundelkhand and Chhatarpur towards Nagpur. Another route passed through Sonpur to Bhojpur and leaving Sambalpur on the left it ran to Chhotanagpur and from that place to Amarakantak and on to Bundelkhand and Chhatarpur towards Nagpur. These routes were suggested by Mudoji Bhonsla to the Governor of Bengal when James Anderson and Captain Campbell were to go to Nagpur by way of Cuttack.[11]

There was no safe and direct road from Bengal to Nagpur through Midnapur and Mayurbhanj. The British were very eager to establish *dak* from Bengal to Nagpur

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8 *Indian Historical Records Commission*—24th Session, Jaipur, 1948, p. 115; *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 62.
9 *Indian Historical Records Commission*—24th Session, Jaipur, 1948, p. 117.
10 J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 459.
11 *C. P. C.*, Vol. V, No. 1,088.

by way of Midnapur and Mayurbhanj and asked the opinion of the Raja of Nagpur in this respect. But as the road was difficult and unsafe the British were advised to prefer the route by way of Cuttack, though longer to those dangerous ways.[12]

Cuttack not only connected Bengal with Nagpur but it is through Cuttack that Bengal-Cuttack road passed to Madras through Puri and Ganjam. Travellers coming either from northern India on Badshahi road or from Central India through Barmul pass to Cuttack had to cross through the Kathjuri and to go through Balianta and Pipli to visit Jagannath at Puri. Raja Man Singh in his Orissa Campaign of 1592 marched from Cuttack through the same well-known route to Puri.[13]

The road from Cuttack to Puri was only the continuation of the Bengal-Cuttack road through Balianta, Balakati and Pipli and further ran through Ganjam to Madras. Colonel Thomas Pearse while marching from Bengal to Madras in 1781 came as far as Cuttack on the Badshahi road and from Cuttack he followed the same route towards Puri as was followed by Raja Man Singh, with the exception that instead of going to Balianta, he lost the way and halted at Telingapet.[14] From Puri he proceeded to Ganjam through Manikpatna, Narasinghpatna, Mithakua, Malud and Prayagi. From Ganjam he passed through Ichhapuram, Burgun, Tickeli Kalingapatam, Chicacole and Vizagapatam towards Madras. In 1803 Colonel Harcourt who had a campaign against the Marathas in Orissa came from Ganjam and followed the same route as far as Puri as followed by Colonel Pearse.[15] From Puri he went to Cuttack through Ahmedpur, Birapurusottampur, Mukundpur, Pipli, Balakati and Balianta and then crossing the Kathjuri to Cuttack, the same route as taken up by Raja Mansingh and Pearse with a little exception referred to above.

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12 *Ibid.*, No. 1,398.
13 J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 208.
14 *British Indian Military Repository of Bengal Artillery*, Colonel Thomas Pearse, p. 205.
15 W. Thorn, *Memoir of War in India*, pp. 252-257.

During the Maratha rule, there was no direct and regular road, like the present Madras Trunk Road connecting Khurda with Cuttack and Ganjam. The reason for the absence of such a road is that, that part of the country from Khurda to Ganjam was filled with dense forests; communication from Ganjam to Khurda or Khurda to Cuttack was neither easy nor safe nor free from danger. That is why Colonel Pearse and Colonel Cockrell from Bengal went to Madras through Puri and Ganjam and not via Khurda and Ganjam. Prince Shah Jahan falling into the displeasure of queen Nur Jahan fled into the Deccan and being assisted into Orissa through Chhatar Duar pass reached Banapur between Telingana and Orissa.[16] From Banapur he first went to Khurda and then proceeded to Cuttack.[17] Although nothing can be said whether there was an original route over which the present Madras Trunk Road is built, still it appears, that there was some route connecting Banapur and Khurda, to whatever extent it was an unsafe and difficult one.

Khurda being the capital of the territory of the Raja of Khurda, who was also the superintendent of the temple of Jagannath at Puri, had regular communication with Puri. The road that connected Khurda with Puri passed from Khurda crossing the river Daya through Sahajpuri and Kalupara and met Cuttack-Puri Road at Pipli. Khan-i-Dauran the Mughal Viceroy of Orissa (1660-1663) had a campaign against the Raja of Khurda. He marched from Cuttack to Pipli and from that place, he went to Khurda through Kalupada and Sahajpuri.[18] In 1592 Raja Man Singh, broke his way at Pipli and followed the same route as followed by Khan-i-Dauran[19] in order to chastise the Raja of Khurda for his unsubmissive behaviour. The same route from Khurda was also taken up by Ahmad Beg Khan, a Mughal Governor of Orissa, who took

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16 Elliot, Vol. VI, p. 390; Vol. II, p. 307; J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. p. 307

17 J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. II. p. 307.

18 J. Sarkar, *Studies in Aurangzeb's Reign*, p. 230.

19 J. Sarkar (ed.), *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 209.

to flight towards Cuttack at the news of the entering of Shahjahan from the Deccan into Orissa.[20]

Trees on the road gave shelter to travellers. Many of them were planted either by benevolent people or by the State.[21] Rest-houses or halting places were often established here and there on the road by private persons in order to secure the blessing of the travellers.[22] Deserted buildings were often utilised as dwelling houses for the shelter of the travellers. They were just like the *sarais* of the days of Shershah. For example, such a house was at Barabati in Balasore; that was of great utility for the travellers, who passed by land from Midnapur to Balasore or from Calcutta to Madras; the travellers could keep their luggage here, and refreshed themselves till they proceeded on their way to their destination[23] next day. In order to provide water to the travellers, wells or ponds were dug out near the road by the generous people.[24] Arrangements were made to supply provisions to travellers on the way.[25]

In order to facilitate the travel of the travellers and transport of commodities from one place to another over the *nalas* and rivers, bridges were constructed at many places. Motte found a number of bridges when he came over the Badshahi road towards Cuttack. There was a stone bridge of 120 yards long and 10 yards broad over the Kansa Bansa[26] river. There was also a good stone bridge over Tunda *nala* at a little distance from the river Salandi which was, however, broken down by the time when Motte crossed over it. Two miles from Damnagar a bridge was constructed over a *nala* that was able to bear the guns. There was a handsome stone bridge, over the river Lussonea, which was flowing at a distance of about seven miles from Jajpur. "At the extremities of the piers" were "small turrets" and because the bridge was constructed on *marshy*

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20 Beni Prasad, *Jahangir*, p. 320.
21 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 3.
22 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
23 *Bengal Public Consultations*, 10 September, 1798, No. 87.
24 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 8.
25 *Ibid.*, pp. 9.-10.
26 *Ibid.*, p. 8. Sujah Khan is said to have built many bridges over small rivers from Cuttack to Murshidabad. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

ground a stone causeway was carried on at each end of it to some distance. This precaution prevented the bridge from rapid decay. A stone bridge stood near the *nala*, Gulgulla between Alti and Aurangabad in good repair. Leckie crossed a bridge with four centre and corner minarets near village Burwa. Colonel Pearse, while marching on the bank of the Birupa, crossed a *nala* by a five-stone bridge of nine inches.[27]

In absence of railway lines and bus routes of the present day and in those days of isolation letters were sent through runners from one place to another. The runners were divided into two classes, one class known as *tappis* and the other as *kasids*. A *tappi* was a *dak* runner, who covered the distance by foot while a *kasid* was generally a mounted postman.[28]

In the postal transaction it was not possible on the part of the same pair of the *tappis* that started from one place to run direct to their destination without rest on the way. For example, as a matter of practice the pair of *tappis*, who started from Balasore had to stop at Cuttack the next station, at which place they had to entrust the letters to another pair of *tappis* ready to receive them and march on to the next station. Therefore, if there was delay, it was easy for one pair of *tappis* to evade responsibility by throwing the blame on others from whom they received letters. Evading the responsibility was not possible on the part of the mounted postman as he had to cover the whole distance from the starting place to the destination without handing over the charge to any other in the midway. The expenses for the employment of the *kasids* were higher than those of the *tappis*.[29]

The *tappis* and the *kasids* appointed by the Maratha government for its own purpose were paid by it. The *tappis* and *kasids* employed by other governments for their works in Orissa were paid by them. The *tappis* and *kasids* so employed were required to obtain necessary passports

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11, 14, 54.
[28] J. Long, *Selections from Unpublished Records*, p. LII.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. LII. LIII.

from Maratha government of Orissa before they took any route in any part of the country.[30]

The British established a very well-organised postal system from Calcutta to Madras through Orissa. The distance from Calcutta to Jagannath consisted of 37 stages; one stage was fixed within a distance from six to eleven miles. Each stage required three *harkaras* and two other people. The British were so much particular to keep up communication between Bengal and Madras that in 1764, in order to avoid delay in passing letters Marriot was appointed to reside at Balasore, Hope at Cuttack and Moore at Malud. In 1768 William was appointed to superintend *kasids* to be sent to the different factories.[31] The same year *kasid* post was established between Calcutta and Balasore through Midnapur and Jaleswar in place of *tappi* post. Balasore grew an important postal centre between Calcutta and Jagannath; there a postmaster assisted by two *munshis* and four *gharialas* was appointed in order to see that letters could be despatched from one end to the other without any difficulty.[32] The British in Bengal often had to depend on the Marathas in Orissa to send their letters through the runners in order to carry on correspondence with Bombay as that with Madras.[33]

It appears a *dak* usually took about one month from Balasore to Madras, while if there was delay owing to unexpected difficulties it took nearly two months to cover the way.[34]

As the roads and tracks in the jungles were beset with tigers and other ferocious animals, they were to be kept off by lighted torches and harsh notes of the drums. In view of this the runners were furnished with *mashals*, oil, tomtom and pikemen by the zamindars through whose jurisdiction they had to pass according to old custom.[35]

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30 *Ibid.*, No. 774.
31 *Ibid.*, p. L11, No. 780.
32 *Bengal Public Consultations*, 30 April, 1790, No. K.
33 *C.P.C.*, Vol. I, No. 2,275.
34 *Ibid.*, No. 1913.
35 J. Long (ed.), *Selections from Unpublished Records*, No. 780.

Generally the letters were sent through *tappis* or *kasids*. But the Marathas were often engaging the services of *fakirs* to carry letters from one place to another when they apprehended interceptions from the hands of the enemy. To use the *fakirs* as postmen served their purpose in two ways. First, it was safe and not amenable to interception. Secondly it was cheap because by paying only ten or fifteen rupees their services could be utilised.[36]

Roads were a source of income to the State. Two types of taxes were collected on the way from the people coming from outside into Orissa. One was custom duty: the other was pilgrim tax. *Rahdars* (collectors of tolls or transit duties) *Guzarbans* (officers appointed to take tolls both on high roads and ferries) *Mustafizans* (custom peons) were appointed on on the roads and ferries for the purpose of collecting taxes.[37] It is only those who got *dastak* or free passage were exempted from paying the tax. A bullock load of silk was taxed at six rupees and so on in proportion to the bulk and value of load.[38]

Pilgrim tax was collected from the people coming to visit Narasinghpur in Mayurbhanj. Because once the British contested the same right and established a *chauki* at Narasinghpur to levy pilgrim tax at nine annas on every pilgrim, there was a complaint from the Raja of Nagpur that there was a loss to the revenue of the government in Orissa.[39]

Twelve chaukis were established between Rajghat and Balasore. They were entrusted with the duty of collecting money from the pilgrims going to the temple of Jagannath. Pilgrims going to the Jagannath from the Deccan were ordinarily asked to pay six rupees and those of Bengal ten rupees.[40]

The travellers were also required to pay duties to the zamindars or feudatory chiefs through the jurisdiction of

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36 C. P. C., Vol. II, No. 1,671.
37 C. P. C., Vol. VI, No. 495; Vol. VII, No. 232.
38 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 56.
39 C. P. C., Vol. IX, Nos. 1,093, 1,109.
40 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, pp. 3, 56.

whose territories they had to pass. For example, the Raja of Daspalla collected duties from the travellers passing through the 'straits of Barmul.'[41]

In spite of many advantages travellers enjoyed, in moving from one corner of the country to the other, they had to face many difficulties on the way. In the eighteenth century the country was filled with vast jungles in which tigers, bears and other ferocious wild beasts including lions were found.[42] The roads passing through the jungle lands were often visited by such wild beasts. The roads were not free from the nuisance of robbers and thieves. Robbers and thieves were numerous at Bhadrak. Pilgrims were often robbed at this place.[43] The robbers were so daring that the baggages of the British army under Colonel Pearse marching towards Madras were once plundered. Mudoji Bhonsla once complained that during the time of Hastings a sum of Rs. 22,000 sent by the brokers of Cuttack to Murshidabad was looted and taken away in the midst of journey at Bhadrak.[44] Motte wrote that at Bhadrak when the weary pilgrims went to sleep they woke up stark-naked. This was because the people of this part applied some intoxicating preparations into the nostrils of the sleepers and when they went senseless their belongings were stolen away.[45]

Robbers were often found in the hill tracts from Kome river to Borasambar. At times plunderers were cutting off *daks* at Jajpur. At Barmul pass if the travellers did not pay any presents to the mountaineers, they very often felled the tree on the narrow way and forced the travellers to purchase assistance from them.[46]

Orissa could be reached by three main water routes. Northern part of Orissa was accessible by the ports of Pipli on the Subarnarekha and Balasore on the Barabalang

41 *Ibid.*, 23; A. Stirling, *An Account of Orissa Proper*, p. XXVIII.
42 C.P.C., Vol. V, 1978.
43 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, pp 10, 15, 30, 53.
44 C.P.C., Vol. VI, No. 1,242, Vol. VII, No. 522.
45 *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p 10.
46 *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 53; Colonel Pearse, *Indian Military Repository of Bengal Artillery*, p. 207.

while sloops with stores could come to Cuttack by a circuitous route from the Dhamra river via Pattamundai.[47] Particularly in the rainy season commodities available in the interior could be sent by boats through river to the coast. Salt, dried fish and various other articles available on the shore or Chilka lake were sent through the river Mahanadi towards Sambalpur and Nagpur.

From Balasore there was a regular water route to Bengal. Goods from the interior of Balasore were sent through sea to Bengal. People from Balasore were used to go through this route to Bengal. Sometimes people intending to visit shrines of Jagannath from Calcutta, preferred the direct water route to Puri to the usual land route.[48] It was through this route that a British detachment under Captain Morgan was sent from Calcutta to occupy the port of Balasore.[49] People desirous of going from Ganjam to Puri generally followed the water route from Rambha to Manikpatna.[50]

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47 Toynbee, *History of Orissa*, p. 80.
48 *C. P. C.*, Vol. I, No. 1,375; Vol. II, No. 1,373; S. C. Hill (ed.), Bengal in 1756-57, P. XIV.
49 W. Thorn, *Memoir of War in India*, p. 252.
50 *C. P. C.*, Vol. V, No. 1,222.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Maratha invasion of Orissa started from 1742. It was subject to occasional invasion for nearly a decade. The principal object of the Marathas in plundering Orissa was to put pressure on Aliwardi to pay them *chauth*. They found that the Muslim Governors in Orissa were either weak or disloyal to Aliwardi. So they could easily defeat them and made Orissa a suitable base to launch frequent attack on Bengal. This period generally brought panic to the people. People particularly in the northern part of Orissa suffered from the march of both Maratha and Muslim forces.

This period was over when a treaty was made between Raghuji and Aliwardi. Mir Habib and Mirza Saleh acknowledged the nominal sovereignty of the Nawab of Bengal. They did not act as desired by the Raja of Nagpur. So the former was killed by Januji and the latter was replaced by Sheo Bhatt Sathe. From 1760 to 1803 Governors were appointed direct from the Court of Nagpur. There were six Maratha Governors excluding Mir Habib and Mirza Saleh. The most important of them was Rajaram Pandit who was twice appointed as Governor of Orissa. First time he stayed in the office for about one year and second time fourteen years. His son Sadashiv Rao ruled about 11 years. Both father and son together ruled about 26 years which covered half of the Maratha rule in Orissa. Mir Habib and Babuji Naik's rule covered the shortest period of only two years.

Bhawani Pandit was removed from his office and Sambhaji was appointed in his place because it was considered that the latter would better help the Raja of Nagpur in coming to a settlement with the British in realising *chauth*. Sambhaji died here while ruling. Madhaji Hari was removed from his office as he failed to take necessary steps against the Raja of Kujung who indulged in plun-

dering British ships. Rajaram Pandit was most popular of all Governors; he ruled over Orissa until he died. The Subahdari of Orissa was in the name of Sadashiv Rao when Orissa was occupied by the British. Hunter has made incorrect statement by saying that "every deputy who came to Orissa had ruined himself in order to buy appointment and he well knew that the time allowed him for building his fortunes would be but short."

From 1756 the British were interested in Orissa. The Maratha Governors found it their duty to fight against British diplomacy. The British desired to perpetuate their influence at Cuttack by supporting the Nawab of Bengal. The Raja of Nagpur upset the plan by appointing a Maratha Governor from Nagpur on his behalf. Then the British persuaded the Nawab not to pay the *chauth* usually paid by the Nawab to the Marathas. Therefore the Marathas threatened to plunder Bengal. Particularly during the administration of Warren Hastings, the Raja of Nagpur forced him to pay a large amount of money to him. Afterwards the British persuaded the Marathas to agree to the incorporation of the lands on the north side of the Subarnarekha but the Marathas did not agree to it as they found that the lands were costly and produced more revenue than what would be taken from them by the British on the southern side of the Subarnarekha in return. The British introduced salt monopoly in Bengal. They stopped the sale of salt by the Maratha traders there. But the Marathas managed to smuggle salt into that country. So the British desired to monopolise the sale of salt from Orissa. But the Maratha Government objected to it as that would ruin the business of the people. The British desired the cession of Orissa from the Marathas on payment. So negotiation was carried on. But the Marathas did not agree to the British proposals as the latter did not accept the Maratha proposal of making a defensive alliance an item in the treaty negotiations.

Thus the clash of interest with the Marathas made the British more active to adopt further tactics to weaken the hold of the Maratha government in Orissa for its

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occupation. It was easy to do so because the political atmosphere of the time cast a demoralising influence on the character of the feudatory chiefs. Some of them were found disloyal to the ruling authority. Some were entering into conspiracy against it with outside powers. They themselves were not quite sure as to which side they would support in case there was an open conflict between the Marathas and the British. The general policy of the feudatory chiefs towards this problem will be understood from the statement of one of them, "The Chatta (Umbrella) is always turned that quarter whence the rain proceeds." In other words, the feudatory chiefs were prepared to show loyalty or help those who appeared more powerful to them. By this time the British won some victories in their conflict with some Indian powers. This helped them in successfully bribing some zamindars to their side in the occupation of Orissa. In fact the Raja of Khurda helped the British in fighting the Marathas. The Raja of Mayurbhanj supported the British. This facilitated the march of British forces from both southern and northern sides into the heart of Orissa. Moreover Wellesley made adequate arrangement to attack Maratha forces at both principal places, *i.e.* Balasore and Cuttack. The Marathas were defeated and they fled away. Orissa was brought under the occupation of the British.

The British political supremacy in Bengal reacted on the economic condition of Orissa, which under the Marathas deteriorated in comparison with the previous period. A good amount of capital was coming to Orissa from the sale of salt, grains and other commodities outside at the end of Muslim rule. After occupation of Orissa the Marathas felt that British trade policy adversely affected the economic condition of Orissa. Previously a large amount of salt was sold at Calcutta and other parts of Bengal. But in consequence of the application of salt monopoly there, that remained unsold. Consequently the income of Orissa from sale of salt in Bengal came to a stop except through smuggling.[1]

[1] 13 May, 1818, Ewer to Government, *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 17 July, 1816, No. 15.

Again during Muslim rule a large amount of grains was exported to other parts of India or outside from Orissa through the ports on the north and south part of Orissa Coast. Capital flew in large quantity into the country. During the Maratha rule in Orissa Northern Sarkars fell into the hands of the British; Bengal was also brought under their power. They now discouraged the export of grain from Orissa either to Bengal or Madras. Consequently this trade deteriorated to a very considerable extent.[2]

The European merchants had already occupied the principal ports on the Bay of Bengal. They now controlled the trade on the coasts. The Oriya merchants failed to compete with them. As a result the export trade of Orissa in all other articles as in grains deteriorated considerably.

This situation to some extent made those commodities cheap inside the country. The price of salt was so cheap that it was sold at four and a half maunds for Arcot Rupee at the place of manufacture. The *Beparis* could purchase salt there at the rate of three and half to four annas per maund or less than one *kahan* of *kauris*. Similarly the price of grain was very cheap at many places. For many years a rupee purchased 68 seers of coarse (*usuna*) rice and 48 seers of clean (*arua*) rice at Jajpur. At Lembai, it was still cheaper. A rupee purchased 120 seers of paddy and 80 seers of rice.[3]

Cost of livestock was also cheap. In some years a bullock was sold at the lowest price of only Rs. 7|8|- and a sheep from 12 annas to about 12 annas 6 pies.[4]

Wages were not high. A *palanquin* bearer could be available for only Rs. 3|8|- a month.[5]

Thus in the medieval society low standard of living and cheapness of articles added to the comfort of the

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[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, Vol. II, p. 168.
[5] *Ibid.*

individual; moreover the Maratha revenue system was not harsh to bring misery to the people. It generally respected the time-old custom. Yearly settlements were made. In the event of sudden inundation, excessive rain, drought or other calamities tahsildars were sent to make enquiries at the extent of loss sustained by the *raiyats* and in accordance with the accounts, which they submitted remission was usually allowed to the zamindars. *Taqavis* were also granted to the cultivators. In fact the rate of revenue collected from the people was not higher than that of the British period. The military chiefs with their *paiks* under them were generally allowed to enjoy the service lands. Rent free lands were also enjoyed by many people. *Kauris* were regarded as chief currency in which revenue was collected. That suited the old village community.

It is wrong to say that the Maratha government was regardless of the improvement of the cultivators and oppressed them. On the other hand, it acted as the saviours of the cultivators because in those days the income of the state principally rested on them. All sorts of revenue collectors were specifically instructed to "keep the *raiyats* prosperous and contented." If anybody was found oppressive, he was removed from his office.

Like revenue system, Maratha judicial system was simple. It was not so well organised as that of the British. Yet justice was cheap and could be easily obtained. Proceedings were simple. *Shastras* or time-honoured customs determined the nature of punishment. Sometimes punishment was cruel. Yet such exemplary punishment frightened the people not to indulge in heinous crimes. So "heinous offences were exceedingly rare."

Collection of revenue from the people and administration of justice required the Maratha government to take interest in improving communication. It spent money and took measures in constructing or repairing roads. Embankments were repaired. Generally the zamindars were entrusted with the task. The ferry system was well organised. Big boats at the ferry could easily carry

elephants from one side to the other. This system received warm admiration from some British officers after their occupation of Orissa.

The Marathas contributed most in the field of religion. The period of Maratha rule may be called a period of religious regeneration. During the Muslim rule worship of gods, particularly of Lord Jagannath was occasionally interfered with. But under the Marathas the people were free from such difficulties. The Marathas brought the temple of Jagannath under their direct management. Adequate arrangements were made for its maintenance.

Pilgrim Tax was collected from among the pilgrims visiting Jagannath. A large amount from that source of income was spent in the different festivals. Pilgrims from different parts of India were encouraged to visit them. Under Maratha patronage the reputation of Jagannath spread far and wide. As a result various presents were offered and lands were granted to Him by religious people from several parts of India. Thus the religious institution grew prosperous day by day.

The Marathas opened *Annachhatras* and granted rent free lands to the Brahmins. They offered money to the *sanyasis*. They encouraged *maths* to perform religious festivals by making suitable grants.

In view of the character of the Maratha administration as stated above Stirling's remarks that, "the Administration of the Marathas was fatal to the welfare and prosperity of the country and exhibits a picture of misrule, anarchy, weakness, rapacity and violence combined which makes one wonder how society can have kept together under so calamitous a tyranny" is found incorrect.

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